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THE PROJECT 
 
 
Publication of this Report marks the completion of the third, and 
final, phase of the joint project for the major reform and 
modernisation of land law and conveyancing law which was 
established in late 2003 by the Department of Justice, Equality and 
Law Reform and the Law Reform Commission.  This project is part 
of a larger programme of reform which has as its ultimate goal the 
introduction of a comprehensive system of eConveyancing.  Its 
primary aim is to modernise the substantive law which underpins the 
conveyancing system and, in so doing, to replace the large number of 
pre-1922 statutes, some of which are centuries old, still in force in the 
State. 
 
The first phase of the project involved the screening of the pre-1922 
statutes with a view to identifying those which could be: (i) repealed 
without replacement; (ii) replaced without substantial amendment; 
(iii) replaced with substantial amendment.  It also involved a review 
of the general law.  The second phase comprised a consultation 
process which was initiated by publication in October 2004 of the 
Consultation Paper on Reform and Modernisation of Land Law and 
Conveyancing Law (LRC CP34 – 2004).  That Paper set out the 
results of the first phase and made numerous recommendations with 
respect to repeal and replacement of pre-1922 statutes and reform of 
the general law.  It invited comments and submissions and the 
Department and Commission were pleased to receive those submitted 
by the various individuals and organisations listed in Appendix A.  
The consultation process was also advanced by an all-day Conference 
held at UCD on 25 November 2004, at which various expert speakers, 
including several from overseas, addressed issues raised by the 
Consultation Paper.  The keynote speaker was Professor J C W 
Wylie who had been engaged as the legal researcher with 
responsibility for carrying out the first phase of the project.  Professor 
Wylie, together with members of the Commission and the 
Department also gave a presentation to the Dáil Eireann Joint 
Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence and Women’s Rights on 24 
November 2004. 
 
The third phase of the project has involved the drafting of the 
legislation to implement the recommendations contained in the 
Consultation Paper, taking into account the various comments and 
 x
submissions received from individuals and organisations.  Professor 
Wylie was again engaged to carry out this task, with the assistance of 
Marcus Bourke, former Parliamentary Draftsman.  Further assistance 
was provided by the Commission’s Substantive Law Working Group, 
which is part of the eConveyancing Project.  Its members are: 
 
The Hon Mrs. Justice Catherine McGuinness, President of the 
Law Reform Commission 
Commissioner Patricia T. Rickard-Clarke 
Commissioner Marian Shanley 
Seamus Carroll, Department of Justice, Equality and Law 
Reform 
Vivienne Bradley, Solicitor 
Dr. John Breslin, Barrister-at-Law 
Patrick Fagan, Solicitor 
Chris Hogan, Former Senior Deputy Registrar, Land Registry 
Caroline Kelly, Barrister-at-Law 
Deirdre Morris, Solicitor 
Marjorie Murphy, Solicitor 
Doreen Shivnen, Barrister-at-Law 
 
Detailed comments on the draft Bill were also provided by the Hon. 
Miss Justice Mary Laffoy and Gavin Ralston SC.  The Commission’s 
Legal Researcher who provided much technical assistance in the 
preparation of this Report was Mary Townsend. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. This Report primarily sets out the draft legislation which it is 
recommended should implement the various recommendations set out 
in the October 2004 Consultation Paper (LRC CP34 – 2004).  The 
draft Bill, entitled the Land and Conveyancing Bill 2005, is set out in 
Appendix B to this Report.  This also contains detailed explanatory 
notes to each part and section of the Bill. 
 
2. The following principles were adopted in carrying out the first 
phase of the Joint Project: 
 
(a) updating the law, so as to make it accord with changes in 
society. 
 
(b) promoting simplification of the law and its language, so as 
to render it more easily understood and accessible; 
 
(c) promoting simplification of the conveyancing process, in 
particular the procedures involved, including the taking of 
security over land; 
 
(d) facilitating extension of the registration of title system, with 
a view to promoting a system of title by registration; 
 
(e) keeping in mind the overall aims of the e-Conveyancing 
Project and facilitating introduction of an e-conveyancing 
system as soon as possible. 
 
3. Chapter 1 of this Report contains some further explanation of 
the drafting of the Bill and its contents.  Chapter 2 discusses areas 
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where the Bill does not conform strictly with recommendations in the 
Consultation Paper and explains why this is so. 
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CHAPTER 1 DRAFT LAND AND CONVEYANCING 
BILL 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.01 As recommended by the Consultation Paper, the draft Bill 
seeks to implement two primary objectives: (i) the replacement of all 
pre-1922 legislation relating to land law and conveyancing; (ii) 
reform of the general substantive law which underpins conveyancing 
practice.  To that extent the Bill is essential to the implementation of 
an eConveyancing system. 
 
1.02 The Commission wishes to reiterate that the joint project 
which culminates in publication of this Report is part of the much 
larger eConveyancing Project.  The latter project has other strands, 
which have been referred to as the administrative and procedural 
strands.  These are concerned, respectively, with the operation of the 
various (mostly) public bodies which hold information relating to 
conveyancing transactions (such as local authorities, the Court 
Service, Land Registry and Registry of Deeds) and with the 
conveyancing process.  Much work has still to be completed by the 
Commission in relation to these matters, before specific 
recommendations can be made with respect to eConveyancing. 
 
1.03 Part of that work involves development of a model for 
eConveyancing and at the time of writing the preparation of such a 
model has been put out to tender.  This aspect of the project is 
supported by a grant from the Government’s Information Society 
Fund, which is administered by the Department of the Taoiseach, the 
Department of Finance and Centre for Management and 
Organisational Development. 
 
1.04 Another part of the larger eConveyancing Project has been a 
study of systems being developed in other jurisdictions.  Some of the 
overseas speakers at the November Conference at UCD provided 
information about these. 
 
1.05 Perhaps the greatest problems to be resolved in relation to 
introduction of an eConveyancing system in this State relate to the 
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varying degrees to which public bodies here have become 
computerised.  Some bodies have clearly made considerable advances 
in recent years, but others have a long way to go.  An inevitable 
consequence of this is that it is likely to be some time before a 
universal system of eConveyancing can be introduced. 
 
1.06 The Commission has reached the initial conclusion that a 
comprehensive system of eConveyancing can operate only in respect 
of registered land.  Given that much urban land remains unregistered, 
and, therefore, a high percentage of annual transactions involve 
unregistered conveyancing, the draft Bill has had to take into account 
the likely continuance of a substantial number of such transactions in 
the foreseeable future.   
 
1.07 Introduction of eConveyancing may be facilitated by 
regulation under the Electronic Commerce Act 2000.  This power to 
legislate by statutory instrument is supplemented by section 91 in the 
draft Bill set out in Appendix B.  Provisions for the establishment of a 
Property Registration Authority are contained in the Registration of 
Deeds and Title Bill 2004 which is currently before the Oireachtas 
 
1.08 Finally the following points should be noted with respect to 
the draft Bill.  First, in accordance with the Commission’s Report on 
Statutory Drafting and Interpretation: Plain Language and the Law 
(LRC 61 – 2000), every effort has been made to make its provisions 
as simple, direct and straightforward as possible.  It is not 
insignificant that provisions contained in some 150 pre-1922 statutes 
and involving hundreds of sections, many of which are couched in 
archaic, convoluted and verbose language, have been reduced to less 
than 140 sections and one, albeit necessarily complicated, Schedule in 
the draft Bill.  Most of the sections in the draft Bill are themselves 
relatively short and simple and, where some complexity has crept in, 
it is invariably because the subject matter being dealt with is complex. 
 
1.09 Secondly, in order to assist the understanding of the draft Bill, 
Appendix B includes detailed introductory notes to each Part of the 
draft Bill and explanatory notes to each section.  These cross-refer to 
the recommendations made in the Consultation Paper and, where 
appropriate, explain the derivation of particular provisions and what 
amendments are made to existing pre-1922 statutes.  In addition, the 
side notes to particular sections refer to pre-1922 statutory provisions 
being replaced and to the relevant paragraph in the Consultation 
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Paper containing the recommendation being implemented. 
 
1.10 Thirdly, in furtherance of one of the primary objectives, the 
draft Bill contains a large list of pre-1922 statutes which would be 
repealed with or without replacement provisions in the Bill itself.  
This list is set out in Schedule 1 to the Bill.  Section 8 and that 
Schedule refer also to amendments to be made to existing, mostly 
post-1922, statutes.  Most of the more important amendments are 
made in the body of the Bill, itself, in the appropriate context, ie, in 
the section dealing with the subject-matter in question.  It is 
recognised that it is likely that numerous minor amendments to other 
statutes may be necessary.  The identification of these will require a 
careful checking of the statute book, which will take some time and 
consultation with the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel.  The 
required amendments will be added at a later stage. 
 
1.11 Fourthly, again in the interests of simplicity and 
straightforwardness, the draft Bill deals with the issue of transitional 
provisions in each context where they are relevant, ie, in particular 
sections in the body of the Bill. 
 
1.12 Lastly, the general approach has been taken of making clear 
where the Bill’s provisions would have prospective effect only.  Apart 
from that there is the general rule of interpretation that legislation 
should not be treated as having retrospective effect.  This is 
particularly important in the field of property in view of the protection 
of vested rights conferred by the Constitution.  Attention is also 
drawn to the provisions in the Interpretation Act dealing with the 
operation of repeals of statutes (currently section 21 of the 1937 Act) 
and construction of references to repealed statutes (section 20 of that 
Act). 
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CHAPTER 2 VARIATIONS FROM CONSULTATION 
PAPER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.01 The individuals and organisations responding to the 
Consultation Paper were generally very supportive of its 
recommendations.  The drafting of the Bill to implement its 
recommendations involved, therefore, the making of minor 
adjustments only in the light of this response.  However, other factors 
have resulted in some more substantial variation of what was 
recommended in the Consultation Paper and the ensuing paragraphs 
outline what these were. 
 
2.02 Before doing that, it is important to emphasise one point upon 
which some uncertainty has arisen.  As reiterated in Chapter 1, the 
draft Bill is not concerned primarily, any more than the Consultation 
Paper was, with the introduction of an eConveyancing system.  It is 
an essential first step toward the introduction of eConveyancing.  
Closely linked with this is the point that unregistered land 
conveyancing will continue to apply to a substantial proportion of 
land transactions for some time and the draft Bill has had to be 
drafted with this in mind.   
 
2.03 Chapter 11 of the Consultation Paper recommended 
replacement, with substantial modification, of the old Registration of 
Deeds Acts, dating from 1707.  The draft Bill does not deal with this 
subject because, as anticipated by the Consultation Paper, it is 
covered by Part 2 of the Registration of Deeds and Title Bill 2004 
currently before the Oireachtas.  The Seanad completed its 
consideration of the Bill in June 2005. 
 
2.04 Chapter 12 of the Consultation Paper contained a number of 
recommendations for reform of the law relating to adverse 
possession, based on earlier Reports of the Commission.  Since those 
reports were written the operation of the doctrine has become the 
subject of increasing controversy.  Much of this relates to the extent 
to which it appears to sanction a person who has no claim whatever to 
the land becoming the owner of it, without having to pay any 
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compensation at all to the “paper” owner or even to obtain the 
sanction of a court order.  In England considerable doubts have been 
expressed by some judges as to whether the doctrine is consistent 
with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms.  Different views were expressed at 
various court levels in the case of J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham 
[2002] Ch 676 (High Court), [2001] Ch 804 (Court of Appeal) and 
[2002] 3 All ER 865 (House of Lords).  It is understood that the case 
has now been appealed to the European Court at Strasbourg.  In 
Beaulane Properties Ltd v Palmer [2005] 14 EG 129 (CS) Nicholas 
Strauss QC (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge) ruled that the 
doctrine was incompatible with the protection of peaceful enjoyment 
of property enshrined in Article 1 of the First Protocol to the 
Convention.  The Westminster Parliament introduced substantial 
limitations on the doctrine’s operation with respect to registered land 
in the Land Registration Act 2002. 
 
2.05 The Commission has reconsidered the subject in the light of 
these developments and concerns raised in the Seanad during the 
Second Stage of the Registration of Deeds and Title Bill 2004.  Not 
only has the European Convention been given effect in Irish law by 
the European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003, but there is 
also the protection of private property rights enshrined in Articles 40 
and 43 of the Constitution. 
 
2.06 The Commission has concluded that the doctrine has long 
served an extremely beneficial and useful purpose in land law and 
conveyancing practice, by providing a means, to use the traditional 
language, of “quieting titles”.  Many doubtful titles have been settled 
by conveyancing counsel, and, on occasion, the courts, on the basis of 
the doctrine and thereby land transactions have been greatly 
facilitated.  This useful purpose should be retained and arguably 
comes within the “exceptional” circumstances based on “public 
interest” or “social justice” and “common good” recognised by the 
Convention and the Constitution.  However, it must be recognised 
that on occasion the doctrine may operate unfairly, especially where it 
appears to enable a person, who deliberately sets out to take 
advantage of it, to use it as a means of obtaining ownership of 
someone else’s land without paying any compensation.  The same 
applies where it appears to exact a very severe penalty on a 
landowner (the loss of the land) through a mere oversight or mistake. 
 
 9
2.07 The provisions in the draft Bill designed to deal with the 
doctrine have attempted to draw a distinction between the different 
situations outlined in the previous paragraph.  They allow the doctrine 
to continue to fulfil its role in settling doubtful titles, but exclude its 
operation where it would otherwise operate unfairly.  As an added 
protection, it is provided that in future a person claiming under the 
doctrine should have to validate the claim by obtaining a court order. 
 
2.08 Finally, as again anticipated in the Consultation Paper, several 
of the miscellaneous items of law reform dealt with in Chapter 13 of 
the Paper are not covered by the draft Bill, for several reasons.  Those 
relating to the Land Registry and the Registry of Deeds are dealt with 
by the Registration of Deeds and Title Bill 2004.  Some are concerned 
more with the procedural aspect of conveyancing practice and 
facilitation of eConveyancing (such as matters relating to planning 
and the Family Home Protection Act 1976).  These will be picked up 
as part of the wider eConveyancing project.  Other matters relating to 
post-1922 legislation, such as the Succession Act 1965, are likely to 
be dealt with by separate legislation.  This applies also to matters 
relating to landlord and tenant law, which is the subject of a separate 
major project being undertaken by the Commission. 
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APPENDIX A LIST OF INDIVIDUALS AND 
ORGANISATIONS RESPONDING TO 
CONSULTATION PAPER 
 
Kevin Cahill, Global & Western News Bureau 
Brendan Carroll 
Conveyancing Committee, Law Society of Ireland 
Frances Cooke, Revenue Solicitor 
Niall Gilligan 
Helen Keenan Dunne, Examiner of Titles, Legal Services Division, 
Department of Agriculture and Food 
Irish Institution of Surveyors 
Irish Mortgage Council 
John M. Lannon, BL 
Dr. John Mee, Faculty of Law, University College, Cork 
Ken O’ Carroll 
Terence O’Keeffe, Dublin City Council 
Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland 
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APPENDIX B LAND AND CONVEYANCING BILL 2005
 
 
This draft Bill provides for implementation of the 
recommendations contained in the Consultation Paper 
on Reform and Modernisation of Land Law and 
Conveyancing Law published in October 2004 by the 
Law Reform Commission (LRC CP 34 – 2004).  That 
Paper (“CP”) resulted from a joint project established 
in late 2003 by the Commission and the Department of 
Justice, Equality and Law Reform.  The project was 
part of a larger programme of reform being carried out 
by the Commission, the ultimate goal of which is the 
introduction of an electronic conveyancing 
(eConveyancing) system.  The reform of the 
substantive law which underpins the conveyancing 
system is an essential preliminary step.  An important 
aspect of this reform process, which this Bill 
implements, is the replacement of obsolete and out-
dated pre-1922 legislation.  It provides for the repeal, 
and where necessary, replacement of some 150 such 
statutes. 
 
The draft Bill also provides for modernisation of the 
general law by getting rid of concepts rooted in the 
feudal age and other eras no longer relevant to Irish 
society in the 21st century.  Thus it abolishes the 
system of feudal tenure which is not compatible with 
the relationship between the State and its citizens as 
enshrined in the Constitution.  In addition the Bill 
contains many provisions designed to simplify the law 
and, as a consequence, conveyancing practice.  It is 
not intended, however, to codify the entire law in 
relation to land because it is important that the courts 
should remain free to develop equitable principles 
designed to do justice in particular cases. One of the 
most significant developments in recent decades has 
been the application to disputes over land of equitable 
doctrines like those relating to resulting and 
constructive trusts and proprietary estoppel.  
 14
Although the draft Bill is designed to prepare the 
ground for the introduction of an eConveyancing 
system, it recognises that it will be some time before 
such a system applies to all land transactions.  Its 
introduction is very much dependent upon 
computerisation of information relating to land and 
landowners and extension of the registration of title 
system to all land.  Currently much urban land remains 
unregistered.  The draft Bill reflects the fact that 
traditional conveyancing practice, including that 
relating to unregistered land, will continue for some 
time after the Bill is enacted and comes into force. 
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LAND AND CONVEYANCING BILL 
 
 
ARRANGEMENT OF SECTIONS 
 
PART 1 
 
Preliminary and General 
 
 
Section 
 
1. Short title. 
2. Commencement. 
3. Interpretation generally. 
4. Service of notices. 
5. Regulations and orders. 
6. Offences. 
7. Expenses. 
8.  Repeals and amendments. 
 
 
PART 2 
 
Tenure and Estates 
 
 
9. Abolition of feudal tenure. 
10. Estates in land. 
11. Restrictions on legal estates and interests. 
12. Prohibition of fee farm grants. 
13. Abolition of the fee tail. 
14. Prohibition of leases for lives. 
15. Minor not to own a legal estate. 
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PART 3 
 
Future Interests 
 
 
16. Abolition of various rules. 
17. Scope of section 16. 
18. Operation of future interests in land. 
 
 
PART 4 
 
Trusts of Land 
 
 
19. Trusts of land. 
20. Trustees of land. 
21. Powers of trustees of land. 
22. Overreaching for protection of purchasers. 
23. Resolution of disputes. 
 
 
PART 5 
 
Powers 
 
 
24. Application of Part 5. 
25. Execution of non-testamentary powers of 
appointment. 
26. Release of powers. 
27. Disclaimer of powers. 
28. Validation of appointments. 
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PART 6 
 
Co-Ownership 
 
 
29. Unilateral severance of a joint tenancy. 
30. Amendment of Succession Act 1965, s. 5. 
31. Court orders. 
32. Bodies corporate. 
33. Waste and encroachment on commonages. 
 
 
PART 7 
 
Appurtenant Rights 
 
Chapter 1 
 
Easements and profits à prendre 
 
 
34. Interpretation of Chapter 1. 
35. Abolition of certain methods of prescription. 
36. Acquisition of easements and profits à prendre 
by prescription. 
37. Limited interests. 
38. Incapacity. 
39. Application of sections 35 to 38. 
40. Extinguishment. 
41. Implied grant. 
 
 
Chapter 2 
 
Rentcharges 
 
 
42. Prohibition of certain rentcharges. 
43. Enforcement. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Party structures 
 
 
44. Interpretation of Chapter 3. 
45. Rights of building owner. 
46. Works orders. 
47. Terms and conditions of works orders. 
48. Discharge and modification. 
49. Registration of court orders. 
 
 
Chapter 4 
 
Freehold covenants 
 
 
50. Interpretation of Chapter 4. 
51. Enforceability of freehold covenants. 
52. Discharge and modification. 
53. Registration of court orders. 
 
 
PART 8 
 
Contracts and Conveyances 
 
Chapter 1 
 
 
Contracts relating to land 
 
54. Evidence in writing. 
55. Auctions. 
56. Passing of beneficial interest. 
57. Abolition of Rule in Bain v Fothergill. 
58. Order for return of deposit. 
59. Vendor and purchaser summons. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Title 
 
 
60. Root of title. 
61. Leasehold titles. 
62. Other conditions of sale. 
63. Protection of purchasers. 
64. Fraudulent concealment and falsification. 
65. Notice of rights on common title. 
 
 
Chapter 3 
 
Deeds and their operation 
 
 
66. Conveyances by deed only. 
67. Exceptions to deeds. 
68. Formalities for deeds. 
69. Escrows by corporate bodies. 
70. Conveyance to oneself. 
71. Words of limitation. 
72. Reservations. 
73. Benefit of deeds. 
74. Features and rights conveyed with land. 
75. Supplemental instruments. 
76. Partial releases. 
77. Fraudulent dispositions. 
 
 
Chapter 4 
 
Contents of deeds 
 
 
78. Construction of instruments. 
79. All estate clause. 
80. Receipt in deeds. 
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81. Conditions and covenants not implied. 
82. Covenants for title. 
83. Additional covenants for leasehold 
conveyances. 
84. Scope of sections 82 and 83. 
85. Covenants by or with two or more persons. 
86. Covenants by person jointly with others. 
87. Production and safe custody of documents. 
88. Notices. 
 
 
Chapter 5 
 
General provisions 
 
 
89. Restrictions on constructive notice. 
90. Court orders. 
91. Regulations for Part 8. 
 
 
PART 9 
 
Mortgages 
 
Chapter 1 
 
Creation of mortgages 
 
 
92. Legal mortgages. 
93. Position of mortgagor and mortgagee. 
 
Chapter 2 
 
Powers and rights of mortgagor 
 
 
94. Title documents. 
95. Abolition of right to consolidate. 
96. Transfer in lieu of discharge. 
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97. Court order for sale. 
98. Advances on joint account. 
 
 
Chapter 3 
 
Powers, rights and duties of mortgagee 
 
 
99. Powers and rights generally. 
100. Taking possession. 
101. Abandoned property. 
102. Mortgagee in possession. 
103. Power of sale. 
104. Incidental powers. 
105. Duties in selling. 
106. Conveyance on sale. 
107. Protection of purchaser. 
108. Mortgagee’s receipts. 
109. Application of proceeds of sale. 
110. Appointment of receiver. 
111. Application of income received. 
112. Insurance. 
113. Further advances. 
 
 
Chapter 4 
 
Leases and surrenders 
 
 
114. Leasing powers. 
115. Exercise of leasing powers. 
116. Surrenders. 
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PART 10 
 
Judgment Mortgages 
 
 
117. Interpretation of Part 10. 
118. Registration of judgments. 
119. Registration of lis pendens. 
120. Registration of judgment mortgages. 
121. Company debtor. 
122. Effect of registration. 
123. Discharge of judgment mortgages. 
124. Abolition of power to seize leasehold estate. 
 
 
PART 11 
 
Limitation of actions 
 
 
125. Amendment of s. 17 of the Act of 1957. 
126. Amendment of s. 18 of the Act of 1957. 
127. Amendment of s. 24 of the Act of 1957. 
128. Amendment of s. 32 of the Act of 1957. 
129. Application by adverse possessor for vesting 
order. 
130. Making of vesting order. 
131. Leasehold land. 
132. Liability of tenant. 
133. Mortgaged land. 
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ACTS REFERRED TO 
 
AJA 1707 Administration of Justice Act (Ireland) (6 
Anne, c.10) 
BC(JT)A 1899 Bodies Corporate (Joint Tenancy) Act (62 & 63 
Vict., c.20) 
CA 1789 Commons Act (Ireland) (29 Geo. 3, c.30) 
CA 1791 Commons Act (Ireland) (31 Geo. 3, c.38) 
CA 1634 Conveyancing Act (Ireland) (10 Chas. 1, sess. 
2, c.3)  
CA 1881 Conveyancing Act (44 & 45 Vict., c.41) 
CA 1882 Conveyancing Act (45 & 46 Vict., c.39) 
CA 1911 Conveyancing Act (1 & 2 Geo. 5 c.37) 
IAA 1830 Illusory Appointments Act (11 Geo. 4, & 1 
Will. 4, c.46) 
JMA 1850 Judgment Mortgage (Ireland) Act (13 & 14 
Vict., c.29) 
JMA 1858 Judgment Mortgage (Ireland) Act (21 & 22 
Vict., c.105) 
LPAA 1859 Law of Property Amendment Act (22 & 23 
Vict., c35) 
LPAA 1860 Law of Property Amendment Act (23 & 24 
Vict., c.38) 
PA 1832 Prescription Act (2 & 3 Will. 4, c.71) 
PA 1858 Prescription (Ireland) Act (21 & 22 Vict., c.42) 
PA 1868 Partition Act (31 & 32 Vict., c.40) 
PA 1876 Partition Act (39 & 40 Vict., c.17) 
PAA 1874 Powers of Appointment Act (37 & 38 Vict., 
c.37) 
QE 1290 Quia Emptores (18 Edw. 1, cc.1-2) 
RPA 1845 Real Property Act (8 & 9 Vict., c.106) 
SF 1695 Statute of Frauds (Ireland) (7 Will. 3, c.12) 
SLA 1882 Settled Land Act (45 & 46 Vict., c.38) 
SLAA 1867 Sale of Land by Auction Act (30 & 31 Vict., 
c.48) 
VCA 1893 Voluntary Conveyances Act (56 & 57 Vict., 
c.21) 
VPA 1874 Vendor and Purchaser Act (37 & 38 Vict., 
c.78) 
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Short title. 
 
 
Commence-
ment. 
LAND AND CONVEYANCING BILL 2005 
 
 
BILL 
 
entitled 
 
AN ACT TO REPEAL ENACTMENTS THAT ARE 
OBSOLETE, UNNECESSARY OR OF NO 
BENEFIT IN MODERN CIRCUMSTANCES, AND 
TO PROVIDE FOR THE REFORM AND 
MODERNISATION OF LAND LAW AND 
CONVEYANCING AND FOR RELATED 
MATTERS. 
 
 
BE IT ENACTED BY THE OIREACHTAS AS 
FOLLOWS: 
 
PART 1 
 
PRELIMINARY AND GENERAL 
 
 
1. – This Act may be cited as the Land and 
Conveyancing Act 2005. 
 
2.  – This Act shall come into operation on such day 
or days as the Minister may appoint by order or orders 
either generally or with reference to any particular 
purpose or provision and different days may be so 
appointed for different purposes and different 
provisions. 
 
 
It is envisaged that different Parts of the Act may be 
brought into force at different times, eg, where they 
are linked with other legislation likely to be 
introduced: see the notes to Parts 3 and 4.
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Interpretation 
generally. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. – In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires 
–  
“the Act of 1957” means the Statute of 
Limitations 1957; 
 
“the Act of 1963” means the Companies Act 
1963; 
 
“the Act of 1964” means the Registration of 
Title Act 1964; 
 
“the Act of 1965” means the Succession Act 
1965; 
 
“the Act of 1976” means the Family Home 
Protection Act 1976; 
 
“the Act of 1988” means the Bankruptcy Act 
1988; 
 
“the Act of 1989” means the Building Societies 
Act 1989; 
 
“the Act of 1995” means the Family Law Act 
1995; 
 
“the Act of 1996” means the Family Law 
(Divorce) Act 1996; 
 
“the Act of 2000” means the Planning and 
Development Act 2000; 
 
“the Act of 200-” means the Registration of 
Deed and Titles Act 200-; 
 
“assent” has the meaning assigned to it by 
section 53 of the Act of 1965; 
 
“charge by way of legal mortgage” has the 
meaning assigned to it by section 92(1); 
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“conveyance” includes an appointment, assent, 
assignment, charge, disclaimer, lease, 
mortgage, release, surrender, transfer, vesting 
certificate, vesting declaration, vesting order 
and every other assurance by way of 
instrument except a will; and “convey” shall be 
read accordingly; 
 
“the court” means the High Court and, subject 
to its jurisdictional limits in respect of land, the 
Circuit Court; 
 
“covenant” includes an agreement, a condition, 
reservation and stipulation; 
 
“deed” has the meaning assigned to it by 
section 68(2); 
 
“development” has the meaning assigned to it 
by section 3 of the Act of 2000; 
 
“disposition” includes a conveyance and a 
devise, bequest or appointment of property by 
will and “dispose” shall be read accordingly; 
 
“exempted development” has the meaning 
assigned to it by section 4 of Act of 2000; 
 
“fee farm grant” has the meaning assigned to it 
by section 12(5); 
 
“fee simple estate in possession” has the 
meaning assigned to it by section 11(2); 
 
“freehold covenant” has the meaning assigned 
to it by section 50; 
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“incumbrance” includes an annuity, charge, 
lien, mortgage, portion and trust for securing 
an annual or capital sum; and “incumbrancer” 
shall be read accordingly and includes every 
person entitled to the benefit of an 
incumbrance or to require its payment or 
discharge; 
 
“instrument” includes a deed, will, or other 
document in writing but not a statutory 
provision; 
 
“land” includes –  
 
(a) any estate or interest in or over 
land, whether corporeal or 
incorporeal; 
 
(b) mines, minerals and other 
substances in the substratum 
below the surface, whether or 
not owned in horizontal, vertical 
or other layers apart from the 
surface of the land; 
 
(c) land covered by water; 
 
(d) buildings or structures of any 
kind on the land and the 
airspace previously or to be 
occupied by such buildings or 
structures, and any parts of 
them, whether the division is 
made horizontally, vertically or 
in any other way; 
 
(e) any part of land; 
 
“Land Registry” has the meaning assigned to it 
by section 7 of the Act of 1964; 
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“landlord” includes a lessor where the 
leasehold estate has been created orally; 
 
“lease” as a noun means the instrument 
creating a leasehold estate; and as a verb means 
the granting of a leasehold estate; 
 
“leasehold estate” has the meaning assigned to 
it by section 11(3); 
 
“legal estate” has the meaning assigned to it by 
section 11(1); 
 
“legal interest” has the meaning assigned to it 
by section 11(4); 
 
“lessee” means the person, including a 
sublessee, in whom a leasehold estate is vested; 
 
“lessor” means the person, including a 
sublessor, entitled to the legal estate 
immediately superior to a leasehold estate; 
 
“Minister” means the Minister for Justice, 
Equality and Law Reform; 
 
“mortgage” includes any charge or lien on any 
property for securing money or money’s worth 
and a judgment mortgage; 
 
“mortgagee” includes any person having the 
benefit of a charge or lien and any person 
deriving title to the mortgage under the original 
mortgagee; 
 
“mortgagor” includes any person deriving title 
to the mortgaged land under the original 
mortgagor or entitled to redeem the mortgage; 
 
“notice” includes constructive notice; 
 29
 
“personal representative” means the executor 
or executrix or the administrator or 
administratrix for the time being of a deceased 
person; 
 
“possession” includes the receipt of, or the 
right to receive, rent and profits, if any; 
 
“property” includes all property both real and 
personal and any part of such property; 
 
“purchaser” means an assignee, chargeant, 
grantee, lessee, mortgagee, or other person 
who acquires land for valuable consideration; 
and “purchase” shall be read accordingly; 
 
“registered land” has the meaning assigned to 
it by section 3(1) of the Act of 1964; 
 
“Registry of Deeds” has the meaning assigned 
to it by section 6 of the Act of 200-; 
 
“rent” includes a rent service or a rentcharge, 
or other annual or periodic payment in money 
or money’s worth, reserved or issuing out of or 
charged on land, but does not include interest; 
 
“rentcharge” means any annual or periodic sum 
charged on or issuing out of land, except –  
 
(a) a leasehold rent; or 
 
(b) interest. 
 
“right of entry” has the meaning assigned to it 
by section 11(10)(a); 
 
“right of re-entry” has the meaning assigned to 
it by section 11(10)(b); 
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“strict settlement” has the meaning assigned to 
it by section 19(1)(a); 
 
“sublease” includes a sub-sublease; and 
“sublessee” shall be read accordingly; 
 
“tenant” includes a lessee where the leasehold 
estate has been created orally; 
 
“trust corporation” has the meaning assigned to 
it by section 30(4) of the Act of 1965; 
 
“trust of land” has the meaning assigned to it 
by section 19(1); 
 
“unregistered land” has the meaning assigned 
to it by section 3(1) of the Act of 1964; 
 
“valuable consideration” does not include 
marriage or a nominal consideration in money; 
 
“will” includes codicil. 
 
 
Section 3 contains various definitions of expressions, 
including references to statutes, used in the Bill. 
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Service of 
notices. 
 
8.43 
 
CA 1881, s. 
67 
 
4. – (1) A notice authorised or required to be given or 
served by or under this Act shall, subject to subsection 
(2), be addressed to the person concerned by name and 
may be given to or served on the person in one of the 
following ways: 
 
(a) by delivering it to the person; or 
 
(b) by leaving it at the address at which the 
person ordinarily resides or, in a case in 
which an address for service has been 
furnished, to that address; or 
 
(c) by sending it by post in a prepaid letter 
to the address at which the person 
ordinarily resides or, in a case in which 
an address for service has been 
furnished, to that address; or 
 
(d) where the notice relates to a building 
and it appears that no person is in 
actual occupation of the building, by 
affixing it in a conspicuous position on 
the outside of the building or the 
property containing the building; or 
 
(e) by sending it by email, fax or other 
electronic means. 
 
(2) Where the notice concerned is to be served on or 
given to a person who is the owner, landlord, tenant or 
occupier of a building and the name of the person 
cannot be ascertained by reasonable inquiry it may be 
addressed to the person at that building by using the 
words “the owner”, “the landlord”, “the tenant” or 
“the occupier”, as the case may require. 
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(3) For the purposes of this section, a company shall 
be deemed to be ordinarily resident at its registered 
office, and every other body corporate and every 
unincorporated body shall be deemed to be ordinarily 
resident at its principal office or place of business. 
 
(4) Where a notice required or authorised to be served 
or given by or under this Act is served or given on 
behalf of a person, the notice shall be deemed to be 
served or given by that person. 
 
(5) A person shall not, at any time during the period of 
3 months after the notice is affixed under subsection 
(1)(d) remove, damage or deface the notice without 
lawful authority. 
 
(6) A person who knowingly contravenes subsection 
(5) is guilty of an offence. 
 
 
Section 4 provides for service of notices provided for 
by the Bill.  Section 88 of the Bill applies these 
provisions to private documents. 
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Regulations 
and orders. 
 
5. - (1) Subject to subsection (5), the Minister may 
make regulations prescribing any matter or thing 
which is referred to in this Act as prescribed or to be 
prescribed. 
 
(2) Every order and regulation made by the Minister 
under this Act shall be laid before each House of the 
Oireachtas as soon as may be after it is made and, if a 
resolution annulling the order or regulation is passed 
by either such House within the next 21 days on which 
that House has sat after the order or regulation is laid 
before it, the order or regulation shall be annulled 
accordingly but without prejudice to the validity of 
anything previously done thereunder. 
 
(3) The Minister may by order amend or revoke an 
order under this Act. 
 
(4) An order under subsection (3) shall be made in the 
like manner and its making shall be subject to the like 
(if any) consents and conditions as the order that it is 
amending or revoking. 
 
(5) Where any such matter or thing relates to –  
 
(a) the Registry of Deeds, it shall be 
prescribed by general rules made under 
section 26 of the Act of 200-, or 
 
(b) the Land Registry, it shall be prescribed 
by general rules made under section 
126 of the Act of 1964, as amended by 
section 43 of the Act of 200-. 
 
 
Section 5 makes provision for the making of 
regulations and orders relating to prescribed matters 
under the Bill, but subsection (5) makes it clear that 
where any matter relates to the Registry of Deeds or 
Land Registry it should be provided for under the 
legislation governing those registries. 
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Offences. 6. – (1) A person convicted of an offence under this 
Act is liable on summary conviction to a fine not 
exceeding €3,000 or imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding 6 months or both. 
 
(2) If the contravention in respect of which a person is 
convicted of an offence under this Act is continued 
after the conviction, the person is guilty of a further 
offence on every day on which the contravention 
continues and for each such offence the person is 
liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding 
€250. 
 
(3) Proceedings in relation to an offence under this 
Act may be brought and prosecuted by [ ]. 
 
(4) Notwithstanding section 10(4) of the Petty 
Sessions (Ireland) Act 1851, proceedings for an 
offence under this Act may be instituted at any time 
within one year after the date of the offence. 
 
(5) Where a person is convicted of an offence under 
this Act the District Court shall, unless it is satisfied 
that there are special and substantial reasons for not so 
doing, order the person to pay to [ ] the costs and 
expenses, measured by the Court, incurred by [ ] 
in relation to the investigation, detection and 
prosecution of the offence. 
 
 
Section 6 makes provision for offences under the Bill.
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Expenses. 
 
7. – The expenses incurred by the Minister in the 
administration of this Act shall, to such extent as may 
be sanctioned by the Minister for Finance, be paid out 
of moneys provided by the Oireachtas. 
 
 
Section 7 is a standard provision.
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Repeals and 
amendments. 
 
8. – (1) Each enactment specified in column (2) of   
Schedule 1 is repealed to the extent specified in 
column (3) of that Schedule. 
 
(2) Any reference in any enactment to –  
 
(a) “the Conveyancing Acts 1881 to 1911” 
or to any of them, or 
 
(b) “the Settled Land Acts 1882 to 1890” 
or to any of them, or 
 
(c) any particular provision in those Acts, 
 
is to be read, so far as is appropriate, as a reference to 
this Act or to the equivalent or substituted provision in 
this Act. 
 
 
This section and Schedule 1 provide for repeals and 
amendments.  Subsection (2) provides for a general 
amendment of the numerous references to the 
Conveyancing Acts and Settled Land Acts in various 
post-1922 Acts, but some of these will require more 
specific amendment.  Some sections of the Bill also 
make specific amendments relating to a particular 
context.
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 PART 2 
 
TENURE AND ESTATES 
 
 
This Part implements the recommendations contained 
in Chapter 2 of the CP.  It introduces some radical 
changes to the system of land ownership which has 
existed in Ireland for many centuries.  In particular, it 
abolished finally the old feudal concept of tenure, but 
preserves ownership of land through the related 
concept of estates.  However, the system of estates is 
considerably simplified as recommended by the CP. 
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Abolition of 
feudal tenure. 
 
2.09 
 
 
 
 
 
2.13 
 
QE 1290, 
cc.1 and 2 
 
 
 
PART 2 
 
TENURE AND ESTATES 
 
 
 
 
9. - (1) In so far as it survives, feudal tenure is 
abolished and ownership of all land continues in 
accordance with section 10. 
 
(2) Subsection (1) does not affect –  
 
(a) the position of the State under –  
 
(i) the State Property Acts 1954 
and 1998; 
 
(ii) section 73 of the Act of 1965, 
 
(b) the concept of a freehold estate as 
specified in section 10, 
 
(c) the freedom to dispose of a fee simple 
estate (otherwise known as the rule 
against inalienability). 
 
 
Section 9 implements the recommendation in the CP 
that the concept of feudal tenure should be abolished, 
as being incompatible with the relationship between 
the State and its citizens, and that as between citizens, 
as set out in the Constitution (see paras 2.02-2.09 of 
the CP). The removal of the concept of tenure 
facilitates the repeal without replacement of numerous 
pre-1922 statutes relating to this outmoded concept 
(see para 2.08 of the CP).   
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Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) contains the basic proposition that 
feudal tenure is no longer to be regarded as existing in 
the State. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) clarifies the effect of the abolition of 
feudal tenure.  Paragraph (a) deals with the position 
of the State as a result of the abolition.  Nothing in the 
new legislation can affect the position of the State, and 
the people of Ireland, as regards ownership of land 
under Articles 10 and 49 of the Constitution.  
Subparagraph (a)(i) preserves the position of the State 
under the State Property Acts 1954 and 1998, which 
provide for the management and control of State land, 
as prescribed by Articles 10.3 and 10.4 of the 
Constitution.  Subparagraph (a)(ii) preserves the 
position of the State as ultimate intestate successor.  
This replaced the old feudal concept of escheat which 
was abolished by section 11(3) of the Succession Act 
1965.  Paragraph (b) preserves the concept of estates 
in land which the CP recommended should be retained 
(see paras 2.10-2.13 of the CP).  The operation of 
estates is further explained by section 10.  Paragraph 
(c) preserves the rule against inalienability, which was 
enshrined in the very old feudal statute Quia Emptores 
1290.  That statute is amongst the many pre-1922 
statutes being repealed (see section 8 and Schedule 1), 
but this rule, which applies only to the freehold fee 
simple estate, remains an important distinguishing 
feature of such an estate, in contrast to a leasehold 
estate.  It has been applied by Irish Courts in recent 
times: see Re Dunne’s Estate [1998] IR 155. 
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Nor does the new legislation have any impact on the 
power of the State to control land use and 
development under legislation like the Planning and 
Development Acts 2002 to 2004 or to acquire land 
compulsorily for public purposes.  The vital point is 
that the source of such powers is legislation and they 
do not derive from the position of the State (or the 
former Crown) under the feudal tenure system (see 
para 2.05 of the CP). 
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Estates in 
land. 
 
2.13 
 
10. - (1) The concept of an estate, whether freehold or 
leasehold, in land is retained and, subject to this Act, 
continues to denote the nature and extent of land 
ownership. 
 
(2) From the commencement of this Act, such an 
estate retains its pre-existing characteristics, but 
without any tenurial incidents. 
 
(3) All references in any enactment or any instrument 
(whether made or executed before or after the 
commencement of this Act) to tenure or estates in 
land, or to the holder of any such estate, shall be read 
accordingly. 
 
 
Section 10 implements the recommendation in the CP 
that the concept of an estate in land should be retained 
(paras 2.10 – 2.13 of the CP).  The ability to divide the 
ownership of land amongst different persons on a 
“temporal” basis, ie, with those persons enjoying the 
benefits of ownership for different periods of time, 
was an inherent feature of the feudal system as it 
operated in Ireland and many other common law 
jurisdictions.  It introduced an important element of 
flexibility, as did the division of ownership between 
the legal and equitable or beneficial title which 
developed by using the concept of a trust.  In this 
respect our system of land ownership is to be 
distinguished from civil law systems which do not 
recognise the concept of estates in land, nor that of a 
trust.  Thus land may be conveyed either directly to or 
on trust for A for life, then to B in fee simple.  In this 
example, what A “owns” is a present life estate 
(entitling A to occupy the land and enjoy its benefits 
for his or her lifetime). What B owns is a future fee 
simple estate which will not fall into possession until 
A dies.  B’s estate (or interest) stays “in remainder” 
until that happens and, meanwhile, he or she is not 
entitled to occupy the land or otherwise enjoy its 
benefits.  As a consequence, under our system what A  
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and B own is not the land as such (ie, the physical 
entity) but rather their respective estates. In view of 
the flexibility and other advantages which this system 
has provided for landowners over the centuries, it 
remains relevant to ownership in modern times. 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) confirms that this fundamental feature 
of land ownership is being retained and that the 
abolition of the concept of feudal tenure by section 9 
does not affect it.  Although section 9 relates only to 
feudal tenure, and therefore to freehold land only, 
subsection (1) refers also to leasehold estates to make 
it clear that the concept of estates will continue to 
operate in respect of leasehold land as well. 
 
Subsection (2)  
 
Subsection (2) confirms that freehold and leasehold 
estates will continue to have their usual attributes, but 
not any incidents which relate to feudal tenure.  The 
CP explained that, apart from the conceptual notion of 
tenure, it is unlikely that any tenurial incidents have 
survived to modern times.  The abolition of escheat by 
the Succession Act 1965 probably removed the last 
surviving one (see paras 2.02 – 2.07 of the CP). 
 
Subsection (3)  
 
Subsection (3) provides that existing or future statutes 
or documents relating to land should be construed in 
accordance with the provisions of subsections (1) and 
(2). 
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Restrictions 
on legal 
estates and 
interests. 
 
2.16 
4.18 
11. – (1) The only legal estates in land which are 
capable of being created or disposed of are -  
 
(a) a fee simple estate in possession, 
 
(b) a leasehold estate. 
 
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a “fee simple 
estate in possession” includes a -   
 
(a) determinable fee, 
 
(b) fee simple subject to a right of entry or 
a right of re-entry,  
 
(c)  fee simple subject only to –  
 
(i) a power of revocation, 
 
(ii) an annuity or other payment of 
capital or income for the 
advancement, maintenance or 
other benefit of any person, 
 
(iii) a right of residence which is not 
an exclusive right over the 
whole land. 
 
(3) For the purposes of subsection (1), a “leasehold 
estate” means, subject to sections 12 and 14, the estate 
created by a lease or orally for a term –  
 
(a) of less than a year, or 
 
(b) of a year or years, or 
 
(c) of a year or years and a fraction of a 
year, or 
 
(d)  from year to year or any other recurring 
period, 
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so that the relationship of landlord and tenant exists 
between the parties and irrespective of whether or not 
the estate –  
 
(i) takes effect in possession or in future, 
or 
 
(ii) is subject to another legal estate or 
interest, or 
 
(iii) is for a term which is uncertain or liable 
to determination by notice, re-entry or 
operation of law or by virtue of a 
provision for cessor on redemption or 
in any other event. 
 
(4) The only legal interests in land which are capable 
of being created or disposed of are –  
 
(a) an easement, 
 
(b) a freehold covenant, 
 
(c) an incumbrance, 
 
(d) a leasehold rent, 
 
(e) a possibility of reverter, 
 
(f) a profit à prendre, including a mining 
right, 
 
(g) a public or customary right, 
 
(h) a rentcharge, 
 
(i) a right of entry or of re-entry attached 
to a legal estate, 
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2.32 
 
 
(j) a wayleave or other right to lay cables, 
pipes, wires or other conduits, 
 
(k) any other legal interest created by or 
under a court order or any statutory 
provision. 
 
(5) A legal estate or legal interest recognised by this 
section as capable of being created or disposed of has, 
subject to this Act, the same attributes as the 
corresponding legal estates and interests existing 
before the commencement of this Act and may subsist 
concurrently with, or subject to, any other legal estate 
or interest in the same land. 
 
(6) Subject to this Act, estates and interests not 
mentioned in subsections (1) to (3) take effect as 
equitable interests only, but this does not prevent the 
creation of estates and interests so mentioned as 
equitable interests. 
 
(7) Nothing in this Act affects judicial recognition of 
equitable interests. 
 
(8) The conversion of a life estate into an equitable 
interest does not affect a life owner’s liability for 
waste. 
 
(9) All estates and interests in land, whether legal or 
equitable, including –  
 
(a) a contingent, executory or future 
equitable interest, or a possibility 
coupled with an interest, whether or not 
the object of the gift or limitation of 
such interest or possibility is 
ascertained, or 
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(b) a possibility of reverter or right of entry 
or re-entry, whether immediate or 
future or vested or contingent, 
 
may be disposed of. 
 
(10) In this section a –  
 
(a) right of entry is a right to take 
possession of land or of its income and 
to retain that possession or income until 
some obligation is performed, 
 
(b) right of re-entry is a right to forfeit the 
legal owner’s estate in the land. 
 
 
Section 11 implements the CP’s recommendations for 
simplification of the law, by restricting the estates and 
interests which will, in future, be regarded as 
conferring legal title to the land.  These provisions are 
linked with those in Part 4 (Trusts of Land) and Part 7 
(Appurtenant Rights).  
 
Subsection (1)  
 
Subsection (1) makes it clear that a legal owner will in 
future hold either a fee simple (freehold) estate or a 
leasehold estate.  As regards the other two freehold 
estates recognised by our law, the fee tail is abolished 
by section 13 and the life estate will confer an 
equitable interest only (see note to subsection (8) 
below). Where a life estate has been created, so that 
there is a fee simple held in reversion by the grantor or 
in remainder by some other person due to get it in 
possession after the death of the life estate owner, a 
trust of the land will come into operation under Part 4.  
The legal title, the fee simple in possession, will then 
be held by the trustees.  
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This is why paragraph (a) of subsection (1) confines 
the legal freehold estate to a fee simple “in 
possession”.  Any fee simple in reversion or remainder 
will be held under a trust in accordance with Part 4 
and so will necessarily be an equitable interest only.  
As regards paragraph (b), this covers leasehold estates 
as the definition in subsection (3) makes clear.  
Excluded, however, are “hybrid” leases prohibited by 
sections 12 and 14. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) implements the CP’s recommendation 
that “modified” fees standing on their own, ie, those 
which do not involve a clear succession of interests, 
should not attract the trust provisions of Part 4 (which 
replace the former settlements legislation) (see paras 
2.15 – 2.16 and 4.17 – 4.18 of the CP).  The point 
about “modified” fees is that the holder of the fee 
simple is very close to being the full owner of the land 
and the likelihood of it going to someone else is 
usually very remote.  This is unlike the case of a 
typical settlement, eg, where land is settled on A for 
life with a remainder to B in fee simple, B has a clear 
expectation of succeeding to the land on A’s death.  
There is a definite succession of interests, whereas in 
the case of modified fees there is no such certainty.  
For this reason the CP recommended that the holder of 
such a fee simple should remain the owner of the legal 
title to the land and be able to deal with it accordingly. 
 
Paragraph (a) refers to a determinable fee, eg, a grant 
by A to B in fee simple so long as Dublin remains the 
capital city of Ireland.  Here A has a mere possibility 
of reverter, ie, the land will only revert (automatically) 
to A if and when the event specified occurs.  That may 
never happen and so B has a legal fee simple in 
possession.  A has at most a mere hope of getting the 
land back which is nevertheless categorised as a legal 
interest by subsection (4).  Paragraph (b) refers to two  
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types of conditional fee simple.  One is where the 
grantor reserves a right of entry to enforce some 
obligation, eg, a grant by A to B in fee simple on 
condition that B covenants to maintain a boundary 
wall, reserving the right to take possession of the 
property if there is a breach of the covenant and to 
retain possession until the breach is rectified.  The 
other is where a right of re-entry is reserved which is a 
much more drastic remedy.  As in the case of such a 
right which is invariably reserved in a lease, it entitles 
the holder to forfeit the grantee’s estate in the land and 
to resume ownership.  In the case of a grant of a fee 
simple, such a right of re-entry is often not linked to 
the performance of an obligation, but rather, as in the 
case of a determinable fee, is linked to the occurrence 
of some event, eg, a grant by A to B in fee simple, but 
if Dublin ceases to be the capital city of Ireland, A 
may re-enter the land and resume ownership.  Unlike 
in the case of a determinable fee, there is no automatic 
forfeiture, and B will not lose the fee simple until A 
exercises the right of re-entry.  Again this is likely to 
be a remote possibility and so B will still be regarded 
as legal owner. Paragraph (b) does not draw a 
distinction between a right of entry or re-entry in 
favour of the grantor or in favour of a third party, as 
the CP did.  The view has been taken that this is a very 
fine distinction of doubtful practical significance. 
 
Paragraph (c) deals with other situations where the fee 
simple estate is subject only to some minor interest or 
incumbrance, so that the owner of the fee simple 
remains the substantial owner of the property and 
should retain the legal title.  Subparagraph (i) refers to 
the situation where the fee simple is subject only to a 
power of revocation.  Subparagraph (ii) refers to the 
situation where the fee simple is subject only to an 
annuity or charge for the benefit of someone else.   
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Subparagraph (iii) refers to the situation where the fee 
simple is subject only to a right of residence in favour 
of someone else, which is not equivalent to a life 
interest, as would be the case where the right is an 
exclusive one relating to the entirety of the land in 
question.  This reflects the distinction between 
different rights of residence made by section 81 of the 
Registration of Title Act 1964. 
 
Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) makes it clear that the various 
categories of leasehold estate hitherto recognised as 
conferring legal ownership will largely continue under 
the new Act.   The exception to this general rule is 
where the Bill prohibits the future creation of certain 
categories, ie fee farm grants (section 12) and various 
leases for lives (section 14). 
 
Subsection (4) 
 
Subsection (4) lists the various interests in land which 
should be recognised as legal interests, as opposed to 
merely equitable interests. This distinction is 
important because the general rule is that legal 
interests bind all successive owners of the land, 
whereas a mere equitable interest may lose priority to 
subsequent purchasers of a legal estate.  Subsection (4) 
is largely declaratory of the existing law, but resolves 
doubts as to whether a possibility of reverter or right 
of entry or re-entry are legal interests.  It is important 
to emphasise that subsection (4) simply lists those 
interests which are “capable” of being legal interests; 
whether in a particular case an interest is in fact legal 
will depend on such matters as how it is created.  Thus 
under section 66 an express grant of, eg, a legal 
interest like an easement or profit à prendre for a 
freehold (fee simple) estate must be made by deed.   
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On the other hand, under section 4 of Deasy’s Act 
(Landlord and Tenant Law Amendment Act, Ireland, 
1860) a lease of such an interest need only be in 
writing or, in certain cases, may be created orally. A 
failure to comply with such formalities may result in 
an equitable interest only being created (see 
subsection (6)). 
 
Subsection (5)  
 
Subsection (5) preserves the existing attributes of legal 
estates and interests, including the essential flexibility 
of our system of land ownership, whereby more than 
one estate or interest can be held concurrently in 
respect of the same land. 
 
Subsection (6)  
 
Subsection (6) states the corollary of subsections (1) to 
(3), ie, those estates and interests which cannot be 
legal ones must necessarily exist as equitable interests 
only.  This is, however, subject to other provisions of 
the Act, such as those which abolish certain types of 
estate and interest, eg, fee farm grants (section 12), 
fees tail (section 13), leases for lives (section 14) and 
certain rentcharges (section 42).  However, it is also 
made clear, as indicated earlier, that estates and 
interests which may be legal ones coming within 
subsections (1) to (3) may also exist as equitable ones, 
eg, because the formalities for creating them as legal 
ones have not been followed.  
 
Subsection (7) 
 
Subsection (7) also contains an important saving of the 
courts’ general equitable jurisdiction to recognise new 
equitable interests in land.  Recent decades have 
illustrated the exercise of this jurisdiction, particularly 
by employing the concepts of resulting and 
constructive trusts and the doctrine of proprietary 
estoppel. 
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Subsection (8) 
 
Subsection (8) recognises another corollary of 
subsection (1), which is that the other freehold estate 
still recognised by the Bill, the life estate, will in 
future operate as an equitable interest only.  As 
explained earlier, such an estate will necessarily create 
a succession of interests which attracts the trust 
provisions in Part 4.  Thus, where there is a grant by A 
to B for life, with remainder to C in fee simple, the fee 
simple in possession (legal title) will vest in the 
trustees, who will hold the land on trust for B for life 
and then for C in fee simple.  Both B’s life estate and 
C’s fee simple in remainder (not being “in 
possession”) are equitable interests.  Similarly, if 
instead of a remainder in favour of C, the grant by A 
makes no provision for what is to happen on B’s 
death, there will be a fee simple in reversion in favour 
of A.  Again the land will vest in trustees and both B’s 
life estate and A’s fee simple in reversion will be 
equitable interests. 
 
Subsection (9) 
 
Subsection (9) re-enacts the substance of section 6 of 
the Real Property Act 1845 and makes it clear that it 
covers interests like possibilities of reverter. 
 
Subsection (10) 
 
Subsection (10) simply provides clarification of the 
distinction between a right of entry and a right of re-
entry, as illustrated earlier. 
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Prohibition of 
fee farm 
grants. 
 
2.22 
 
12. - (1) The creation of a fee farm grant at law or in 
equity is prohibited. 
 
(2) Any instrument entered into after the 
commencement of this Act purporting to –  
 
(a) create a fee farm grant, or 
 
(b) grant a lease for life or lives renewable 
for ever or for any period which is 
perpetually renewable,  
 
vests in the purported grantee or lessee a legal fee 
simple or, as the case may be, an equitable fee simple 
and any contract for such a grant entered into after 
such commencement operates as a contract for such a 
vesting. 
 
(3) A fee simple which vests under subsection (2) is 
freed and discharged from any covenant or other 
provision relating to rent, but all other covenants or 
provisions continue in force so far as consistent with 
the nature of a fee simple estate or interest. 
 
(4) Subsection (2) does not apply to any contract or 
instrument giving effect to a contract entered into 
before the ___ day of ___ 2005. 
 
(5) In this section a “fee farm grant” means any –  
 
 (a)  grant of a fee simple, or 
 
 (b) lease for ever or in perpetuity, 
 
reserving or charging a perpetual rent, whether or not 
the relationship of landlord and tenant is created 
between the grantor and grantee, and includes a sub-
fee farm grant. 
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 (6) Notwithstanding section 11(4), any fee farm rent 
existing at law at the commencement of this Act 
continues as a legal interest and capable of being 
disposed of. 
 
 
Section 12 implements the recommendation in the CP 
that the future creation of fee farm grants should be 
prohibited.  This was part of the scheme to simplify 
the law, by reversing the confusion between freehold 
and leasehold ownership which such grants involve 
(see paras 2.17 – 2.26 of the CP). The primary reason 
for the creation of such grants nowadays is to get 
round the difficulties relating to enforceability of 
freehold positive covenants against successors in title.  
That problem is, however, resolved by the provisions 
relating to such covenants in Part 7 (see section 51).  
Section 12 concerns only the creation of future grants 
and does not deal with existing fee farm grants.  The 
effect of section 12 will be to resolve the doubt which 
exists as to whether the prohibition on the creation of 
new “ground rents” in respect of dwellings in the 
Landlord and Tenant (Ground Rents) Act 1978 applies 
to fee farm grants (see paras 2.19 – 2.20 of the CP).  
However, section 12 does not deal with conversion of 
existing fee farm grants, or redemption of existing fee 
farm rents.  The CP recommended that this matter 
should be considered as part of a general review of the 
ground rents legislation (see para 2.23 of the CP). 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) contains the prohibition on the future 
creation of fee farm grants, whether legal or equitable. 
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Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) provides for the effect of any attempt 
by a grantor to ignore the prohibition.  In effect the 
grantor will suffer the penalty of losing the rent, ie, the 
grantee will obtain the fee simple discharged from any 
obligations relating to the rent.  However, any other 
obligations, such as covenants restricting the use of 
the land, will remain enforceable as provided by 
section 51.  On the other hand, any other obligation 
incompatible with a fee simple estate, such as one 
offending the rule against inalienability (see section 
9(2)(c)), would also not remain enforceable.  Any 
contract for a grant offending the prohibition would 
operate as a contract to create a fee simple similarly 
discharged from such obligations.  
 
 Paragraph (b) has been included because one of the 
pre-1922 statutes being repealed is the Renewable 
Leasehold Conversion Act 1849.  Under section 37 of 
that Act any post-1849 lease for lives or years 
perpetually renewable operates as a fee farm grant.  
With that repeal, it is necessary to make provision for 
the effect of such a lease purported to be created after 
that repeal.  It too would vest a fee simple discharged 
from the rent and other incompatible obligations, and 
any contract would operate as a contract to create such 
a fee simple. 
 
Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) spells out the provisions relating to the 
discharge of rent and other incompatible obligations. 
 
Subsection (4) 
 
Subsection (4) contains a saving for contracts entered 
into prior to the date of the publication of the draft 
Bill. 
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Subsection (5) 
 
Subsection (5) makes it clear that the section applies to 
every kind of fee farm grant, including the most 
common category creating the relationship of landlord 
and tenant and the much less common category 
creating a rentcharge payable by the grantee. 
 
Subsection (6) 
 
Subsection (6) contains a saving for existing fee farm 
rents.  Since no new ones can be created as a result of 
section 12, they are not included in the list of legal 
interests contained in section 11(4).  However, 
subsection (6) preserves existing ones where they are 
legal interests.  
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Abolition of 
the fee tail. 
 
2.29 
 
 
13. – (1) The creation of a fee tail of any kind at law or 
in equity is prohibited. 
 
(2) Any instrument entered into after the 
commencement of this Act purporting to create a fee 
tail in favour of any person vests in that person a legal 
fee simple or, as the case may be, an equitable fee 
simple and any contract for such a creation entered 
into before or after such commencement operates as a 
contract for such vesting. 
 
(3) Where, immediately before the commencement of 
this Act, a person was entitled to a fee tail at law or in 
equity prohibited by this section, that person is 
entitled, on such commencement, to a legal fee simple 
or, as the case may be, an equitable fee simple. 
 
(4) In subsection (3) “fee tail” includes a –  
 
(a) base fee provided the protectorship has 
ended, and 
 
(b) base fee created by failure to enrol the 
disentailing deed,  
 
but does not include the estate of a tenant in tail after 
possibility of issue extinct. 
 
(5) A fee simple which vests under subsection (2) or 
subsection (3) is –  
 
(a) not subject to any estates or interests 
limited by the instrument creating the 
fee tail to take effect after the 
determination of the fee tail, 
 
(b) subject to any estates or interests 
limited to take effect in defeasance of 
the fee tail which would be valid if 
limited to take effect in defeasance of a 
fee simple. 
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Section 13 implements the recommendations in the CP 
that the archaic fee tail estate should be abolished and 
any existing fee tail should be converted into a fee 
simple, as can be done by executing a disentailing 
assurance (deed) under the Fines and Recoveries 
(Ireland) Act 1834 (see paras 2.27 – 2.30 of the CP). 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) contains the prohibition on creation of 
fees tail in the future. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) provides that, if this prohibition is 
ignored, the purported creation of a fee tail will in fact 
create a fee simple and a contract for such a creation 
will operate accordingly.  In view of the conversion 
provisions in subsection (3) this includes any contract 
entered into before the commencement of the Act. 
 
Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) automatically converts existing fees tail 
into fees simple, thereby achieving automatically what 
could be achieved by executing a disentailing 
assurance under the Fines and Recoveries (Ireland) 
Act 1834.  This facilitates the repeal of that Act. 
 
Subsection (4) 
 
Subsection (4) makes it clear that the automatic 
conversion provisions of subsection (3) vary in their 
application to a number of situations where a barring 
of the entail under the Fines and Recoveries (Ireland) 
Act 1834 was not effective or possible.  
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 Paragraph (a) refers to the situation where the tenant 
in tail executes a disentailing assurance without the 
consent of the “protector”, usually the holder of a prior 
interest (eg, a life estate owner, as where a grant was 
made to A for life, remainder to B in fee tail, and B 
executes the disentailing assurance while A is still 
alive and without A’s consent) or some other person 
specified in the grant.   This would create a “base fee” 
only, whereby the issue in tail are barred, but not 
reversioners or remaindermen.  Paragraph (a) 
preserves this position, but provides that once the 
protectorship ends (eg, on the death of the protector) 
the automatic conversion provisions of subsection (3) 
will operate.  At that point the holder of the base fee 
would, at present, become free to execute a fully 
effective disentailing assurance on his or her own.   
 
Paragraph (b) deals with another kind of base fee, 
sometimes referred to as a “voidable” or 
“determinable” base fee.  This arises where the 
disentailing assurance would be fully effective but for 
the failure to enrol it in the High Court within six 
months, as required by section 39 of the Fines and 
Recoveries (Ireland) Act 1834.  This technicality has 
often been forgotten in the past but it has the serious 
effect of rendering the base fee determinable by the 
issue in tail, ie, in effect the former tenant in tail 
becomes a life owner only.  The Law Reform 
Commission had previously described this enrolment 
requirement as “excessive”: see Report on Land Law 
and Conveyancing Law: (1) General Proposals (LRC 
30-1989), para 14.  It was recommended that it should 
be replaced by the more usual practice of registering 
the deed in the Registry of Deeds or Land Registry.  
That was made in the context of the fee tail estate 
surviving.  In view of the provisions of section 13, and 
since this matter concerns only a technical mistake 
made by the tenant in tail himself or herself, 
paragraph (b) applies the automatic conversion 
provisions to such cases.  The need for enrolment 
would go in any event with the repeal of the 1834 Act.   
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The last part of subsection (4) on the other hand, 
excludes the operation of the conversion provisions 
from a rare case where a tenant in tail holds an 
“unbarrable” entail.  This arises where what is known 
as a fee tail “special” has been created and the issue 
(successors) to succeed have to be the children of a 
specified spouse.  If that spouse predeceases the tenant 
in tail and they have no children, the tenant becomes a 
tenant in tail “after possibility of issue extinct”.  
Section 15 of the 1834 Act provides that such a tenant 
cannot execute a disentailing assurance.  The result is 
that the tenant in tail becomes, in effect, a tenant for 
life and the reversionary or remainder estate due to 
take effect on determination of the fee tail will take 
effect on the tenant in tail’s death.  Subsection (4) 
preserves the vested interest of the owners of such 
reversions or remainders.  
 
 
Subsection (5) 
 
Subsection (5) clarifies the effect of subsections (2) 
and (3).  The vesting of a fee simple is not subject to 
the interests of the reversioners or remaindermen due 
to take the land when the fee tail comes to an end.  
Thus where land was granted to A in fee tail, with 
remainder to B in fee simple, the fee simple will vest 
in A and B will be left with no interest.  That is 
already the effect of A executing a disentailing 
assurance under the 1834 Act and paragraph (a) 
reflects this.  Paragraph (b) reflects the fact that it is 
possible to attach a “defeasance” condition to a fee 
tail, just as it is in respect of a fee simple, eg, a grant 
to A in fee tail, but if Dublin ceases to be the capital 
city of Ireland, then B has the right to re-enter and take 
over as holder of the fee simple. The fee simple 
created by a disentailing assurance executed by A 
would remain subject to this right of re-entry and 
paragraph (b) makes it clear that that would remain 
the case under section 13. 
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Prohibition of 
leases for 
lives. 
 
2.36 
 
 
14. – (1) The grant, after the commencement of this 
Act, of a lease for – 
 
 (a) a life or lives, 
 
 (b) a life or lives combined with a 
concurrent or reversionary term of any 
period, 
 
 (c) any term coming to an end on the death 
of a person or persons, 
 
and any contract for such a grant entered into after the 
_ day of _ 2005 is void. 
 
 
Section 14 implements the recommendation of the CP 
that, in order to reduce the confusion between freehold 
and leasehold estates and thereby simplify the law, the 
future creation of various categories of leases linked to 
persons’ lives should be prohibited (see paras 2.33 – 
2.36).  The section does not deal with the category 
which used to be common, a lease for lives renewable 
for ever.  These were dealt with by the Renewable 
Leasehold Conversion Act 1849, section 37 of which 
provided that after 1849 such leases would operate 
instead as fee farm grants.  Pre-1849 leases which 
were not converted into a fee simple interest were 
converted by section 74 of the Landlord and Tenant 
(Amendment) Act 1980 (see para 2.34 of the CP).  
These provisions are being replaced by section 12 of 
this Bill.  Section 14 deals with the much less common 
lease for a life or lives without a perpetual renewal 
provision and/or lease linked otherwise to a life or 
lives, such as a combination of a term of years and 
lives.  It prohibits their future creation, but, unlike 
previous sections, there are no provisions for 
conversion of existing leases,  The CP took the view 
that these leases are so rare nowadays that it was not 
appropriate to impose conversion provisions on 
existing ones (para 2.35 of the CP). 
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The section specifies the categories of leases to which 
the prohibition applies.  Paragraph (a) deals with a 
straightforward lease for a life or lives.  This should 
not be confused with a grant of a freehold life estate, 
which, under section 11, becomes an equitable interest 
only.  Paragraph (b) deals with cases where the lease 
combines a grant for a term with a life or lives, eg, a 
lease to X for the lives of A, B, and C and for 35 
years.  It is often a matter of construction whether the 
term of years runs concurrently with the lives or is 
reversionary (ie, runs from the death of the last 
surviving life).  Paragraph (c) deals with a variation 
of the paragraph (b) situation, ie, where a term of 
years is granted but it is determinable on the death of a 
life or the last survivor of a number of lives.  
 
The section in this instance renders any attempt to 
create such leases void.  This approach has been 
adopted because of the rarity of such leases and avoids 
the need for complicated conversion provisions that 
would otherwise be necessary to deal with the various 
categories if the prohibition is ignored.  It is simpler to 
nullify any such ignoring of the prohibition. 
 62
Minor not to 
own a legal 
estate. 
 
4.16 
 
15. – (1) From the commencement of Part 4, a minor 
is not capable of owning a legal estate or interest in 
land. 
 
(2)  Any party to a conveyance shall, until the contrary 
is proved, be presumed to have attained full age at the 
date of its execution. 
 
 
Section 15 reflects what has long been the position in 
practice as a result of sections 59 and 60 of the Settled 
Land Act 1882 whereby land held by a minor 
constitutes settled land, but the powers of dealing with 
it may be exercised by the trustees of the settlement, 
thereby rendering such dealings fully effective.  
Otherwise any transaction carried out by the minor is 
liable to be set aside when the minor reaches full age 
(18 years).  Under the new settled land regime 
introduced by Part 4 of the Bill the legal title to land 
belonging to a minor would be vested in trustees and 
the minor would have an equitable interest only (see 
para 4.16 of the CP). 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) reflects what would be the position 
under Part 4 (see section 18). 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) is designed to simplify conveyancing 
by creating a presumption that any party to a 
conveyance is of full age.  This removes the need for 
those acting for purchasers to make enquiries or to 
raise requisitions relating to this matter. 
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PART 3 
 
FUTURE INTERESTS 
 
 
This Part implements the recommendations contained 
in Chapter 3 of the CP.  This endorsed the 
recommendations contained in the Commission’s 
earlier Report on the Rule Against Perpetuities and 
Cognate Rules (LRC 62-2000).  That Report called for 
a substantial simplification of the law by abolition of 
several exceptionally complicated rules governing the 
vesting of interests in the future.  These were the rule 
against perpetuities and cognate rules, such as the 
Rule in Whitby v Mitchell, the rule against 
accumulations and the Rule in Purefoy v Rogers.  The 
Commission took the view that abolition of the rule 
against perpetuities should be accompanied by 
introduction of variation of trusts legislation: see para 
4.32 of LRC 62-2000 and Report on Variation of 
Trusts (LRC 63-2000).  The Commission reiterated its 
views on this matter in its Consultation Paper on Trust 
Law: General Proposals (LRC CP 35-2005), Chapter 
11.  It is envisaged, therefore, that Part 3 of this Bill 
will not be brought into force until variation of trusts 
legislation is enacted. 
 
The CP added an additional recommendation, the 
abolition of the complex common law contingent 
remainder rules (see paras 3.02-3.04 of the CP).  It did 
so because it involved a much wider review of land 
law and conveyancing law than was carried out by the 
earlier Report.  In particular, many of its 
recommendations were concerned with getting rid of 
outmoded feudal concepts from which the remainder 
rules derived their function.  
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 Under the new scheme for land ownership enshrined 
in Parts 2 and 4 of this Bill, every future interest, 
whether contingent or otherwise, will operate as an 
equitable interest only and the freehold legal title (the 
fee simple in possession) will be vested in trustees.  
That title will be held in trust for the beneficiaries 
entitled to the various future interests created in 
respect of the land. 
 
 65
 
 
 
 
Abolition of 
various rules. 
 
3.04 
 
PART 3 
 
FUTURE INTERESTS 
 
16. - Subject to section 17, the following rules are 
abolished: 
 
(a) the rules known as the common law 
contingent remainder rules, 
 
(b)  the rule known as the Rule in Purefoy v. 
Rogers, 
 
(c) the rule known as the Rule in Whitby v. 
Mitchell (also known as the old rule 
against perpetuities and the rule against 
double possibilities), 
 
(d) the rule against perpetuities, 
 
(e) the rule against accumulations. 
 
 
Section 16 implements the recommendation in the 
Law Commission’s Report and CP for abolition of 
various rules governing future interests. 
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Scope of 
section 16. 
 
17.  – Section 16 applies to any interest in property 
whenever created, but does not apply if, in reliance on 
such an interest being invalid by virtue of the 
application of any of the rules abolished by that 
section –  
 
(a) the property has been distributed or 
otherwise dealt with, or 
 
(b) any person has done or omitted to do 
any thing which renders the position of 
that or any other person materially 
altered to that person’s detriment after 
the commencement of this Part. 
 
 
Section 17 defines the scope of section 16. It 
recognises that some of the rules being abolished by 
the section were not confined to land, but applied also 
to future interests in other property, eg, the rule 
against perpetuities. Notwithstanding the general 
scope of the Bill (which deals with land), the abolition 
of the rules is meant to be comprehensive and total.  It 
also makes it clear that it applies to all interests in 
property whenever created, but subject to the saving 
detailed in paragraphs (a) and (b) for “vested” rights.  
This saving protects the interest of any person who has 
already taken property, or has materially altered his or 
her position, on the basis that some prior disposition of 
the property was void under any of the rules abolished 
by section 16.  The time for assessing whether such 
material alteration of position has occurred, or 
legitimate expectation has arisen, is after the abolition 
has taken effect. 
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Operation of 
future 
interests in 
land. 
 
3.03 
 
18. - (1) Subject to subsection (2), all future interests 
in land, whether vested or contingent, exist in equity 
only. 
 
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a –  
 
(a) possibility of reverter, or 
 
(b)   right of entry or a right of re-entry 
attached to a legal estate. 
 
 
Section 18 is consequential upon section 16 and, as 
recommended in paragraph 3.03 of the CP, subsection 
(1) provides that future interests in land will operate in 
equity only after Part 3 of the Bill comes into force, as 
interests taking effect under a trust.  Subsection (2) 
makes it clear that this does not apply to certain future 
interests which under section 11(4) of the Bill can 
operate as legal interests.  These are a possibility of 
reverter attached to a determinable fee simple and a 
right of entry or re-entry attached to a legal estate. 
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PART 4 
 
TRUSTS OF LAND 
 
 
This Part implements the recommendations in Chapter 
4 of the CP.  These were designed to simplify greatly 
the existing law relating to the various ways in which 
family settlements of land may be created.  Such 
settlements may take the form of a “strict” settlement, 
where land is settled directly on persons in succession 
without the use of a trust.  Alternatively, the land may 
be vested in trustees to hold for beneficiaries in 
succession, but the existing law complicates matters 
by drawing a distinction between a trust for sale and a 
“holding” trust (where, at most, the trustees have a 
power of sale, ie, there is no obligation to sell).  The 
CP recommended replacement of the existing law with 
a new statutory scheme, under which all forms of 
settlement and trusts of land would, in future, fall 
within a single “trust of land” concept (see paras 4.15-
4.27 of the CP). 
 
In accordance with the recommendations in the CP, 
Part 4 sets out a much simplified scheme to replace the 
complicated provisions of the Settled Land Acts 1882-
90.  It does so by conferring on trustees of trusts of 
land plenary powers in respect of the land.  These 
would operate by way of “default”, ie be applicable 
unless restricted expressly by the instrument creating 
the trust (where such an instrument exists).  Apart 
from that, the general law of trusts would apply, in 
particular the law governing the obligations owed by 
trustees to beneficiaries.  The same would apply to 
powers of trustees, in so far as the general law, 
including statute law, imposes restrictions on exercise 
of certain powers.  This whole subject was the subject 
of a separate Consultation Paper published by the Law 
Reform Commission in February 2005, Trust Law: 
General Proposals (LRC CP 35-2005).  
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 It is envisaged that this will result in comprehensive 
legislation dealing with the law of trusts generally, so 
that Part 4 of this Bill may not be brought into force 
until that legislation is also enacted. 
 
Although Part 4 applies to a wide range of trusts of 
land, including implied, resulting and constructive 
trusts and bare trusts, it does not apply to charitable 
trusts.  That subject was also dealt with by another 
Consultation Paper published by the Law Reform 
Commission in February 2005, Charitable Trust Law: 
General Proposals (LRC CP 36-2005).  It is 
envisaged that this will lead to separate legislation on 
an area to which special considerations of a public 
nature apply. 
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Trusts of 
land. 
 
4.14 
 
SLA 1882 
PART 4 
 
TRUSTS OF LAND 
 
 
19. – (1) Subject to this Part, where land is –  
 
(a) for the time being held for interests 
limited by an instrument, whenever 
executed, to persons by way of 
succession without the interposition of 
a trust (in this Part referred to as a 
“strict settlement”), or 
 
(b) held, either with or without other 
property, on a trust whenever it arises 
and of whatever kind, or 
 
(c) vested, whether before or after the 
commencement of this Part, in a minor, 
 
there is a trust of land for the purposes of this Part. 
 
(2) For the purposes of –  
 
(a) subsection (1)(a), a strict settlement 
exists where an estate or interest in 
reversion or remainder is not disposed 
of and reverts to the settlor or the 
testator’s successors in title, but does 
not exist where a person owns a fee 
simple estate in possession, 
 
(b) subsection (1)(b), a trust includes an 
express, implied, resulting, constructive 
and bare trust and a trust for sale. 
 
(3) Subject to this Part, a trust of land is governed by 
the general law of trusts. 
 
(4) This Part does not apply to land held directly for a 
charitable purpose and not by way of a remainder. 
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Section 19 establishes the new statutory model of a 
“trust of land”.  This covers all forms of a trust of land 
and settlements of land where no trust has been used.  
In order to simplify the law further the new model will 
apply to existing trusts and settlements, subject to 
adjustments necessary to deal with situations where 
under the present law no trust or trustees would 
necessarily be involved initially.  Sections 20 and 21 
make these adjustments. 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Paragraph (1)(a) covers cases where there is what is 
usually referred to as a “strict settlement”, ie, where 
land is limited to persons in succession without the 
interposition of a trust.  A simple example would be a 
grant “to A for life, with remainder to B in fee 
simple”.  Under the existing law, including the Settled 
Land Acts 1882-90, A would have the powers of 
dealing with the land of a “tenant for life”, including 
the power of sale.  However, although not a trustee of 
the land, the tenant for life is regarded as a “trustee of 
the powers”, so that in exercising the powers regard 
must be had to the interests of the other beneficiaries 
supposed to take the land in succession.  This position 
of the tenant for life is reiterated by the requirement 
that upon a sale, or other disposition of the land, made 
by the tenant for life which raises capital money, that 
capital money must not go to the tenant for life.  
Instead, under section 22 of the Settled Land Act 1882 
it must be paid to independent “trustees of the 
settlement” (usually nominated by the deed of 
settlement), or else, under section 46 of the 1882 Act, 
paid into court.  If this is not done, the purchaser or 
other person dealing with the tenant for life will not 
obtain a good title.  In this respect the imposition of a 
direct trust in the case of such strict settlements may 
be regarded as a recognition of the practical realities 
of the parties’ position. 
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Paragraph (1)(b) covers all situations where land is 
held on some form of trust, whether it has come into 
existence before the commencement of Part 4 or after 
that commencement.  Subsection (2)(b) clarifies this 
point, by making it plain that Part 4 applies not only to 
a trust created expressly (eg, taking the example given 
earlier, when land is conveyed or left by will “to X 
and Y to hold on trust for A for life, with remainder to 
B in fee simple”, the trust being either a holding trust 
or trust for sale), but also to one which arises from the 
application of equitable principles (eg, an implied, 
resulting or constructive trust).  It also makes it clear 
that it incorporates a situation where there is no 
succession of interests, eg a bare trust, where land is 
held by a trustee or nominee for a beneficiary who is 
entitled absolutely to the land. 
 
Paragraph (1)(c) deals with a special case where 
under the existing law settled land is deemed to exist, 
ie, where it is vested in a minor.  However, although 
the legal fee simple may be vested in the minor 
absolutely, he or she is deemed to be a tenant for life 
for the purposes of the Settled Land Act 1882 (see 
section 59).  Despite that, if an effective sale or other 
major disposition is to be made of the land (ie, one 
which the minor cannot disown on reaching his or her 
majority), it must be made by trustees of the 
settlement or under a court order (in accordance with 
section 60 of the 1882 Act) rather than by the minor.  
Again, by imposing a trust, paragraph (1)(c) may be 
regarded as recognising the practical realities. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) clarifies subsection (1).  Paragraph (a) 
makes it clear that a succession of interests necessary 
to create a strict settlement for the purposes of 
subsection (1)(a) exists even though on the face of it 
no express succession has been created.  
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 For example, if land is granted by A, holder of a fee 
simple estate, simply “to B for life”, there appears to 
be no limitation to persons in succession.  However, 
there is, in fact and in law, a succession, because a 
reversion in favour of A will automatically come into 
existence upon the making of the grant.  It is also 
made clear, however, that there is no succession where 
a person holds a “modified” fee simple – this ties in 
with the provisions in section 11(1) and (2).  The CP 
recommended that it was not appropriate to impose a 
trust on the holder of such a fee simple. Paragraph (b) 
has already been explained.   
 
Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) makes it clear that any trust of land 
arising under Part 4 is governed by the general law, 
including new statute law which may be enacted in the 
future.  This is, however, qualified because Part 4 
applies some provisions which would not necessarily 
apply under the general law.  For example, section 21 
provides that trustees of land have the powers of 
dealing with the land of an absolute owner, which 
would not be the general rule for trustees of other 
kinds of property. 
 
Subsection (4) 
 
Subsection (4) makes it clear that Part 4 does not apply 
to land held directly for charitable purposes.  
Charitable trusts give rise to special considerations.  
They are already the subject of particular legislation 
(the Charities Acts 1961 and 1973) and are likely to be 
the subject of further legislation in the near future.  
Part 4 does apply where the land is held initially for an 
individual, but with a remainder over in favour of a 
charity. 
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Trustees of 
land. 
 
4.20 
 
SLA 1882 
20. – (1) The following persons are the trustees of a 
trust of land (in this Part referred to as the “trustees of 
land”) –  
 
(a) in the case of a strict settlement, where 
it  –  
 
(i) exists at the commencement of 
this Part, the tenant for life 
within the meaning of the 
Settled Land Act 1882 together 
with any trustees of the 
settlement for the purposes of 
that Act, 
 
(ii) is purported to be created after 
the commencement of this Part, 
the persons who would fall 
within paragraph (b) if the 
instrument creating it were 
deemed to be an instrument 
creating a trust of land, 
 
(b) in the case of a trust of land created 
expressly –  
 
(i) any trustee nominated by the 
trust instrument, but, if there is 
no such person, then, 
 
(ii) any person on whom the trust 
instrument confers a present or 
future power of sale of the land, 
or power of consent to or 
approval of the exercise of such 
a power of sale, but, if there is 
no such person, then, 
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(iii) any person who, under either 
the trust instrument or the 
general law, has power to 
appoint a trustee of the land, 
but, if there is no such person, 
then, 
 
(iv) the settlor or, in the case of a trust 
created by will, the testator’s 
personal representative or 
representatives, 
 
 
(c) in the case of land vested in a minor 
before the commencement of this Act 
or purporting so to vest after such 
commencement, the persons who would 
fall within paragraph (b) if the 
instrument vesting the land were 
deemed to be an instrument creating a 
trust of land,  
 
(d) in the case of land the subject of an 
implied, resulting, constructive or bare 
trust, the person in whom the legal title 
to the land is vested. 
 
(2) For the purposes of –  
 
(a) subsection (1)(a)(ii) and (1)(c), the 
references in subsection (1)(b) to 
“trustee”  and “trustee of the land” 
includes a trustee of the settlement, 
 
(b) subsection (1)(b)(iii) a power to appoint 
a trustee includes a power to appoint 
where no previous appointment has 
been made, 
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(3) Nothing in this section affects the right of any 
person to obtain an order of the court appointing a 
trustee of land or vesting land in a person as trustee. 
 
 
Section 20 follows on from section 19 and specifies 
for the purposes of each category of trust of land, 
whether an existing trust or settlement or future trust, 
who are the trustees of the land. 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Paragraph (a) of subsection (1) deals with strict 
settlements.  Subparagraph (i) covers a settlement 
already in existence at the commencement of Part 4, 
where the powers of dealing with the land would be 
vested directly in the tenant for life, but subject to the 
indirect role of trustees of the settlement.  Some 
continuity of that position is preserved by making the 
tenant for life and the trustees (if, as they should be in 
any well-drafted settlement, such trustees have been 
nominated) the joint trustees.  If there are no trustees 
of the settlement, the tenant for life will be the sole 
trustee, but, in accordance with the safeguard which 
already exists under current law, will not be able to 
deal with it without another trustee being appointed.  
As a last resort that appointment can be made by the 
court (see subsection (3)).  That safeguard remains 
under the proposed statutory scheme (see section 
22(2)(a)).  Subparagraph (ii) deals with any new 
purported strict settlement created after the 
commencement of Part 4.  Under section 19(1)(a) this 
would nevertheless operate as a trust of land, 
notwithstanding the failure to vest the land initially in 
trustees.  Subparagraph (ii) adapts paragraph (b) by 
specifying that in such a case the deed of settlement is 
to be treated as if it were an instrument creating a trust 
of land for the purposes of identifying who are the 
trustees in whom the legal title to the land will vest.   
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Thus, if, after the commencement of Part 4, land is 
granted directly “to A for life, with remainder to B in 
fee simple” and X and Y are nominated as the trustees 
of the settlement, the land would vest in X and Y to 
hold on trust for A for life, with remainder to B in fee 
simple.  The same would apply if, instead of the 
settlement nominating X and Y as trustees of the 
settlement, it gave them a power to appoint trustees of 
the settlement or a power to consent to or approve 
such an appointment.  If there are no such persons, the 
fall-back position is that the court can appoint trustees 
– see subsection (3). 
 
Paragraph (b) covers the case of a trust of land 
created expressly.  Usually the trustees will be 
nominated in the trust instrument, but, if there are 
none, the paragraph goes on to specify other persons 
connected with the trust who would become the 
trustees instead, such as persons given a power of 
dealing with the land or a power to appoint trustees.  
Paragraph (2)(b) makes it clear that this includes a 
power to make an appointment for the first time, ie, 
not just a power to appoint a replacement for an 
existing trustee.  If there are no such persons, the 
settlor or, in the case of the trust created by will, the 
testator’s personal representatives would be the 
trustees, pending appointment of someone else to act 
as trustee.  Under section 50(3) of the Succession Act 
1965 where there are no trustees of the settlement, the 
personal representatives proving a will which settles 
land are deemed to be the trustees until such trustees 
are appointed.  The same applies where land is left to a 
minor and no trustees of the settlement have been 
nominated by the will (see sections 57 and 58(2) of the 
1965 Act).  The final “default” provision would be an 
appointment by the Court.  Subsection (3) preserves 
that jurisdiction. 
 78
Paragraph (c) deals with the special case of land 
vesting in a minor directly.  Where such a vesting 
occurred prior to the commencement of Part 4, a trust 
would come into force automatically by virtue of 
section 19(1)(c).  Under section 15 a minor cannot 
own a legal estate after the commencement of Part 4 
and so again a trust automatically comes into force.  
Paragraph (c) adapts the provisions of paragraph (b) 
in order to identify who would be a trustee for the 
minor. 
 
Paragraph (d) deals with non-express trusts, ie, where 
a trust arises by application of equitable principles 
such as those relating to resulting or constructive 
trusts, and special trusts like a bare trust.  It is 
declaratory of the existing law, that in such cases the 
person in whom the legal title is vested is the trustee. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) clarifies some of the provisions in 
subsection (1). Paragraph (a) adapts subsection (1)(b) 
(which deals with cases where the land has been put 
directly in a trust) to cases where a strict settlement or 
vesting in a minor without a direct trust has been 
made. Paragraph (b) makes it clear that a person with 
a power to appoint a trustee includes someone with a 
power to make the initial appointment, as opposed to 
an appointment of a replacement for an existing 
trustee.  
 
Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) confirms that the ultimate “default” 
provision of obtaining an order of the court for 
appointment of a trustee or vesting of land in a person 
as trustee remains.  Apart from the court’s inherent 
jurisdiction to make such an appointment, section 38 
of the Settled Land Act 1882 conferred jurisdiction to 
appoint trustees of the settlement in the case of settled 
land (including where land was vested in a minor).   
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Furthermore, the court has a statutory jurisdiction 
under section 35 of the Trustee Act 1893 to make an 
appointment of trustees generally whenever it is found 
otherwise “inexpedient, difficult or impracticable” to 
make an appointment.  There is also a statutory 
jurisdiction to make vesting orders: see 1893 Act, 
sections 26 and 35 and Trustee Act 1893 Amendment 
Act 1894. It is envisaged that this statutory jurisdiction 
will be upgraded in new legislation to replace this pre-
1922 legislation governing trusts and subsection (3) 
confirms that any such legislation would apply to 
trusts of land operating under Part 4. 
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Powers of 
trustees of 
land. 
 
4.22 
 
21.  - Subject to –  
 
(a)  the duties of a trustee, and 
 
(b) any restrictions imposed by any 
statutory provision (including this Act) 
or the general law or by any instrument 
or court order relating to the land, 
 
a trustee of land has the power of an absolute owner to 
convey or otherwise deal with it. 
 
 
Section 21 implements the recommendation in the CP 
that the new statutory scheme governing settlements 
and trusts of land should confer on trustees the powers 
of an absolute owner (see paras 4.21-4.22 of the CP).  
This greatly simplifies the existing law governing 
settlements, where the Settled Land Acts 1882-90 
contain numerous provisions conferring various 
statutory powers, but subject to various limitations. 
This usually results in settlors being advised to 
enhance those powers by express provisions in the 
instrument creating the settlement.  Instead section 21 
adopts the opposite approach by conferring on a 
trustee of land the powers of an absolute owner and 
leaves it to settlors to decide whether some express 
restriction should be put on the trustee. 
 
It is important to emphasise that there are limitations 
to a trustee of land’s powers.  Paragraph (a) makes it 
clear that, notwithstanding the wide powers being 
conferred on the trustee, he or she is still a trustee and, 
therefore, subject to the duties of a trustee.   
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These derive partly from equitable principles 
developed by the courts over the centuries and partly 
from statutory provisions, eg, the duty when making 
an investment of trust funds to take account of such 
matters as an appropriate diversification and liquidity 
of investments (see Article 3 of the Trustee 
(Authorised Investments) Order 1998 (Amendment) 
Order 2002 (SI No 595 of 2002) made under section 2 
of the Trustee (Authorised Investments) Act 1958).   
 
Paragraph (b) makes it clear that the powers 
conferred by section 21 are subject to any restrictions 
imposed by any statute, including the present Bill, eg, 
the need for two trustees or a trust corporation where 
the land is being disposed of (see section 22).  Such 
restrictions may also be implied by the general law, 
eg, in the case of a bare trustee holding the land for an 
absolute owner.  It also makes it clear that it is open to 
the settlor or testator in the case of an express trust to 
include restrictions in the trust instrument (provided, 
of course, they do not offend the general law, 
including statute law).  It also makes it clear that a 
trustee must comply with any restriction imposed by a 
court order. 
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Overreaching 
for protection 
of purchasers. 
 
4.24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.20 
 
 
 
 
22.  – (1) Subject to subsection (3), a conveyance to a 
purchaser of a legal estate or legal interest in land by 
the persons specified in subsection (2) overreaches 
any equitable interest in the land so that it ceases to 
affect that estate or interest, whether or not –  
 
(a) the purchaser has notice of the 
equitable interest, or 
 
(b)  any person entitled to that interest is in 
actual occupation of the land. 
 
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), the “persons 
specified” –  
 
(a) shall be at least two trustees or a trust 
corporation where the trust land 
comprises –  
 
(i) a strict settlement, or 
 
(ii) a trust, including a trust for sale, 
of land held for persons by way 
of succession, or 
 
(iii) land vested in or held on trust 
for a minor, 
 
(b) may be a single trustee or owner of the 
legal estate or interest in the case of any 
other trust of land. 
 
(3) Subsection (1) does not apply to –  
 
(a) any conveyance made for fraudulent or 
other improper purposes of which the 
purchaser has actual knowledge at the 
date of the conveyance or to which the 
purchaser is a party, or 
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(b) any equitable interest –  
 
(i) to which the conveyance is 
expressly made subject, or 
 
(ii) protected by deposit of title 
documents relating to the legal 
estate or legal interest, or 
 
(iii) in the case of a trust coming 
within subsection (2)(b), 
protected by registration prior to 
the date of the conveyance. 
 
(4) In subsection (3)(b)(iii), “protected by registration” 
means registration of the equitable interest in the 
Registry of Deeds or Land Registry, as appropriate. 
 
(5) Section 72(i)(j) of the Act of 1964 is amended by 
the insertion after “disclosed” of –  
 
“or where a transfer is made in 
accordance with section 22(1) of the 
Land and Conveyancing Act 2005”. 
 
(6) Where an equitable interest is overreached under 
this section it attaches to the proceeds of sale and the 
trustees or trust corporation shall give effect to it 
accordingly. 
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(7) Nothing in this section affects the operation of the 
Act of 1976. 
 
 
Section 22 provides, as recommended by the CP (see 
paras 4.23-4.24 and 6.17-6.20), for the protection of 
purchasers of land from trustees or legal owners of 
land.  Subject to some limitations, the general rule is 
that a purchaser should obtain good legal title to the 
land without being concerned with equitable interests. 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) provides the general rule that a 
conveyance (which, in accordance with the definition 
in section 3, includes a transfer of registered land) of a 
legal estate or legal interest (both defined by section 
11) will “overreach” any equitable interests, ie, the 
purchaser will obtain a clear legal title and will not be 
bound by the equitable interests.  Instead, any 
equitable interest previously affecting the land will 
attach to the proceeds of sale and the trustee or 
trustees will hold that money subject to that interest.  
This is confirmed by subsection (6).  The extent to 
which a conveyance overreaches an equitable interest 
varies according to the type of trust of land or situation 
whereby the legal owner holds the land subject to 
another person’s equitable interest, as specified by 
subsection (2).  The requirement for such overreaching 
that the conveyance must be made by at least two 
trustees accords with the safeguard currently contained 
in section 39 of the Settled Land Act 1882.  The Law 
Reform Commission recently recommended that this 
safeguard should be retained and that the alternative of 
a “trust corporation” should be introduced generally 
(see Consultation Paper on Trust Law: General 
Proposals (LRC CP 35-2005) paras 1.46-1.87).  
Provision is made for such corporations in section 57 
of the Succession Act 1965 (dealing with minor 
beneficiaries of a deceased person’s estate). 
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It is important to note that the general rule is that such 
overreaching will operate in favour of a “purchaser” 
only (see the definition in section 3).  Furthermore 
paragraph (a) emphasises that such overreaching 
occurs whether or not the purchaser has notice of the 
equitable interests.  This is the rule currently where a 
tenant for life conveys settled land under the Settled 
Land Act 1882, but section 22 gives it a wider scope in 
the interests of simplifying conveyancing.  That wider 
scope is reiterated by paragraph (b), which concerns 
an issue which causes conveyancers much difficulty 
and uncertainty under current law.  Under section 72 
(1)(j) of the Registration of Title Act 1964 a person 
with a “right” (which includes an equitable interest) to 
land, who is also in “actual occupation” of the land, is 
given the special protection of having a burden which 
affects registered land without registration, ie, a 
transferee of the land automatically takes subject to 
that right even though it has not been protected by 
lodgment of a caution or inhibition.  So far as 
unregistered land is concerned, it is probable that a 
purchaser is again bound by the interest because, 
under the doctrine of constructive notice, the fact of 
“occupation” would be treated as sufficient to alert the 
purchaser to the need to make enquiries.  Paragraph 
(b) resolves this issue in favour of overreaching 
provided the conveyance is made in accordance with 
subsection (2).  It must also be emphasised, as is 
explained below, that “overreaching” is designed only 
to facilitate conveyancing and does not mean that the 
owner of the equitable interest loses all rights.  It 
simply means that they cease to affect the land and 
instead attach to the proceeds of sale which replaces 
the land and is held on trust for the previous owner of 
an equitable interest in the land. 
 86
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) distinguishes between two types of 
case.  Paragraph (a) deals with cases which under 
existing law would fall within the Settled Land Acts 
1882-90, ie, where land is either limited directly to or 
held on trust for persons by way of succession or 
vested in a minor.  In such cases, which are brought 
within the concept of a trust of land by section 19 of 
this Bill, overreaching will only take effect where the 
conveyance is made by at least two trustees or a trust 
corporation.  Paragraph (b) deals with other trusts of 
land, such as cases involving “hidden” co-ownership.  
The typical case is where the legal title is vested in 
one person, but another has acquired an equitable 
interest under a resulting or constructive trust.  The CP 
drew attention to the conveyancing difficulties which 
arise in such cases where the co-owners are not 
spouses, so that the need for consent to a conveyance 
by the spouse holding the legal title does not arise 
under the Family Home Protection Act 1976. The CP 
recommended that overreaching should take place in 
such cases unless the equitable interest had been 
protected by registration in the Registry of Deeds or, 
in the case of registered land, the Land Registry (see 
paras 6.17-6.20).  The important differences from 
cases falling within paragraph (a) are that in the case 
of paragraph (b) overreaching will occur even though 
the conveyance (or transfer) is made by one trustee or 
sole owner of the legal estate or interest, but, on the 
other hand, it will not occur if the owner of the 
equitable interest has protected it by registration prior 
to the conveyance (or transfer) (see subsection 
(3)(b)(iii)). 
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Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) contains further safeguards for the 
owner of an equitable interest.  Paragraph (a) 
prevents overreaching taking effect where the 
purchaser has actual knowledge of or is a party to 
fraud or other improper conduct relating to the sale or 
other disposition of the land.  Paragraph (b) deals 
with other situations where it is not appropriate that an 
equitable interest should be overreached.  
Subparagraph (i) covers the obvious case where the 
purchase is expressly subject to the equitable interest 
continuing to affect the land.  Subparagraph (ii) 
recognises the common transaction whereby an 
equitable mortgage is created by deposit of title 
documents relating to the land with the lender.  That 
deposit forms the essence of the lender’s security and 
will alert the purchaser to the existence of the 
equitable mortgage.  Subparagraph (iii) contains the 
essence of the new general rule being introduced for 
“hidden” equitable interests, that the owner of an 
equitable interest in land must in future protect it by 
registration in order to avoid it being overreached. 
 
Subsection (4) 
 
Subsection (4) explains that protection by registration 
means registration of the equitable interest in the 
Registry of Deeds or Land Registry, depending upon 
whether it relates to unregistered or registered land.  
The precise method of registration is to be prescribed 
by regulations or orders made in accordance with 
section 5(5). 
 
Subsection (5) 
 
Subsection (5) ensures that there is no conflict 
between the provisions of section 22 and section 72 of 
the Registration of Title Act 1964.  An equitable 
interest will not be a section 72 burden where it has 
been overreached in accordance with section 22. 
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Subsection (6) 
 
Subsection (6) reiterates the point made earlier, that 
overreaching does not destroy the equitable owner’s 
rights.  It simply shifts them from the land to the 
proceeds of sale raised on the conveyance of the land, 
which will be in the hands of the trustees.  It 
emphasises that the trustees must hold that money on 
trust so as to ensure that the equitable owner gets his 
or her share. 
 
Subsection (7) 
 
Subsection (7) contains a saving for a spouse whose 
consent to a disposition of the family home is required 
under the Family Home Protection Act 1976. 
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Resolution of 
disputes. 
 
4.26 
 
23. – (1) Any person having an interest in a trust of 
land may apply to the court in a summary manner for 
an order to resolve a dispute between the –  
 
(a)  trustees themselves, or 
 
(b) beneficiaries themselves, or 
 
(c) trustees and beneficiaries, or 
 
(d) trustees or beneficiaries and other 
persons interested, 
 
in relation to any matter concerning the –  
 
(i) performance of their functions 
by the trustees, or 
 
(ii) nature or extent of any beneficial 
or other interest in the land, or 
 
(iii) other operation of the trust. 
 
(2) Subject to subsection (3), in determining an 
application under subsection (1) the court may make 
whatever order and direct whatever inquiries it thinks 
fit in the circumstances of the case. 
 
(3) In considering an application under subsection (1) 
the court shall have regard to –  
 
(a) the purposes which the trust of land is 
intended to achieve, 
 
(b) the interests of any minor or other 
beneficiary subject to any incapacity, 
 
(c) the interests of any secured creditor of 
any beneficiary,  
 
(d) any other matter which the court 
considers relevant. 
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(4) For the purposes of subsection (1) a “person having 
an interest” includes a mortgagee or other secured 
creditor. 
 
(5) Nothing in this section affects the jurisdiction of the 
court under section 36 of the Act of 1995. 
 
 
Section 23 implements the recommendation in the CP 
that there should be an effective mechanism for 
resolution of disputes (see paras 4.25-4.26 of the CP).  
It enables any person interested in a trust of land to 
apply to the court (the Circuit or High Court, 
depending upon the usual jurisdictional limits) for an 
order to determine a dispute. 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) makes it clear that the dispute may 
involve one as between the trustees (where there are 
more than one) themselves, as between the 
beneficiaries themselves, as between the trustees and 
beneficiaries, or as between the trustees or 
beneficiaries and other interested persons, such as a 
mortgagee.  It also makes it clear that the dispute may 
relate to how the trustees perform their duties or 
exercise their powers, the nature or extent of any 
beneficial or other interest in the land, or the other 
operation of the trust. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) confers a very wide jurisdiction on the 
court as to the order it may make, including directing 
inquiries to be made. 
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Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) specifies a number of matters which the 
court may take into account in exercising its 
discretion, such as the interests of minors or other 
persons subject to any incapacity. 
 
Subsection (4) 
 
Subsection (4) makes it clear that for the purposes of 
the section a “person having an interest” who may 
bring an application, or in relation to whom a dispute 
may arise in respect of which a trustee or beneficiary 
may bring an application, includes a mortgagee or 
other secured creditor. 
 
Subsection (5) 
 
Subsection (5) provides a saving for the jurisdiction to 
determine questions between spouses in relation to 
property now contained in section 36 of the Family 
Law Act 1995. 
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PART 5 
 
POWERS 
 
Part 5 implements the recommendations in Chapter 5 
of the CP.  It is concerned with powers relating to 
property. These usually involve the conferment by an 
owner of property (not necessarily land) (the “donor”) 
of authority on another person (the “donee”) to 
dispose of the property in some way.  A common 
example is a power of attorney, comprehensive 
provisions for which were contained in the Powers of 
Attorney Act 1996.  Another common example is a 
power of appointment, which usually authorises the 
donee to select (“appoint”) from a group of other 
persons (the “objects”) which of them (the 
“appointees”) should take a specified property and in 
what shares.  It should also be noted that various 
powers are conferred by statute, eg, the powers 
conferred on personal representatives under the 
Succession Act 1965 and those conferred on 
mortgagees by Part 9 of this Bill. 
 
Part 5 contains a number of provisions which apply to 
powers generally (but not powers of attorney to the 
extent that they are covered by the 1996 Act) and 
some which relate to powers of appointment 
specifically.  To a large extent they replace existing 
statutory provisions in a simpler and more cohesive 
form, but otherwise without substantial amendment.  
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Application 
of Part 5 
PART 5 
 
POWERS 
 
 
24.  - Except where stated otherwise, this Part applies 
to powers created or arising before or after the 
commencement of this Act. 
 
 
Section 24 makes it clear that Part 5 applies generally 
to powers whenever conferred.  This is because, as 
explained above, its provisions largely replace existing 
law without substantial amendment.  The one 
exception is contained in section 25, as explained 
below. 
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Execution of 
non-
testamentary 
powers of 
appointment. 
 
 
LPAA 1859, 
s. 12 
 
 
5.07 
25.  – (1) Subject to subsection (2), an appointment 
made by deed after the commencement of this Act is 
only valid provided the requirements of section 68 are 
met. 
 
(2) Subsection (1) does not –  
 
(a) prevent a donee making a valid 
appointment in some other way 
expressly authorised by the instrument 
creating the power of appointment, or 
 
(b) relieve a donee from compliance with 
any direction in the instrument creating 
the power of appointment that –  
 
(i) the consent of any person is 
necessary to a valid appointment, 
or 
 
(ii) an act is to be performed having 
no relation to the mode of 
executing and attesting the deed of 
appointment in order to give 
validity to any appointment. 
 
 
Section 25 replaces section 12 of the Law of Property 
Amendment Act 1859.  It relates to execution of non-
testamentary powers of appointment, ie, those not to 
be executed by making a will, which are covered by 
section 79 of the Succession Act 1965.  As 
recommended by the CP (see paras 5.06-5.07 of the 
CP), section 25 alters the provisions in section 12 of 
the 1859 Act which mean that the donee of the power 
has to meet requirements not necessary for deeds 
generally (eg, attestation by two or more witnesses).  
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Instead, following the precedent in section 79 of the 
1965 Act, section 25 requires simply that a deed 
executing a power of appointment should only have to 
meet the requirements for execution and attestation of 
deeds generally.  These are now set out in section 68 
of this Bill. 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) contains the new requirement and, 
because this changes the existing law in section 12 of 
the 1859 Act, the provision applies only to deeds 
executed after the commencement of the new 
legislation. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) contains various qualifications to 
subsection (1), which accord with those contained in 
section 12 of the 1859 Act.  There is no change of 
substance, but the provisions have been recast in 
simpler form. 
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Release of 
powers. 
 
 
CA 1881, s. 
52 
 
5.09 
26.  – (1) Subject to subsection (2), a person to whom 
any power, whether coupled with an interest or not, is 
given may release or contract not to exercise the 
power by deed or in any other way in which the power 
could be created. 
 
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a power in the 
nature of a trust or other fiduciary power. 
 
 
Section 26 largely reproduces the existing law. 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) re-enacts without substantial 
amendment section 52 of the Conveyancing Act 1881. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) is declaratory of the existing law and 
has been added as recommended by the CP (see paras 
5.08-5.09 of the CP). 
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Disclaimer of 
powers. 
 
CA 1881, s.6 
 
5.11 
27.  – (1) A person to whom any power, whether 
coupled with an interest or not, is given may by deed 
disclaim the power and, after disclaimer, cannot 
exercise or join in the exercise of the power. 
 
(2) On such disclaimer, the power may be exercised 
by any other person or persons, or the survivor or 
survivors of any other persons, to whom the power is 
given, subject to the terms of the instrument creating 
the power. 
 
 
Section 27 reproduces without substantial amendment 
section 6 of the Conveyancing Act 1882, as 
recommended by the CP (see paras 5.10-5.11 of the 
CP). 
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Validation of 
appointments. 
 
IAA 1830 
PAA 1874 
 
5.05 
28. – (1) No appointment made in exercise of any 
power to appoint any property among two or more 
objects is invalid on the ground that –  
 
(a) an insubstantial, illusory or nominal 
share only is appointed to or left 
unappointed to devolve on any one or 
more of the objects of the power, or 
 
(b) any object of the power is excluded, 
 
but every such appointment is valid notwithstanding 
that any one or more of the objects is not, or is not in 
default of appointment, to take any share in the 
property. 
 
(2) This section does not affect any provision in the 
instrument creating the power which declares the 
amount of any share from which any object of the 
power is not to be excluded. 
 
 
Section 28 replaces the provisions currently to be 
found in the Illusory Appointments Act 1830 and 
Powers of Appointment Act 1874 without substantial 
amendment.  They are, however, consolidated in more 
straightforward language, as recommended by the CP 
(see paras 5.02-5.05 of the CP). 
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PART 6 
 
CO-OWNERSHIP 
 
Part 6 implements various recommendations contained 
in Chapter 6 of the CP.  An exception to this relates to 
the recommendation concerning equitable co-owners – 
that is implemented by section 22 in Part 4 of the Bill. 
 
Some of the recommendations contained in the CP 
reiterated those contained in earlier Reports and 
Consultation Papers published by the Law Reform 
Commission.  Those relating to severance of a joint 
tenancy (so as to convert the co-ownership into a 
tenancy in common and thereby destroy the right of 
survivorship) were made in the Commission’s Report 
on Land Law and Conveyancing Law: (1) General 
Proposals (LRC 30-1989) (paras 28-29); Report on 
Land Law and Conveyancing Law: (7) Positive 
Covenants over Freehold Land and Other Proposals 
(LRC 70 - 2003) (Chapter 5) and Consultation Paper 
on Judgment Mortgages (LRC CP 30 - 2004) (paras 
6.12 and 6.16).  Those relating to commorientes 
(simultaneous deaths of joint tenants) were also made 
in Chapter 3 of the Report on Land Law and 
Conveyancing Law (7) (LRC 70 – 2003).  Those 
relating to partition were also partly made in para 6.19 
of the Consultation Paper on Judgment Mortgages 
(LRC CP 30 – 2004). 
 
Part 6 does not, however, contain as recommended by 
the CP (see paras 6.23-6.26) a  provision relating to 
matters which are related to co-ownership situations.  
The precise position concerning ownership of party 
structures varies from case to case.  They may be co-
owned in the strict sense that each neighbour jointly 
owns an undivided wall or other structure built on the 
boundary line between the neighbouring properties.  
But often the structure is, in fact, divided (down the 
middle) so that each neighbour owns separately the 
half on the side of his or her property.  
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 This concerns more the relationship between 
neighbouring landowners and so is dealt with in Part 7 
(appurtenant rights). 
 
The other matter referred to in the CP is also 
concerned with neighbouring landowners.  This is the 
problem which occurs where neighbouring properties 
are built in very close proximity, close to or practically 
on the boundary line of the properties.  Often in such a 
situation it is impossible to carry out work (eg repairs 
and maintenance) on one property without using the 
neighbouring property as the only practical means of 
access.  Since such access has obvious close affinity to 
appurtenant rights (such as an easement like a right of 
way) implementation of this part of the CP is also 
contained in Part 7 of the Bill (see sections 44 - 49). 
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Unilateral 
severance of 
a joint 
tenancy. 
 
 
6.09 
 
PART 6 
 
CO-OWNERSHIP 
 
29. - (1) From the commencement of this Part, any –  
 
(a) conveyance, or contract for a 
conveyance, of land held in a joint 
tenancy, or 
 
(b) acquisition of another interest in such 
land, 
 
by one joint tenant without the consent referred to in 
subsection (2) is void both at law and in equity. 
 
(2) In subsection (1) “consent” means the consent in 
writing of the other joint tenant or, where there are 
more than one other, all the other joint tenants. 
 
(3) From the commencement of this Part, 
 
(a) the vesting of the estate or interest of 
an insolvent joint tenant in the Official 
Assignee or a liquidator, or 
 
(b)  registration of a judgment mortgage 
against the estate or interest in land of 
a joint tenant, 
 
does not sever the joint tenancy. 
 
(4) Nothing in this section affects the jurisdiction of 
the court to find that joint tenants together by mutual 
agreement or by their conduct have severed the joint 
tenancy in equity. 
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Section 29 implements the various changes in the law 
governing severance of a joint tenancy recommended 
by the Law Reform Commission.  Severance has very 
substantial consequences for this form of co-
ownership because it converts the joint tenancy into a 
tenancy in common.  This destroys the right of 
survivorship which is the main distinguishing feature 
between the two forms of co-ownership.  Under the 
right of survivorship (which cannot be thwarted once a 
joint tenant dies, so that a will has no effect on it), the 
surviving joint tenants succeed to the interest of the 
deceased joint tenant(s).  Ultimately the last survivor 
succeeds to the entire land and becomes sole owner of 
it.  Severance of the joint tenancy and conversion of it 
into a tenancy in common, therefore, deprives each 
joint tenant of the hope of being the last survivor and, 
where there is a substantial age discrepancy, severance 
deprives the younger or youngest of the expectation of 
becoming the sole owner.  Instead, as tenants in 
common each becomes entitled to leave his or her 
share to successors specified in a will.  If no effective 
will is made, the share will go to the intestate 
successors.  These considerations led the Law Reform 
Commission to recommend that it should no longer be 
possible for one joint tenant to bring about “unilateral” 
severance, ie, without the consent of the other joint 
tenants (see LRC CP 70 – 2003, paras 5.03-5.19). 
 
Section 29 does not deal with one other 
recommendation made by the Commission.  This was 
that the somewhat cumbersome method of severing 
freehold land, which involves the medieval system of 
conveying the land to a third party by way of a “use” 
executed by the Statute of Uses (Ireland) 1634, should 
be replaced by a simple deed of conveyance (without 
any reference to a “use”).  Such a simple deed is 
effective under current law only where leasehold land 
is held in a joint tenancy (see LRC 30 – 1989, paras 29 
– 29 and LRC 70 – 2003, para 5.02).  
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 In fact this recommendation is implemented 
elsewhere in the Bill through several provisions.  One 
is the repeal of the 1634 statute and the other is 
various consequential provisions.  These include 
sections 66 (conveyances by simple deed only, 
voluntary conveyances and resulting trusts), 70 
(conveyances to oneself) and 72 (reservations without 
execution by grantee). 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) prohibits unilateral severance by 
rendering it ineffective in the two situations where the 
law currently permits it, ie, alienation and acquisition 
of another interest.  Because the right of survivorship 
cannot be defeated by the will of a deceased joint 
tenant, alienation in this context means a conveyance 
of the joint tenant’s interest before death to a third 
party.  Involuntary alienation is dealt with by 
subsection (3).  Acquisition involves the acquisition of 
one of the other joint tenant’s interest in the land, eg, 
where land is owned by A, B and C as joint tenants 
and A then acquires B’s interest.  Under current law, 
the one-third interest A acquires from B will be held in 
a tenancy in common and so C will lose the hope or 
expectancy of succeeding to it by way of survivorship.  
Subsection (1) implements the Law Reform 
Commission’s recommendation that such a 
conveyance or acquisition would be void unless done 
with the consent of the other joint tenant or tenants.  It 
is made clear that this applies both at law and in 
equity.  For this reason paragraph (a) renders void 
also a contract for such a conveyance.  Furthermore, 
subsection (4) makes it clear that, while the existing 
courts’ jurisdiction to find that the parties have 
effected a severance in equity is preserved, this is 
based upon mutual agreement and not unilateral 
action. 
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Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) makes it clear that the consent 
necessary to render unilateral action by one joint 
tenant an effective severance means the consent in 
writing of all the other joint tenants. 
 
Subsection (3) 
 
Paragraph (b) implements the recommendation that it 
should be made clear that registration of a judgment 
mortgage against a joint tenant’s interest does not 
effect a severance.  Under current law it appears that a 
severance does occur where the interest is in 
unregistered land, but probably does not where it is 
registered land.  The Commission took the view that 
the general policy against unilateral severance should 
be extended to this situation (LRC CP 30 – 2004, 
paras 6.09 – 6.16 of the CP).  Paragraph (a) extends 
the policy to “involuntary” alienation, ie, on the 
bankruptcy or liquidation of a joint tenant. 
 
Subsection (4) 
 
Subsection (4) preserves the jurisdiction of the court to 
find that there has been a severance in equity where 
the circumstances of the case point to a mutual 
agreement by all the joint tenants to this effect.  This is 
to be distinguished from a case of alleged unilateral 
severance by one joint tenant and is consistent with 
the imposition of a requirement of consent in such a 
case. 
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Amendment 
of the Act of 
1965, s. 5. 
 
 
30.  – The following section is substituted for section 5 
of the Act of 1965:   
 
“5. – (1) Where, after the commencement of 
this Act, two or more persons have died in 
circumstances rendering it uncertain which of 
them survived the other or others, then, for all 
purposes affecting title to their property, they 
are deemed to have died simultaneously. 
 
(2) Where immediately before the death of two 
or more persons they held any property –  
 
(a)  in a joint tenancy, or 
 
(b) otherwise in such a way that 
one of them would become 
solely entitled to it as the 
survivor of the other or others, 
 
and they died, or under subsection (1) were  
deemed to have died, simultaneously, they are 
deemed to have held, immediately before their 
deaths, the property as tenants in common. 
 
(3) Property deemed under subsection (2) to 
have been held by persons as tenants in 
common passes on their deaths to their 
respective successors accordingly.” 
 
 
Section 30 implements an earlier recommendation of 
the Law Reform Commission, and reiterated in the CP 
(see paras 6.08 – 6.09), that the law of commorientes 
(“simultaneous” deaths) set out in section 5 of the 
Succession Act 1965 should be amended in the case of 
joint tenants.  The amendment recommended was that 
“simultaneous” deaths in circumstances rendering it 
uncertain which died first should effect a severance of 
the joint tenancy.  
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 The new provision also covers cases where there are 
clear simultaneous deaths.  In addition, it covers all 
purposes affecting title, but is confined to cases where 
all of the joint tenants die.  By converting the 
deceaseds’ ownership into a tenancy in common, their 
shares in the property would go to their respective 
successors in title.  Rather than effect the amendment 
by inserting wording in section 5 of the 1965 Act as it 
stands, section 30 contains a replacement section.  
Because section 5 is being amended substantially this 
substituted section will operate only from the 
commencement of Part 6. 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) largely re-enacts the existing section 5, 
but extends it to cover all purposes affecting title to 
property. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) introduces further amendments 
providing for severance of the joint tenancy when all 
of the joint tenants die or are deemed to die 
simultaneously. 
 
Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) makes it clear that the consequence of 
the severance is that each former joint tenant’s 
successors succeed to that joint tenant’s share derived 
from treating him or her as a tenant in common. 
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Court orders. 
 
 
 
6.12 and 6.14 
PA 1868 
PA 1876 
 
 
 
 
AJA 1707, 
s. 23 
31. – (1) Any person having an interest in land which 
is co-owned whether at law or in equity may apply to 
the court for an order under this section. 
 
(2) In dealing with an application for an order under 
subsection (1) the court may –  
 
(a) dismiss the application without making 
any order, or 
 
(b) combine more than one order under 
this section, or 
 
(c) attach conditions or other requirements 
to any such order. 
 
(3) An order under this section includes –  
 
(a) an order for partition of the land 
amongst the co-owners, 
 
(b) an order for sale of the land and 
distribution of the proceeds of sale as 
the court directs, 
 
(c) an order directing that accounting 
adjustments be made as between the 
co-owners, 
 
(d) such other order relating to the land as 
the court thinks fit in the circumstances 
of the case. 
 
(4) In this section –  
 
(a) “person having an interest in land” 
includes a mortgagee or other secured 
creditor or a trustee, 
 
(b) “accounting adjustments” includes –  
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(i) payment of an occupation rent 
by a co-owner who has enjoyed, 
or is continuing to enjoy, 
occupation of the land to the 
exclusion of any other co-
owner, 
 
(ii) compensation to be paid by a 
co-owner to any other co-owner 
who has incurred 
disproportionate expenditure in 
respect of the land (including its 
repair or improvement), 
 
(iii) contributions by a co-owner to 
disproportionate payments 
made by any other co-owner in 
respect of the land (including 
payments in respect of rates, 
taxes, and other charges payable 
in respect of it), 
 
(iv) redistribution of rents and 
profits received by a co-owner 
disproportionate to his or her 
interest in the land, and 
 
(v) any other adjustment necessary 
to achieve fairness between the 
co-owners. 
 
(5) Nothing in this section affects the jurisdiction of 
the court under the Act of 1976, the Act of 1995 and 
the Act of 1996. 
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Section 31 implements the recommendation in the CP 
that the complicated and somewhat uncertain 
provisions of the Partition Acts 1868 and 1876 should 
be replaced with substantial amendment (see paras 
6.10 – 6.12 of the CP).  Section 31 contains much 
more straightforward provisions designed to give the 
court a wide jurisdiction to deal with disputes as 
between co-owners and to enable an individual co-
owner or other person interested in the land to obtain 
an order to resolve a difficulty which the other co-
owners are unwilling to resolve.  In view of this much 
wider and more flexible discretionary jurisdiction it is 
unnecessary to implement the recommendation made 
in an earlier Consultation Paper (LRC CP 30 – 2004, 
para 6.19) that the Partition Acts should no longer 
apply to judgment mortgages.  Section 31 also 
implements the recommendation in the CP that the 
provision in section 23 of the Administration of Justice 
Act (Ireland) 1707 relating to accounts should be 
replaced without substantial amendment (see paras 
6.13 – 6.14 of the CP). 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) confers the right of any person 
interested (whether as a joint tenant or tenant in 
common) in co-owned land (whether the owner of a 
legal estate or equitable interest) to apply for an order 
from the court.  Subsection (4)(a) makes it clear that 
“person having an interest” includes a mortgagee or 
other secured creditor and a trustee.  “Mortgagee” is 
defined in section 3 of this Bill as including any 
person having the benefit of a charge or lien.  Thus an 
application may be made not only by a co-owner but 
also by mortgagees, chargees and other persons having 
a secured interest in a co-owner’s estate or interest in 
the land.  It also includes the Official Assignee of a 
bankrupt co-owner. 
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Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) reiterates the wide and discretionary 
jurisdiction being conferred by section 31.  Paragraph 
(a) makes it clear that it would remain open to the 
court to refuse to make an order in a particular case.  
One reason for this might be that the case would be 
better dealt with under other legislation such as that 
saved by subsection (5).  Paragraph (b) makes it clear 
that the court may make “combined” orders, eg, an 
order for sale but also directing that the proceeds 
should be distributed so as to make adjustments 
designed to compensate a particular co-owner or 
otherwise redress some imbalance or unfairness which 
has occurred between the co-owners.  Paragraph (c) 
makes it clear that the court may attach conditions or 
other requirements to particular orders, eg, setting a 
timescale for compensation payments. 
 
Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) lists the typical court orders which 
would be made, reflecting the provisions of the 
Partition Acts and section 23 of the 1707 Act referred 
to above.  However, paragraph (d) widens the court’s 
jurisdiction to make other orders as it thinks fit. This 
introduces a flexibility which was lacking in the 
legislation being replaced. 
 
Subsection (4) 
 
Subsection (4) provides various definitions for 
expressions used in section 31.  Paragraph (a) 
clarifies “person having an interest” as explained 
earlier.  Paragraph (b) defines “accounting 
adjustments” and refers to the sort of adjustments that 
the courts have ordered since this jurisdiction was 
conferred by section 23 of the 1707 act.  
Subparagraph (b) (v), however, preserves the wide 
discretionary jurisdiction to make any other 
adjustments necessary to achieve fairness between the 
co-owners. 
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Subsection (5) 
 
Subsection (5) contains a saving for the court’s 
jurisdiction under legislation which also applies to co-
owners.  Under the Family Home Protection Act 1976 
the court may be asked to dispense with the consent of 
a spouse to alienation of the family home by the other 
spouse who is the legal owner of the home.  The 
spouse whose consent is required may hold an 
equitable interest in the home, so that the legal owner 
spouse is holding it on trust for both spouses.  The 
court may also adjourn proceedings by a mortgagee or 
lessor for possession or sale of the family home. 
Under the Family Law Acts 1995 and 1996 the court 
has wide jurisdiction to make various orders relating 
to matrimonial property (eg property adjustment 
orders) on judicial separation or divorce of spouses. 
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Bodies 
corporate. 
 
6.1 
 
BC (JT) A 
1899 
32.  – (1) A body corporate may acquire and hold any 
property in a joint tenancy in the same manner as if it 
were an individual. 
 
(2) Where a body corporate and an individual or two 
or more bodies corporate become entitled to any 
property in circumstances or by virtue of any 
instrument which would, if the body or bodies 
corporate had been an individual or individuals, have 
created a joint tenancy, they are entitled to the 
property as joint tenants. 
 
(3) On the dissolution of a body corporate which is a 
joint tenant of any property, the property devolves on 
the other surviving joint tenant or joint tenants. 
 
 
Section 32 implements the recommendation in the CP 
that the Bodies Corporate (Joint Tenancy) Act 1899 
should be replaced without substantial amendment.  
This was the statute which enabled corporate bodies 
like banks and other financial institutions to hold 
property in a joint tenancy, eg, as trustees. 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) re-enacts the basic proposition enabling 
a corporate body to hold any property in a joint 
tenancy. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) re-enacts the supporting proposition 
that property acquired by or given by any instrument 
to a corporate body and an individual or to two or 
more corporate bodies as joint tenants is so held by 
them. 
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Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) makes it clear that in the case of a 
corporate joint tenant, the right of survivorship which 
is the hallmark of a joint tenancy operates in the usual 
way.  A corporate body does not die like an individual, 
but it can be dissolved.  Subsection (3) provides, 
therefore, that dissolution should be treated as the 
equivalent of death of an individual joint tenant.  On 
dissolution the corporate body’s interest in the 
property held on a joint tenancy disappears and the 
surviving joint tenant or tenants become the owners of 
the property. 
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Waste and 
encroachment 
on 
commonages. 
 
6.22 
 
CA 1789 
CA 1791 
33.  – (1) Any person who –  
 
(a) destroys the surface of or otherwise 
commits waste on, or 
 
(b) knowingly encroaches on, whether by 
inclosure or erection of any building or 
structure, 
 
any land held in commonage is guilty of an offence. 
 
(2) Nothing in this Act affects the exercise of any 
right of pasturage, turbary or similar right which may 
exist over land held in common. 
 
(3) In this section “land held in commonage” includes 
land held by two or more persons whether as joint 
tenants or tenants in common. 
 
 
Section 33 implements the recommendation in the CP 
that the provisions in the Commons Acts (Ireland) 
1789 and 1791 should be replaced without substantial 
amendment (see para 6.22 of the CP).  Those Acts 
prohibit the commission of waste and encroachment 
on common land.  This relates primarily to the 
commonages which still exist of bog and grazing land 
on the hills and mountains in the remoter areas of the 
western counties. 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) specifies the offences covered by 
section 32 and largely coincides with the provisions in 
the 1789 and 1791 Acts.  The penalties for conviction 
of such an offence are specified in section 6 of the 
Bill. 
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Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) makes it clear that the section does not 
interfere with legitimate rights which may exist in 
respect of common land, such as the right to pasture 
animals or the right to cut turf which are typically 
enjoyed by various persons over commonages in rural 
areas. 
 
Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) makes it clear that the section applies to 
any form of commonage. 
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PART 7 
 
APPURTENANT RIGHTS 
 
 
This Part implements the recommendations contained 
in Chapter 7 of the CP.  That incorporated 
recommendations made in two earlier Reports 
published by the Law Reform Commission: Report on 
the Acquisition of Easements and Profits à Prendre by 
Prescription (LRC 66-2002); Report on Land Law and 
Conveyancing Law: (7) Positive Covenants over 
Freehold Land and Other Proposals (LRC 70-2003), 
Chapter 1. 
 
Part 7 relates to “appurtenant rights” over land, ie, 
rights which usually exist as between neighbouring 
landowners and entitle one neighbour to do something 
in respect of the other neighbour’s land or to stop that 
other neighbour doing something on the other 
neighbour’s land.  One of the most common categories 
of such rights is the ancient one of “incorporeal 
hereditaments”.  The two examples of this category 
which remain in frequent use in modern times are 
easements (such as rights of way and rights of light) 
and profits à prendre (such as rights to fish or to cut 
turf).  Profits comprise a wide range of rights and can 
exist without the “appurtenant” characteristic, ie, a 
person can own a profit over someone else’s land 
without being a neighbouring landowner, or, indeed, 
without being a landowner of any kind (other than 
owing the profit).  The provisions in Part 7 (sections 
34 – 41) contain various amendments to the law 
governing acquisition of easements and profits, which 
the CP regarded as defective.  This involves the 
replacement of the pre-1922 statutes dealing with the 
law of prescription: the Prescription Act 1832 and the 
Prescription (Ireland) Act 1858.  
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 In view of the likelihood that it will be several years 
before an eConveyancing system will operate in 
respect of all land transactions, and that unregistered 
land conveyancing will continue to operate for some 
time, the conclusion has been reached that the doctrine 
of prescription should not be abolished altogether, but 
rather should be modified.  It is much relied upon in 
modern times. 
 
The CP pointed out that many categories of 
incorporeal hereditaments have become obsolete, such 
as tithe rentcharges, former Crown rents and quit 
rents.  It was recommended that various pre-1922 
statutes relating to these should be repealed without 
replacement and the Bill provides for this (section 8 
and Schedule 1).   
 
The CP also recommended that the future creation of 
rentcharges be prohibited, as they too have become 
obsolete, except where created by statute.  As regards 
existing rentcharges, some pre-1922 statutes or 
provisions have ceased to have any practical 
significance and are to be repealed without 
replacement (see section 8 and Schedule 1).   
 
Other provisions remain of relevance and are replaced 
by the provisions in section 43 of this Bill.  However, 
Part 7 does not implement the recommendations 
relating to replacement of section 10 of the Law of 
Property Amendment Act 1859, which relates to partial 
release of rentcharges.  That is dealt with by section 
76 in Part 8, which deals with conveyances of land 
generally. 
 
As indicated in the introduction to Part 6, Part 7 also 
implements recommendations relating to two matters 
dealt with in Chapter 6 of the CP.  These concern 
neighbouring landowners’ rights and obligations in 
respect of party structures and rights of access for the 
purpose of carrying out work to buildings close to the 
boundary line (see sections 44-49). 
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The other substantial purpose of Part 7 is to overhaul 
the law relating to freehold covenants as 
recommended originally by the Commission’s Report 
LRC 70 - 2003 (Chapter 1) (sections 50 – 53).  This 
corrects what has long been recognised as a major 
defect in our land law and conveyancing system.  In 
addition to rendering such covenants (which are 
frequently created as between neighbouring 
landowners) fully enforceable against successors in 
title, the Bill also introduces provision to facilitate the 
discharge or modification of old covenants which have 
become obsolete or an unreasonable interference with 
the use and enjoyment of neighbouring land. 
 
Finally it should be noted that Part 7 does not 
implement two recommendations contained in Chapter 
7 of the CP.  One related to the need for words of 
limitation in a grant or transfer of an easement 
appurtenant to registered land (see CP paras 7.20-
7.21).  This has been dealt with by section 41 of the 
Registration of Deeds and Title Bill 2004 (amending 
section 123 of the Registration of Title Act 1964).  
Apart from that section 71 of this Bill removes the 
need for words of limitation generally.  The other 
matter relates to the operation of section 6 of the 
Conveyancing Act 1881 with respect to the passing of 
an easement or profit à prendre to a purchaser of 
neighbouring land.  Section 6 has a much wider scope 
than this and so this aspect of its application is dealt 
with by its replacement to be found in Part 8 (see 
section 74). 
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Interpretation 
of Chapter 1. 
 
 
PART 7 
 
APPURTENANT RIGHTS 
 
Chapter 1 
 
Easements and profits à prendre 
 
34.  - In this Chapter, unless the context otherwise 
requires –  
 
“dominant land” means land benefited by an 
easement or profit à prendre to which other 
land is subject, or in respect of which a 
relevant user period has commenced; and 
“dominant owner” shall be read accordingly 
and includes that owner’s predecessors and 
successors in title; 
 
“foreshore” has the meaning assigned to it by 
section 2(1) of the Act of 1957; 
 
“interruption” means interference with, or 
cessation of, the use or enjoyment of an 
easement or profit à prendre for a continuous 
period of at least one year, but does not include 
an interruption under section 38(2); 
 
“limited interest” means any estate or interest 
in land vested in possession other than a fee 
simple estate; 
 
“period of non-user” has the meaning assigned 
to it by section 40(2); 
  
“relevant user period” has the meaning 
assigned to it by section 36(4); 
 
“servient land” means land subject to an 
easement or profit à prendre, or in respect of 
which a relevant user period has commenced; 
and “servient owner” shall be read 
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accordingly and includes that person’s 
predecessors and successors in title; 
 
“State authority” means a Minister of the 
Government or the Commissioners of Public 
Works in Ireland; 
 
“user as of right” means use or enjoyment of 
an easement or profit à prendre without force, 
without secrecy and without the oral or written 
consent of the servient owner. 
 
 
Section 34 contains various definitions relating to the 
provisions Chapter 1 of Part 7.  Most of these concern 
the acquisition of easements and profits à prendre by 
prescription. 
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Abolition of 
certain 
methods of 
prescription. 
 
7.19 
35.  - Subject to section 39, acquisition of an 
easement or profit à prendre by prescription at 
common law and prescription by way of the doctrine 
of lost modern grant is abolished and after the 
commencement of this Act acquisition by 
prescription shall be in accordance with section 36. 
 
 
Section 35 implements the recommendation in the CP 
that the law relating to acquisition of easements and 
profits by prescription should be much simplified.  
The earlier Law Reform Commission Report on the 
Acqusisiotn of Easements and Profits à Prendre by 
Presciption (LRC 66-2002) recommended that the 
complicated methods based on the common law and 
the doctrine of lost modern grant should be abolished 
(see paras 2.21-2.24).  Further simplification was to be 
achieved by having just one, statutory method of 
prescription, to replace that introduced by the 
Prescription Act 1832 (applied to Ireland by the 
Prescription (Ireland) Act 1858).  Section 36 
implements this recommendation. 
 
The abolition of certain methods of prescription does 
not destroy a prescriptive claim which is in the course 
of being acquired at the date of commencement of Part 
7.  Provided the usual conditions relating to such 
claims are met, such a claim can continue to be made 
in accordance with the provisions of section 39. 
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Acquisition 
of easements 
and profits à 
prendre by 
prescription. 
 
7.19 
 
PA 1832 
PA 1858 
36.  – (1) Except where the servient owner consents 
to registration of an easement or profit à prendre over 
the servient land, an easement or profit à prendre shall 
be acquired by prescription only on registration, in 
accordance with subsection (3), of a court order made 
under this section. 
 
(2) In an action to establish or dispute the acquisition 
by prescription of an easement or profit à prendre, the 
court shall make an order declaring the existence of 
the easement or profit à prendre if it is satisfied that 
there was a relevant user period immediately before 
the commencement of the action. 
 
(3) An order made under subsection (2) shall be 
registered in the Registry of Deeds or Land Registry, 
as appropriate. 
 
(4) In this section, “relevant user period” means a 
period of user as of right without interruption by the 
person claiming to be the dominant owner or owner of 
a profit à prendre in gross, for –  
 
(a) where the servient owner is not a State 
authority, a minimum period of 12 
years, or 
 
(b) where the servient owner is a State 
authority –  
 
(i) a minimum period of 30 years, 
or 
 
(ii) where the servient land is 
foreshore, a minimum period of 
60 years. 
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Section 36 implements the recommendations in Report 
LRC 66 – 2002 that the excessively complicated 
provisions governing prescription in the Prescription 
Act 1832 (as applied to Ireland by the Prescription 
(Ireland) Act 1858) should be replaced by a much 
simpler scheme (see Chapters 3 and 4).  The result is 
that the provisions in section 36 do not distinguish 
between easements and profits nor between different 
easements and different profits.  The only points of 
distinction concern State land and foreshore in respect 
of which special considerations apply (see LRC 66 – 
2002, paras 3.12-3.14 and 4.04-4.05). 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) is designed to introduce a single 
statutory method of acquisition of easements and 
profits à prendre by prescription, based on certain 
principles enshrined in the 1832 Act.  One is that a 
claimant does not acquire the easement or profit until 
the claim is brought before the court.  Secondly, in 
order to succeed, the claimant must establish sufficient 
“user as of right” for the requisite period immediately 
prior to the date of commencement of the action.  
What that period is depends on whether the “servient 
land” (ie, the land over which the easement or profit is 
being claimed) is State land (or foreshore).  If it is not, 
the period is 12 years (as opposed to the 20 – and 40 – 
year periods for easements, and 30 – and 60 – year 
periods for profits under the 1832 Act), by way of 
analogy with the 12 – year limitation period in respect 
of actions to recover land under the Statute of 
Limitations 1957 (see LRC 66 – 2002, paras 3.02 – 
3.03).  Thirdly, as subsection (4) makes clear, the new 
statutory provision applies equally to a profit in gross 
(ie where the claimant is not the owner of 
neighbouring land and, therefore, does not come 
within the definition of “dominant owner” in section 
34).  These provisions, in particular the need to obtain  
 124
a court order, do not apply where the servient owner 
consents to registration. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) reiterates the principle in the 1832 Act 
that a claim to prescription must be based on the 
period of use or enjoyment immediately before the 
court action. 
 
Subsection (3)  
 
Subsection (3) makes the substantial change to the 
current law of requiring the court order declaring the 
acquisition to be registered.  This is designed to 
facilitate conveyancing by ensuring that future 
purchasers will become aware of the easement’s or 
profit’s existence.  The precise method of registration 
will be prescribed by regulations made in accordance 
with section 5(5). 
 
Subsection (4) 
 
Subsection (4) provides further clarification of the 
“relevant user period” which must be established by a 
claimant.  It must be “user as of right” which is 
defined in section 34, in keeping with the long-
established view that it must be user or enjoyment of 
the claimed easement or profit without force, secrecy 
or consent.  That definition also clears up the 
uncertainty under the 1832 Act as to whether it must 
be written, as opposed to oral, permission.  Either 
form will defeat a claim under the new legislation.  
The user or enjoyment must also be “without 
interruption”, but the definition of “interruption” in 
section 34 makes it clear that this will only defeat a 
claim if it is for a continuous period of at least a year.  
This reflects the position under the 1832 Act.  That 
definition also makes it clear that where the user 
period is suspended because of the incapacity of the 
servient owner, this does not constitute an interruption 
(see section 38). 
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Subsection (4) then goes on to specify the requisite, 
minimum period of time for such user to establish a 
claim.  Ordinarily it is 12 years, as provided by 
paragraph (a), but, under paragraph (b), longer 
periods are prescribed for land owned by the State (30 
years or 60 years where it owns the foreshore). 
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Limited 
interests. 
 
 
7.19 
 
PA 1832, s. 8 
37.  – (1) Where the dominant owner acquiring an 
easement or profit à prendre under section 36 owns a 
limited interest only in the dominant land, the 
easement or profit à prendre attaches to that land and, 
on termination of the limited interest, passes to the 
owner of the reversion or remainder. 
 
(2) Where an easement or profit à prendre is acquired 
under section 36 against a servient owner who owns a 
limited interest only in the servient land, it terminates 
on termination of that interest, but if the servient 
owner enlarges that interest by acquisition of a 
superior interest the easement or profit à prendre 
attaches to the superior interest. 
 
(3) Nothing in subsection (2) prevents the subsequent 
acquisition of an easement or profit à prendre under 
section 36 on the basis of a new relevant user period 
against the owner of the reversion or remainder taking 
possession of the servient land on termination of the 
limited interest. 
 
(4) In this section “owner of the reversion or 
remainder” includes successors in title, or persons 
deriving title under such owner or successors. 
 
 
Section 37 recasts provisions in the Prescription Act 
1832 dealing with the operation of prescription where 
either the dominant owner or the servient owner holds 
a “limited interest” only (see LRC 66 – 2002, paras 
3.30 – 3.31 of the CP).  For these purposes section 34 
provides a definition which makes it clear that this 
covers both a freehold limited interest (like a life 
interest) and a leasehold estate. 
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Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) deals with the situation where the 
person claiming an easement or profit owns a limited 
interest only in the dominant land.  In such a case, that 
person will obviously enjoy the easement or profit 
acquired so long as his or her interest in the dominant 
land lasts.  Once it terminates the easement or profit 
will not end, but will instead pass to the person who is 
entitled to take possession of the land, ie, the owner of 
the reversion or remainder succeeding on termination 
of a life interest, or, in the case where the dominant 
owner had a leasehold estate only in the dominant 
land, the landlord. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) deals with the reverse situation, ie, 
where it is the servient owner, who owns a limited 
interest only and becomes subject to the easement or 
profit.  In this case the easement or profit will last only 
for the period of that limited interest.  The owner of 
the reversion or remainder who takes possession of the 
servient land on termination of the limited interest will 
not be subject to the easement or profit.  However, if 
no action is then taken by that owner, the dominant 
owner may eventually succeed in prescribing afresh 
against that owner under section 35. 
 
 
Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) reiterates the point just made that a 
dominant owner may prescribe anew against the 
owner of a reversion or remainder who fails to 
interrupt continuing use or enjoyment after 
termination of a limited interest in the servient land. 
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Subsection (4) 
 
Subsection (4) makes it clear that section 37 applies 
also to successors in title or persons deriving title 
under the owner or successors.  Thus on termination of 
a dominant owner’s lease, the easement or profit may 
pass to a new tenant to whom the landlord relets the 
land rather than resuming possession himself or 
herself.  Similarly, on termination of a servient 
owner’s lease, the dominant owner may begin 
prescribing against a new tenant to whom the landlord 
relets the servient land. 
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Incapacity. 
 
 
7.19 
 
1832 Act, s. 7 
38.  – (1) In this section, a person’s “incapacity” 
means that person’s minority or mental incapacity. 
 
(2) Subject to subsection (3), where the servient owner 
is incapable, whether at the commencement or during 
the relevant user period, of management of that 
owner’s affairs because of an incapacity, the running 
of that period is interrupted until the incapacity ceases, 
but in no such case does the relevant user period 
exceed 30 years. 
 
(3) Subsection (2) does not apply where the court 
considers that it is reasonable, in the circumstances of 
the case, to have expected some other person, whether 
as trustee, committee of a ward of court, an attorney 
under an enduring power of attorney or otherwise, to 
have acted on behalf of the servient owner during the 
relevant user period. 
 
 
Section 38 recasts the provisions in the 1832 Act 
dealing with cases where the servient owner is subject 
to some incapacity. 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) defines “incapacity” as either a 
person’s minority or mental incapacity.  The Law 
Reform Commission Report LRC 66 – 2002 
recommended that minority should no longer affect a 
prescriptive claim, on the basis that minor will usually 
have a parent or guardian capable of protecting his or 
her interests (see paras 3.20-3.23).  This would 
become even more the case under Section 15 of the 
Bill, whereby a minor would no longer hold legal title 
to the servient land, and, instead, it would be held on 
trust for the minor under Part 4 (see section 19). 
However, the view has been taken that there may be 
cases where the adult who should protect the minor’s 
interests fails to do so and the minor should not suffer 
as a consequence.   
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Subsection (3) enables the court to review the 
circumstances of a particular case. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) deals with the case of incapacity of the 
servient owner.  In such a case LRC 66 – 2002 
recommended that the prescription period should be 
suspended during such incapacity, but subject to a 
“long-stop” of 30 years, ie, an easement or profit 
would be acquired after 30 years uninterrupted user 
whether or not the servient owner recovered from the 
incapacity.  Subsection (2) does not, however, cover 
physical incapacity, since such a person is capable of 
handling his or her own affairs and of enlisting the aid 
of others. 
 
Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) enables a court in a particular case of to 
take the view that there was some other person whom 
it was reasonable to expect to protect the servient 
owner’s interests, eg, a trustee holding the land for the 
minor, a committee in control of a ward of court’s 
property, or an attorney under an enduring power of 
attorney.  In such a case the relevant user period 
would not be interrupted under subsection (2). 
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Application 
of sections 35 
to 38. 
 
39.  – In relation to any claim to an easement or profit 
à prendre made after the commencement of this 
Chapter, sections 35 to 38 –  
 
(a) apply to any claim based on a relevant 
user period notwithstanding that it is 
alleged that an additional user period 
occurred before that commencement, 
 
(b) do not apply to any claim based on a 
user period alleged to have commenced 
prior to that commencement where the 
action in which the claim is made is 
brought within three years of such 
commencement. 
 
 
Section 39 contains provisions to deal with the 
situation where a person claims to have commenced 
user of an easement or profit before the new 
provisions in sections 35 to 38 have come into force.  
They modify the proposals in the Report LRC 66 – 
2002, so as to make the new provisions applicable as 
soon as possible, taking into account what may be 
regarded as vested rights.  They also take into account 
the fact that, under the law being replaced, the periods 
of required user are longer and, under, eg, the doctrine 
of lost modern grant (which is being abolished), there 
is no requirement that the period of user be one 
immediately before the date of the action in which the 
claim is made. 
 
Paragraph (a) makes it clear that the new provisions 
(including the provisions for registration of the court 
order declaring the existence of the easement or profit) 
will apply to all claims made at least 12 years after the 
commencement.  Thus, a person who commenced user 
5 years before sections 35 – 38 commenced will be 
able to make a claim 12 years later (ie, after 17 years’ 
user in total), rather that having to wait a further 15 
years (to make a total of 20 years for an easement) or  
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25 years (to make a total of 30 years for a profit) under 
the old law.  Furthermore, since sections 35 – 38 will 
apply to such a case, the claimant will not be able to 
rely upon the old law wherever the claim is made 
more than 12 years after the commencement of those 
sections. 
 
Paragraph (b) deals with cases where the period of 
user required under the old law has already been 
achieved by the date of commencement of the new 
law, or is very close to being achieved (no more than 
an additional 3 years are needed).  In such cases the 
claimant will be able to rely upon the old law provided 
the action is brought within 3 years of commencement 
of sections 35 – 38 .  After that transitional period of 3 
years any claimant would have to satisfy the 
requirements of sections 35 – 38, such as establishing 
at least 12 years’ use or enjoyment immediately before 
the date the action is brought. 
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Extinguishment. 
 
 
7.19 
 
40.  – (1) On the expiry of a 12 year continuous 
period of non-user of an easement or profit à prendre 
acquired by –  
 
(a) prescription, or 
 
(b) implied grant or reservation, 
 
the easement or profit à prendre is extinguished 
except where a notice in the prescribed form is 
registered in the Registry of Deeds or Land Registry, 
as appropriate. 
 
(2) In subsection (1) a “period of non-user” means a 
period during which the dominant owner ceases to 
use or enjoy the easement or profit à prendre. 
 
(3) This section applies to extinguishment of an 
easement or profit à prendre notwithstanding that it 
was acquired before the commencement of this Part, 
provided at least three years of the period of non-user 
occur after such commencement. 
 
(4) Nothing in this section affects the jurisdiction of 
the court to declare that an easement or profit à 
prendre, however acquired, has been abandoned or 
extinguished. 
 
 
Section 40 modifies the recommendation in Report 
LRC 66 – 2002 that in the case of easements and 
profits acquired by prescription, which under section 
36 can be acquired by 12 years’ continuous use or 
enjoyment, there should be a corresponding 
presumption of abandonment by a similar period of 
non-use or enjoyment (see paras 3.38 – 3.40 of the 
CP). Instead, section 40 is designed to simplify 
conveyancing by introducing a rule that such 
easements and profits will be extinguished by 12 
years’ non-user, unless protected by registration in the 
Land Registry or Registry of Deeds.  
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Such registration will alert any purchaser of the 
servient land to the existence of the easement of 
profit.  This provision will apply primarily to 
easements or profits already acquired before the 
commencement of Part 7, or acquired within 3 years 
of that commencement in accordance with section 39.  
Any easements or profits acquired by prescription 
subsequently will have to be registered under section 
36.   
 
Section 40 also applies to easements and profits 
acquired by implied grant or reservation, again in the 
interests of simplifying conveyancing.  The point here 
is that, like easements or profits acquired by 
prescription, there is no documentary evidence of the 
existence of those acquired by implied grant or 
reservation.  If there is no evidence of continuing use 
or enjoyment by the dominant owner, a purchaser of 
the servient land may be taken unawares, but 
nevertheless remain subject to the easement or profit 
because it is a legal interest in land.  Again, 12 years’ 
non-user will result in extinguishment unless the 
easement or profit has been registered. 
 
Subsection (1)  
 
Subsection (1) contains the new rule that 12 years’ 
non-user of an easement or profit acquired by 
prescription or implication will result in its 
extinguishment unless it has been protected by 
registration.  The precise method of protection will be 
prescribed by regulations made in accordance with 
section 5(5). 
 
Subsection (2)  
 
Subsection (2) clarifies what is meant by a “period of 
non-user” – it means the dominant owner ceasing to use 
or enjoy the easement or profit. 
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Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) applies the new rule to easements and 
profits acquired before the commencement of Part 7, but 
only where at least 3 years’ of the period of non-user 
occur after that commencement.  This provides the 
dominant owner with a 3 year period in which either to 
recommence use or enjoyment or to protect the easement 
or profit by registration. 
 
Subsection (4)  
 
Subsection (4) makes it clear that section 40 does not 
otherwise affect the law relating to extinguishment of 
easements and profits, so that it will remain possible for a 
servient owner to establish in court that there is clear 
evidence of an intention by the dominant owner to 
abandon the easement or profit, however it was acquired. 
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Implied grant. 
 
7.23 
 
41.  – (1) The rule known as the Rule in Wheeldon v. 
Burrows is abolished and replaced by subsection (2). 
 
(2) A conveyance of land creates for the benefit of that 
land any easement or profit à prendre over the land 
retained by the grantor which it is reasonable to 
assume, in the circumstances of the case, was within 
the contemplation of the parties at the date of the 
conveyance as being included in it, or would have 
been if they had adverted to the matter. 
 
 
Section 41 implements the recommendations in the CP 
to replace the complex rule in Wheeldon v Burrows 
(which relates to acquisition of easements or profits by 
implied grant, but not by implied reservation) with a 
new rule based on the principle of non-derogation 
from grant (see paras 7.22-7.23 of the CP).  The rule 
in Wheeldon v Burrows is based upon that principle, 
but involves various additional glosses which are 
neither clear nor certain in their application.  The CP 
recommended returning the law to the underlying 
general principle which has been applied on several 
occasions by the Irish courts. 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) abolishes the rule in Wheeldon v 
Burrows and makes it clear that it is being replaced by 
the new provision in subsection (2). 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) makes it clear that in future implied 
grant claims must be grounded on a  rule based on the 
non-derogation principle which was recently reiterated 
by the Supreme Court in William Bennett 
Construction Ltd v Greene [2004] 2 ILRM 96. 
 137
 
 
 
 
Prohibition of 
certain 
rentcharges. 
 
7.12 
Chapter 2 
 
Rentcharges 
 
42.  - (1) Subject to subsection (2), the creation of a 
rentcharge at law or in equity is prohibited. 
 
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to the creation of a 
rentcharge under –  
 
(a) a contract entered into before the _ day 
of _ 200-, 
 
(b) an order of the court, or 
 
(c) any statutory provision. 
 
 
Section 42 implements the recommendation in the CP 
that in pursuit of the policy of simplifying the law, the 
future creation of rentcharges should be prohibited 
(see paras 7.11-7.12 of the CP). 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) contains the prohibition which prevents 
creation of both legal and equitable rentcharges. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) contains important exceptions to the 
prohibition in subsection (1).  Paragraph (a) preserves 
the rights of parties to a contract already entered into 
by the _ day of _ 200- (the date of publication of this 
Bill).  Paragraph (b) covers rentcharges created under 
a court order.  Paragraph (c) covers rentcharges 
created by statute, of which there have been many 
examples in the past, eg, land improvement and 
drainage charges and rentcharges or annuities for 
repayment of advances made under the Land Purchase 
Acts. 
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Enforcement 
of 
rentcharges. 
 
7.16 
 
CA 1881, s. 
44 
43.  –Subject to any other statutory provision, from the 
commencement of this Act, a rentcharge is 
enforceable as a simple contract debt only. 
 
 
Section 43 does not implement the recommendation in 
the CP  that the provisions in section 44 of the 
Conveyancing Act 1881 relating to enforcement of 
rentcharges should be replaced without substantial 
amendment (subject to deletion of references to the 
right of distress) (see paras 7.15-7.16 of the CP).  The 
view has been taken that the remedies provided by 
section 44 are now obsolete and, given the rarity of 
private rentcharges, should be enforceable as simple 
contract debts only.  This is subject to any other 
statutory provisions governing rentcharges. 
 139
 
 
 
 
Interpretation 
of Chapter 3. 
 
6.24 
6.26 
Chapter 3 
 
Party structures 
 
44.  – (1) In this Chapter, unless the context otherwise 
requires –  
 
“adjoining” includes adjacent; 
 
“building” includes part of a building; 
 
“building owner” means the owner for the time 
being of any estate or interest in a building or 
unbuilt-on land who wishes to carry out works 
to a  party structure; 
 
“the court” means the District Court; 
 
“party structure” means any arch, ceiling, 
ditch, fence, floor, hedge, partition, shrub, tree, 
wall or other structure which horizontally, 
vertically or in any other way –  
 
(a) divides adjoining and separately 
owned buildings, or  
 
(b)  is situated at or on or so close to 
the boundary line between 
adjoining and separately owned 
buildings or unbuilt-on lands 
that it is impossible or not 
reasonably practical to carry out 
works to the structure without 
access to the adjoining building 
or unbuilt-on land, 
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and includes any such structure which 
is–  
 
(i) situated entirely in or on one of 
the adjoining buildings or 
unbuilt-on lands, or 
 
(ii) straddles the boundary line 
between adjoining buildings or 
unbuilt-on lands and is either 
co-owned by their respective 
owners or subject to some 
division of  ownership between 
them; 
 
“adjoining owner” means the owner of any 
estate or interest in a building or unbuilt-on 
land adjoining that of the building owner; 
 
“works” include –  
 
(a) carrying out works of 
adjustment, alteration, cutting 
into or away, decoration, 
demolition, improvement, 
lowering, maintenance, raising, 
renewal, repair, replacement, 
strengthening or taking down, 
 
(b) cutting, treating or replacing 
any hedge, tree or shrub, 
 
(c) clearing or filling in ditches, 
 
(d) ascertaining the course of 
drains, sewers, pipes, wires, 
cables or other means of 
conveying material and 
clearing, renewing, repairing or 
replacing them; 
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(e) carrying out inspections, 
drawing up plans and 
performing other tasks requisite 
for, incidental to or 
consequential on any works 
falling within paragraphs (a) to 
(d); 
 
“works order” means an order under section 
46(1). 
 
 
Section 44 provides important definitions for sections 
45-49, which implement the recommendations made 
in the CP relating to neighbouring parties’ rights in 
respect of party structures dividing their properties and 
resolving disputes over access.  The two key 
definitions are those concerning “party structures” and 
“works”.  These make it clear that the provisions of 
sections 45-49 cover a wide variety of situations 
where there may be difficulties or disputes about 
carrying out works to structures dividing a separately 
owned building, parts of buildings or parcels of 
unbuilt-on land.  The object of sections 45-49 is to 
clarify the right of a person interested in a party 
structure to carry out various works to it and to enable 
parties in dispute over works to party structures to 
seek a court order to resolve that dispute.  The form of 
that order would be a “works order” which would, in 
effect, sanction the carrying out of works to the 
structure and regulate the position of the parties during 
the works and after they have been completed.  In 
many cases it is likely that a party, who finds his or 
her neighbour refusing to allow access to his or her 
building or land for the purpose of carrying out works 
to the party structure, will seek a court order to obtain 
such access. 
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The definition of “party structure” includes a case not 
coming within the typical party wall or other structure, 
ie, where the structure is entirely owned by one 
person, but is so close to the boundary with a 
neighbour’s land that the only possible or practical 
way of carrying out works to it is by gaining access to 
the neighbour’s  land. 
 
To some extent Chapter 3 encapsulates, but in a modified 
form, the provisions of the old Boundaries Act (Ireland) 
1721 (which is being repealed) and extends a modified 
version of provisions to be found in the Dublin 
Corporation Act 1890 throughout the country (see CP, 
paras 6.23 – 6.26 of CP). 
 
 143
Rights of 
building 
owner. 
 
45.  – (1) Subject to subsection (2), a building owner 
may carry out works to a party structure for the purpose 
of –  
(a) compliance with any statutory provision 
or any notice or order under such a 
provision, or 
 
(b) carrying out development which is 
exempted development or development 
for which planning permission has been 
obtained or compliance with any 
condition attached to such permission, or 
 
(c) preservation of the party structure or of 
any building or unbuilt-on land of which it 
forms a part, or 
 
(d) carrying out any other works which –  
 
(i) will not cause substantial damage 
or inconvenience to the adjoining 
owner, or 
 
(ii) if they may or will cause such 
damage or inconvenience, it is 
nevertheless reasonable to carry 
them out. 
 
(2) Subject to subsection (3), in exercising any right 
under subsection (1) the building owner shall –  
 
(a)  make good all damage caused to the 
adjoining owner as a consequence of the 
works, or reimburse the adjoining owner 
the reasonable costs and expenses of such 
making good, 
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(b) pay to the adjoining owner –  
 
(i) the reasonable costs of obtaining 
professional advice with regard to 
the likely consequences of the 
works, 
 
(ii)  reasonable compensation for any 
inconvenience caused by the 
works. 
 
(3) The building owner may –  
 
(a) claim from the adjoining owner a 
contribution to, or set off against any 
reimbursement of, the cost and expenses 
of making good such damage under 
subsection (2)(a), 
 
(b) set off against compensation under 
subsection (2)(b)(ii), 
 
such sum as will take into account the proportionate use 
or enjoyment of the party structure which the adjoining 
owner makes or is likely to make. 
 
(4) If -  
 
(a)  a building owner fails within a reasonable 
time to –  
 
(i) make good damage, or to 
reimburse the costs and expenses, 
under subsection 2(a), or  
 
(ii) pay reasonable costs or 
compensation under subsection 
2(b), 
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the adjoining owner may recover such 
cost and expenses or compensation, 
 
(b) an adjoining owner fails to meet a claim 
to a contribution under subsection (3)(a), 
the building owner may recover such 
contribution, 
 
as a simple contract debt in a court of competent 
jurisdiction. 
 
 
Section 45 confers on a landowner interested in a party 
structure (as defined by section 44) the right to carry out 
works to the structure, subject to the various provisions 
set out in the section.  The kind of works is a very wide 
one, as defined again in section 44. 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) sets out the purposes which justify 
exercise of the right to carry out works.  A dispute over 
this may be resolved by seeking a “works order” from 
the court under section 46.  Paragraph (a) specifies 
compliance with statutory provisions, or notice or orders 
made under such provisions, such as the building 
regulations.  Paragraph (b) specifies carrying out 
development for which planning permission has been 
obtained, or compliance with planning conditions.  
Paragraph (c) specifies preservation of the party 
structure, such as maintenance and repairs.  Paragraph 
(d) specifies cases where no substantial damage or 
inconvenience will be caused to the adjoining owner or, 
if there will be such damage or inconvenience, it is 
nevertheless reasonable to carry out the work.  Again a 
dispute of this can be resolved by the court under section 
46.  Furthermore it is important to read with subsection 
(1) the requirements of subsection (2). 
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Subsection (2)  
 
Subsection (2) imposes obligations on the building owner 
to make good damage caused by the works and to 
compensate the adjoining owner for damage or 
inconvenience and to reimburse reasonable professional 
expenses. 
 
Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) enables account to be taken of any 
“benefit” which may accrue to the adjoining owner from 
the works to the party structure.  The building owner may 
claim a contribution or right of set-off. 
 
Subsection (4)  
 
Subsection (4) enables claims to reimbursement of costs 
or to compensation by the adjoining owner or to a 
contribution by the building owner to be recovered as a 
civil debt. 
 147
Works 
orders. 
 
46.  – (1) A building owner who is in dispute with an 
adjoining owner with respect to exercise of rights under 
section 45 may apply to the court for an order 
authorising the carrying out of works (a “works order”). 
 
(2) In determining whether to make a works order and, if 
one is to be made, what terms and conditions should be 
attached to it, the court shall have regard to section 45 
and may take into account any other circumstances 
which it considers relevant. 
 
 
Section 46 enables a landowner who wishes to exercise 
the right to carry out works to a party structure conferred 
on section 45, but is obstructed by the adjoining owner, 
to resolve the dispute by seeking a “works order” from 
the court. 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) confers the right to seek a works order. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) confers a discretion on the court whether 
to make a works order and, if it is going to make one, on 
what terms and conditions.  Further provision as to terms 
and conditions is made by section 47.  Subsection (2) 
requires the court to have regard to the provisions of 
section 45 which govern the right to carry out works to a 
party structure – it must be exercised for a purpose 
specified in section 45 and subject to its provisions as to 
making good damage and compensation.  However, 
subsection (2) also authorises the court to have regard to 
other circumstances which it considers relevant. 
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Terms and 
conditions of 
works orders. 
47.  – (1) Subject to subsection (3), a works order 
shall authorise the carrying out of the works specified, 
on such terms and conditions (including those 
necessary to comply with section 45) as the court 
thinks fit in the circumstances of the case. 
 
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection 
(1), a works order may –  
 
(a)  authorise the building owner, and that 
owner’s agents, employees or servants, to 
enter on an adjoining owner’s building or 
unbuilt-on land for any purpose 
connected with the works, 
 
(b) require the building owner to indemnify 
or give security to the adjoining owner 
for damage, costs and expenses caused 
by or arising from the works or likely so 
to be caused or to arise. 
 
(3) A works order shall not authorise any permanent 
interference with, or loss of, any easement of light or 
other easement or other right relating to a party 
structure unless it incorporates provision for 
compensation for such interference or loss. 
 
 
Section 47 confers a wide jurisdiction on the court as 
to the terms and conditions which may be contained in 
a works order. 
 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) confers a wide discretion as to the 
terms and conditions which may be included by the 
court in a works order.  These may, of course, include 
those which are necessary to ensure that the provisions 
of section 45 are complied with. 
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Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2), without prejudice to the general 
discretion, empowers the court to give the building 
owner access to the adjoining land in order to carry 
out the works and to require an indemnity or security 
to be given to the adjoining owner. 
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Discharge or  
modification 
of works 
orders. 
 
48.  - On the application of any person affected by a 
works order, the court may discharge or modify the 
order, on such terms and conditions as it thinks fit. 
 
 
Section 48 confers jurisdiction to discharge or modify 
a works order which has already been made and gives 
the court a discretion as to the terms and conditions 
upon which this may be done. 
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Registration 
of court 
orders. 
 
49.  – An order under section 46 or section 48 shall be 
registered in the Registry of Deeds or Land Registry, as 
appropriate. 
 
 
Section 49 makes provision for registration of works 
orders, and orders discharging or modifying such orders, 
in the Registry of Deeds or Land Registry, depending on 
whether the order relates to unregistered or registered 
land.  The precise method of registration will be 
prescribed by regulation in accordance with section 5(5). 
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Interpretation 
of Chapter 4. 
 
Chapter 4 
 
Freehold covenants 
 
50.  – In this Chapter, unless the context otherwise 
requires –  
 
“dominant land” means land benefited by a 
freehold covenant to which other land is subject; 
and “dominant owner” shall be read accordingly 
and includes persons deriving title from or under 
that owner; 
 
“freehold covenant” means a covenant affecting 
freehold land entered into after the 
commencement of this Part; 
 
“scheme of development” means a building or 
estate scheme created on a subdivision of land 
and intended to confer the benefit of covenants on 
subsequent owners of subdivided parts in 
accordance with the rule sometimes known as the 
Rule in Elliston v Reacher; 
 
“servient land” means land subject to a freehold 
covenant benefiting other land; and “servient 
owner” shall be read accordingly and includes 
persons deriving title from or under that owner. 
 
 
Section 50 provides important definitions for the 
provisions in sections 51 – 53 which overhaul the law 
relating to freehold covenants.  These provisions relate 
only to covenants entered into after the commencement 
of this Part. 
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The definition of “freehold covenant” makes it clear 
that the new provisions are concerned only with 
freehold land and not leasehold land, where quite 
different rules apply.  There is no need to refer to fee 
farm grants in this context (which under existing law 
are usually governed by leasehold law) because the 
new provisions apply only to covenants entered into 
after the commencement of Part 7.  The future creation 
of such grants is prohibited by section 12 in Part 2. 
 
The definition of “land” in section 3 of the Bill makes 
it clear that, unless the covenant or instrument 
provides otherwise, the benefit and burden of a 
covenant will attach to both the whole and any part of 
the dominant and servient land.  The definition of 
“owner” in relation to “dominant land” and “servient 
land” makes it clear, again subject to a provision to the 
contrary, that the benefit and burden of a covenant 
may attach to persons deriving title from or under the 
dominant and servient owner eg, a lessee or 
mortgagee. 
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Enforceability 
of freehold 
covenants. 
 
7.30 
 
CA 1881, ss. 
58 and 59 
 
51.  - (1) Subject to subsection (3), the rules of 
common law and equity relating to the enforceability 
of a freehold covenant (including the rule known as 
the Rule in Tulk v Moxhay) are abolished and 
replaced by this section. 
 
(2) Subject to subsection (3), any freehold covenant 
which imposes in respect of servient land an 
obligation to do or to refrain from doing any act or 
thing is enforceable –  
 
(a) by –  
 
(i) the dominant owner for the time 
being, or 
 
(ii) a person who has ceased to be 
that owner, but only in respect 
of any period when that person 
was such an owner, 
 
(b)  against –  
 
(i) the servient owner for the time 
being, or 
 
(ii) a person who has ceased to be 
that owner, but only in respect 
of any period when that person 
was such owner. 
 
(3) This section –  
 
(a) does not affect the enforceability of –  
 
(i) a freehold covenant by a person 
entitled to the benefit of a 
scheme of development, or 
 
(ii) a covenant for title under 
section 82, 
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(b) takes effect subject to the terms 
of the covenant or the 
instrument containing the 
covenant. 
 
 
Section 51 implements the recommendation in the CP 
that the Law Reform Commission’s earlier 
recommendations relating to enforcement of positive 
covenants over freehold land should be implemented 
(see paras 7.29 – 7.32 of the CP).  Those earlier 
recommendations were contained in Chapter 1 of the 
Report on Land Law and Conveyancing Law: (7) 
Positive Covenants over Freehold Land and other 
Proposals (LRC 70 – 2003). The provisions of section 
51, which apply unless the instrument containing the 
covenant provides otherwise, rendered it unnecessary 
to re-enact the equivalent of sections 58 and 59 of the 
Conveyancing Act 1881.  The CP recommended that 
their provisions should be consolidated with the new 
provisions governing freehold covenants. 
 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) makes it clear that the provisions in 
section 51 are designed to replace the unsatisfactory 
rules of the common law and equity (including the 
rule in Tulk v Moxhay which confines enforceability of 
freehold covenents to negative covenants and so 
excludes important positive covenants, such as, 
covenants for repair and maintenance).  The one 
exception to this is the special equitable rule usually 
known as the Rule in Elliston v Reacher, which is 
preserved by subsection (3)(a)(i). 
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Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) contains the new law, which essentially 
makes freehold covenants as fully enforceable by and 
against successors in title as leasehold covenants. 
Subsection (2) makes it clear that the benefit and 
burden of a covenant will attach to a dominant or 
servient owner only in respect of the period when he 
or she was that owner.  Thus, once the servient owner 
has ceased to own the land subject to the covenant, 
there is no continuing liability for breaches which 
occur subsequently.  The servient owner will, 
however, still be liable for breaches which occurred 
while he or she was the owner and which may be 
pursued subsequently, subject to the statutory 
limitations period relating to actions to enforce such 
covenants.  In such instances, since that former 
servient owner no longer occupies the land, 
enforcement will involve an action for damages, rather 
than, eg, an injunction to restrain a continuing breach.  
Such an injunction may be sought against the new 
servient owner. 
 
Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) clarifies the scope of the new 
provisions.  As mentioned earlier, paragraph (a)(i) 
preserves the special rule in Elliston v Reacher (see 
also the definition of “scheme of development” in 
section 50), whereby the benefit of a covenant may be 
claimed by a person who is not strictly a successor in 
title to the original covenantee.  This relates to cases 
of subdivision of land (whether freehold or leasehold), 
where the common vendor (or landlord) who 
originally creates the scheme (such as a typical 
housing estate or shopping centre) sells (or leases) 
subdivided parts to different purchasers (or lessees) 
who enter into common covenants designed to be 
enforceable by everyone on the development and their 
respective successors in title.  
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What usually occurs is that the parts are sold (or 
leased) originally over a period of months or years, so 
that the “dominant land” benefited by covenants 
entered into in later original sales (or leases) will not 
include parts previously sold (or leased). Under the 
general law those purchasing (or leasing) parts sold off 
later could not claim to succeed to the benefit of 
covenants entered into by purchasers (or lessees) of 
parts previously sold (or leased).  The special rule of 
equity enshrined in Elliston v Reacher was designed to 
get round this problem and provides that all purchasers 
(or lessees) and their successors in title can claim the 
benefit of covenants throughout the development, 
whatever the order in which individual parts were 
originally sold (or leased). Paragraph (a)(ii) makes it 
clear that the new provisions do not apply to 
covenants for title (the enforceability of which is 
governed by Section 82). Paragraph (b) excludes the 
new provisions where the covenant itself or the 
instrument containing it makes it clear that, eg, the 
covenant is personal to the original parties and is not 
intended to benefit or burden their respective 
successors in title. 
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Discharge 
and 
modification. 
 
7.30 
 
 
52.  – (1) A servient owner may apply to the court for 
an order discharging in whole or in part or modifying 
a freehold covenant on the ground that continued 
compliance with it would involve an unreasonable 
interference with the use and enjoyment of the 
servient land. 
 
(2) In determining whether to make an order under 
subsection (1) and, if one is to be made, what terms 
and conditions should be attached to it, the court shall 
have regard to the following matters–  
 
(a) the circumstances in which, and the 
purposes for which, the covenant was 
originally entered into and the time 
which has elapsed since then, 
 
(b) any change in the character of the 
dominant land and servient land or their 
neighbourhood, 
 
(c) the development plan for the area under 
the Act of 2000, 
 
(d) planning permissions granted under 
that Act in respect of land in the 
vicinity of the dominant land and 
servient land or refusals to grant such 
permissions, 
 
(e) whether the covenant secures any 
practical benefit to the dominant owner 
and, if so, the nature and extent of that 
benefit, 
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(f) where the covenant creates an 
obligation on the servient owner to 
execute any works or to do any thing, 
or to pay or contribute towards the cost 
of executing any works or doing any 
thing, whether compliance with that 
obligation has become unduly onerous 
compared with the benefit to be derived 
from such compliance, 
 
(g) whether the dominant owner has 
agreed, expressly or impliedly, to the 
covenant being discharged or varied, 
 
(h) any representations made by any 
person served with notice of the 
application, 
 
(i) any other matter which the court 
considers relevant. 
 
(3) Where the court is satisfied that compliance with 
an order under subsection (1) will result in a loss to 
the dominant owner or other person adversely affected 
by the order, it shall include as a condition in the order 
a requirement by the servient owner to pay the 
dominant owner or other person such compensation as 
the court thinks fit. 
 
 
Section 52 implements the other main 
recommendation contained in the Commission’s 
earlier Report LRC 70 – 2003 that there should be 
introduced provisions to facilitate the discharge 
altogether or variation of freehold covenants which 
have become obsolete or no longer serve a useful 
purpose and, as a consequence, impede development 
of the land subject to them.  
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It is envisaged that this jurisdiction will apply 
primarily to covenants restricting use. 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) creates the jurisdiction to discharge or 
modify freehold covenants on the ground that 
compliance involves an unreasonable interference 
with the use and enjoyment of the servient land. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) makes it clear that the court has a wide 
discretion whether to make an order under subsection 
(1) and then goes on to list a wide range of matters 
which it may take into consideration in exercising its 
discretion. 
 
Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) makes it clear that where the court 
decides that it should make an order, but is also 
satisfied that compliance with the order will result in a 
loss to the dominant owner, the servient owner must 
be required to pay compensation for this. 
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Registration 
of court 
orders. 
53.  –  An order under section 52 shall be registered in 
the Registry of Deeds or Land Registry, as 
appropriate. 
 
 
Section 53 makes provision for registration of court 
orders made under section 52 in the Registry of Deeds 
or Land Registry, depending on whether the land 
affected by the order is unregistered or registered land.  
The precise method of registration will be prescribed 
by regulation in accordance with section 5(5). 
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PART 8 
 
CONTRACTS AND CONVEYANCES 
 
Part 8 implements Chapter 8 of the CP.  It deals with 
contracts relating to land transactions and 
conveyances.  In doing so it also implements various 
recommendations for reform and simplification of the 
law contained in several previous reports and 
consultation papers published by the Law Reform 
Commission.  Although this Bill is designed partly to 
facilitate introduction of eConveyancing, to some 
extent it is also intended to deal with practice in the 
interim period before that new system becomes fully 
operative.  For this reason, as recommended by the 
Consultation Paper, some provisions will in due 
course be replaced once a fully effective 
eConveyancing system is in force (see para 8.04 of the 
CP). 
 
Part 8 will result in the repeal of some archaic pre-
1922 legislation and will also replace, often with 
substantial amendment, provisions governing 
contracts and conveyances contained in numerous 
other pre-1922 statutes. 
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Evidence in 
writing. 
 
SF 1695, s.2 
 
8.05 
PART 8 
 
CONTRACTS AND CONVEYANCES 
 
Chapter 1 
 
Contracts relating to land 
 
54.  – (1) Subject to subsection (2), no action shall be 
brought to enforce any contract for the sale or other 
disposition of land unless the agreement on which 
such action is brought, or some memorandum or note 
of it, is in writing and signed by the party to be 
charged or that party’s authorised agent. 
 
(2) Subsection (1) –  
 
(a) applies to contracts whether made before 
or after the commencement of this Part, 
 
(b) does not affect the law relating to part 
performance or other equitable doctrines. 
 
(3) For the avoidance of doubt, a deposit is not 
necessary for an enforceable contract. 
 
 
Section 54 re-enacts the substance of section 2 of the 
Statute of Frauds (Ireland) 1695, which requires that 
contracts for the sale or other disposition of land must 
be evidenced in writing.  The Consultation Paper 
recommended that, until an eConveyancing system 
comes on stream, it was more appropriate to retain the 
long-established law (see para 8.03 of the CP).  Under 
an e-conveyancing system the likelihood is that 
conveyancing contracts will be created without use of 
paper or other documents, ie by instantaneous 
electronic transmission.  This can be facilitated by 
statutory instrument in accordance with the Electronic 
Commerce Act 2000.  
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Further powers to make regulations governing 
conveyancing contracts by statutory instrument are 
contained in section 91 of this Bill. 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) recasts in more simple language the 
substance of section 2 of the 1695 Act.  It does not 
refer to “any interest in land” since this is incorporated 
in the definition of “land” in section 3. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2)(a) makes it clear that subsection (1) 
applies to contracts entered into before the new Act 
comes into force, because it is preserving the 
substance of the existing law.  Paragraph (b) makes it 
clear that the doctrine of part performance will still 
operate.  This is a long-established equitable doctrine 
under which a contract not evidenced in writing may 
nevertheless be enforceable.  It also makes it clear that 
other equitable doctrines may be invoked in order to 
secure performance of an oral agreement, such as 
those based upon constructive trusts and estoppel.   
 
Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) clarifies a matter upon which there has 
been some doubt.  Whether or not a deposit payable 
by the purchaser is a necessary part of a contract 
relating to land should be up to the parties to decide.  
Only if they considered it an essential or material term 
should it have to be specified in the written evidence. 
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Auctions. 
 
 
SLAA 1867 
 
8.09 
 
55.  – (1) Where land is offered for sale by auction it 
may be offered –  
 
(a) subject to a reserve price, 
 
(b) with a right to bid up to that price (but 
not beyond it) reserved, 
 
and, in either of these events, the fact that it is so 
offered shall be stated. 
 
(2) Where it is not stated that the land is offered for 
sale subject to a reserve price, the sale is without 
reserve. 
 
(3) Where the sale is without reserve –  
 
(a) the vendor shall not bid, or employ any 
person to bid, at the sale, 
 
(b) the auctioneer shall not knowingly take 
any bidding from the vendor or any 
person employed by the vendor, 
 
(c) if the vendor or a person employed by 
the vendor bids at the sale, the sale is 
voidable by the purchaser, 
 
(d) the highest bidder shall be deemed to 
be the purchaser. 
 
(4) Where it is stated that a right to bid up to the 
reserve price is reserved, the vendor or one (but not 
more than one) person on the vendor’s behalf may bid 
at the auction up to that price in such manner as may 
be appropriate, but if more than one person bids as or 
on behalf of the vendor or any bid is made by or on 
behalf of the vendor beyond the reserve price, the sale 
is voidable by the purchaser. 
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(5) In this section –  
 
“employ” means engage as an agent or servant 
with or without reward, and cognate words 
shall be read accordingly; 
 
“stated” means specified in all advertisements, 
the particulars or conditions of sale and any 
other publicity relating to the auction and at the 
time of the auction. 
 
 
Section 55 re-enacts, as recommended by the 
Consultation Paper, much of the substance of the Sale 
of Land by Auction Act 1867, but clarifies its operation 
(see paras 8.08-8.09 of the CP).  It does not, however, 
deal with court sales and the re-opening of biddings in 
such sales, which the Consultation Paper 
recommended should be dealt with by rules of court 
(see para 8.08 of the CP). 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) re-enacts the rule that the particulars or 
conditions of sale relating to a land auction must 
specify whether there is a reserve price or the right to 
bid is reserved.  Usually a reserve price is specified, 
with a right to bid up to that price reserved (as in the 
Law Society’s General Conditions of Sale).  It is rare 
for a right to bid to be reserved without a reserve price 
and, arguably, this could operate unfairly on other 
bidders.  Subsection (1) accords with standard 
practice. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) re-enacts the corollary that if the 
particulars or conditions are silent, there is no reserve 
price. 
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Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) makes it clear that if the sale is without 
reserve the vendor, or someone on his or her behalf, 
must not bid and, if this happens, the purchaser may 
avoid the purchase.  It also prevents the auctioneer 
from, in effect, imposing an undisclosed reserve by 
withdrawing the land after the last bid. 
 
Subsection (4) 
 
Subsection (4) re-enacts the rule that where a right to 
bid up to the reserve price is reserved, only one person 
(the vendor or another person on his or her behalf) 
may bid up to that price, but not beyond it, otherwise 
again the sale may be avoided by the purchaser. 
 
Subsection (5) 
 
Subsection (5) makes it clear that a person acting on 
behalf of the vendor may be a paid or unpaid agent or 
servant.  It also makes it clear that compliance with 
the section must be met by express provisions in 
advertisements, publicity and in the particulars or 
conditions of the contract for sale.  The last has long 
been done in the Law Society’s General Conditions of 
Sale. 
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Passing of 
beneficial 
interest. 
 
8.06 
56.  – (1) Subject to subsection (2), on the making, 
after the commencement of this Part, of an enforceable 
contract for the sale or other disposition of land the 
entire beneficial interest passes to the purchaser. 
 
(2) Subsection (1) does not affect –  
 
(a) the duty of the vendor to maintain the 
land so long as possession of it is 
retained, or 
 
(b) the liability of the vendor for loss or 
damage under any provision dealing 
with such risk, or 
 
(c) the vendor’s right to rescind the 
contract for failure by the purchaser to 
complete or other breach of the 
contract, or 
 
(d)  any provisions to the contrary in the 
contract. 
 
 
 
 
Section 56 implements the recommendation in the 
Consultation Paper that earlier recommendations 
contained in previous reports of the Law Reform 
Commission concerning the Supreme Court’s views in 
Tempany v Hynes [1976] IR 101 should be 
implemented (see para 8.06(i) of the CP).  This relates 
to the aspect of that decision which concerns the 
position of a purchaser upon the entering into of a 
contract relating to land.  The majority of the Court 
(Kenny J, O’Higgins CJ concurring) held that the 
beneficial interest passes only to the extent that the 
purchase money, or a part of it (eg, the deposit), has 
been paid.   
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Hitherto the “orthodox” view (given by the dissenting 
judge, Henchy J) had been that the entire beneficial 
interest passes to the purchaser upon entering into the 
contract, regardless of how much of the purchase price 
is paid.  In practice only the deposit (usually 10%) will 
be paid on entering into the contract and the balance of 
the purchase price will not be paid until completion.  
The majority decision has proved to be very 
controversial and subsequent judicial statements have 
suggested that it might have to be reviewed.  As 
recommended by the Commission on several 
occasions, section 56 restores the orthodox view of the 
position of the purchaser. 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) confirms that, in future, the entire 
beneficial interest should be deemed to pass to the 
purchaser upon the entering into of the contract for 
sale or other disposition of the land. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) clarifies the effect of subsection (1).  
Paragraph (a) preserves the long-standing rule that, 
notwithstanding the passing of the beneficial interest, 
the vendor has a duty to maintain the land so long as 
he or she retains possession (which usually is until 
completion).  Paragraph (b) preserves what has now 
become the position as a result of a change made in 
the Law Society standard contract form (which 
resulted from a recommendation made by the Law 
Reform Commission: see Report on Land Law and 
Conveyancing Law: (3) The Passing of Risk from 
Vendor to Purchaser (LRC 39-1991), para 5.7). Under 
Condition 43 of the General Conditions of Sale (1995 
Edition) (the same condition is now in the current 
2001 Edition) the risk of loss or damage is retained by 
the vendor, thereby reversing the common law 
position.   
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Paragraph (c) makes it clear that the passing of the 
beneficial interest is, as was the position under the 
orthodox view of the law, subject to the “condition 
subsequent” that it might be lost if the purchaser failed 
subsequently to complete the purchase or otherwise 
was guilty of a breach entitling the vendor to rescind 
the contract.  Paragraph (d) makes it clear that it 
would remain open to the parties to agree that the 
beneficial interest, or some of it, does not pass upon 
entering into the contract. 
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Abolition of 
the Rule in 
Bain v. 
Fothergill. 
 
 
8.06 
 
57.  – (1) The rule of law restricting damages 
recoverable for breaches of contract occasioned by 
defects in title to land (known as the Rule in Bain v. 
Fothergill) is abolished. 
 
(2) Subsection (1) applies only to contracts made after 
the commencement of this Part. 
 
 
Section 57 implements the recommendation in the 
Consultation Paper which reiterated an earlier 
recommendation of the Law Reform Commission that 
the controversial Rule in Bain v Fothergill (1874) LR 
7 HL 158, should be abolished (see para 8.06 (ii) of 
the CP).  This Rule restricts a purchaser’s right to 
damages where the vendor cannot make good title to 
the land. 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) provides for abolition of the rule. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) makes it clear that the abolition 
operates only in relation to future contracts. 
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Order for 
return of 
deposit. 
 
8.43 
 
58.  – Where the court refuses to grant specific 
performance of a contract for the sale or other 
disposition of land, or in any action for the return of a 
deposit, the court may, if it thinks fit, order the 
repayment of the whole or any part of any deposit, 
with or without interest. 
 
 
Section 58 implements the recommendation in the 
Consultation Paper that it should be made clear that 
where the court refuses to order specific performance 
of a contract against a purchaser, it has an unfettered 
discretion to order a refund of any deposit paid by the 
purchaser, whether the whole or just a part of the 
deposit (see para 8.43 in relation to section 3(11) of 
the Conveyancing Act 1881).  The English courts 
doubted whether such jurisdiction existed in the 
absence of clear evidence of fraud or other clear 
default by the vendor and, although the Irish courts 
have in the past expressed doubts about this view, 
uncertainty as to the position here has remained. 
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Vendor and 
purchaser 
summons 
 
8.18 
 
VPA 1874, 
s. 9 
 
 
59.  – (1) Any party to a contract for the sale or other 
disposition of land may apply to the court in a 
summary manner for an order determining a question 
relating to the contract. 
 
(2) On such an application the court may make such 
order, including an order as to costs, as it thinks fit. 
 
(3) A question in respect of which an application may 
be made under subsection (1) includes a question 
relating to any requisition, objection, claim for 
compensation or other question arising out of or 
connected with the contract, but does not include a 
question affecting the existence or validity of the 
contract. 
 
 
Section 59 implements the recommendation in the 
Consultation Paper that the provisions in section 9 of 
the Vendor and Purchaser Act 1874 should be 
replaced without substantial amendment (see paras 
8.17-8.18 of the CP).  These govern the commonly 
used jurisdiction to bring a vendor and purchaser 
summons in order to determine a question which has 
arisen in relation to a conveyancing contract. 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) preserves the jurisdiction.  As 
recommended by the Consultation Paper it does not 
refer to the procedure for such applications, on the 
basis that such matters are better dealt with by rules of 
court. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) confirms the wide discretion in the 
court as to the orders which can be made, including 
orders as to costs. 
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Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) retains the restriction on the scope of 
the jurisdiction, that it cannot be used to question the 
existence or validity of the contract. 
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Root of title. 
 
8.12 
 
VPA 1874, 
s. 1 
 
Chapter 2 
 
Title 
 
60.  – (1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), after the 
commencement of this Part, a period of at least 20 
years commencing with a good root of title is the 
period for proof of title which the purchaser may 
require. 
 
(2) Where the title originates with a fee farm grant or 
lease, subsection (1) does not prevent the purchaser 
from requiring production of the fee farm grant or 
lease. 
 
(3) Subsection (1) takes effect subject to the terms of 
the contract for the sale or other disposition of the 
land. 
 
 
Section 60 implements the recommendation in the 
Consultation Paper that the statutory period of title to 
be shown on an “open” contract should be reduced 
from 40 years to 20 years (thereby replacing section 1 
of the Vendor and Purchaser Act 1874 with 
substantial amendment) (see paras 8.11-8.12 of the 
CP). 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) reduces the period to 20 years, but 
incorporates the long-standing rule that this is a 
minimum period, which may be extended so as to 
ensure that the title begins with a “good root”. 
 
 176
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) confirms the long-standing rule that 
where a purchaser is taking a conveyance or 
assignment of an interest held under a fee farm grant 
or lease, he or she is entitled to production of the 
original grant or lease, however long ago it was 
granted.  Section 12 of the Bill prohibits the future 
creation of fee farm grants, but existing ones will 
remain a feature of titles for many years to come. The 
statutory period of title does not restrict this and 
instead governs which (if any) subsequent 
conveyances or assignments of the interest should, in 
addition, be produced by the vendor. 
 
Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) confirms the rule that the statutory 
period of title applies only to an “open” contract, ie, 
where there is no express provision in the contract 
dealing with the matter. 
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Leasehold 
titles. 
 
 
VPA 1874, 
 s. 2 
 
CA 1881,  
ss. 3 and 13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CA 1882, s. 4 
 
 
 
 
 
61.  – (1) Subject to subsections (2) and (5), under a 
contract to grant or assign a lease or sublease of land, 
the intended grantee or assignee is not entitled to call 
for the title to –  
 
(a) the fee simple estate, or 
 
(b) any leasehold estate superior to that out 
of which the sublease is, or is to be, 
immediately derived. 
 
(2) Subject to subsection (5), under a contract made 
after the commencement of this Part to grant a lease or 
sublease for a term exceeding 5 years the intended 
grantee may call for–  
 
(a) in the case of a lease to be derived 
immediately out of the fee simple 
estate, a copy of the conveyance of that 
estate to the grantor, or 
 
(b) in the case of a sublease, a copy of the 
superior lease out of which it is to be 
immediately derived and, if any, the 
immediate assignment of the superior 
lease to the grantor, 
 
and, where the lease or sublease is granted for the full 
market rent, taking into account any premium also 
paid by, but disregarding any concessions or 
inducements made to, the intended grantee, that 
grantee may also call for 20 years’ title as a purchaser 
under section 60(1). 
 
(3) For the purpose of the deduction of title to an 
intended assignee, no preliminary contract for or 
relating to the lease forms part of the title, or evidence 
of the title, to the lease. 
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Reversal of 
the Rule in 
Patman v 
Harland 
 
(4) Where by reason of subsection (1) an intended 
grantee or assignee is not entitled to call for the title to 
the fee simple estate or a superior leasehold estate, that 
person, where the contract is made after the 
commencement of this Part, is not affected with notice 
of any matter or thing of which, if the contract had 
specified that such title should be furnished, that 
person might have had notice. 
 
(5) Subsections (1) and (2) take effect subject to the 
terms of the contract for the grant or assignment of the 
lease or sublease. 
 
 
Section 61 implements the recommendation in the 
Consultation Paper that the provisions in section 2 of 
the Vendor and Purchaser Act 1874 and sections 3 
and 13 of the Conveyancing Act 1881 relating to 
deduction of title in leasehold cases should be 
modified in accordance with Law Society 
recommendations (see paras 8.13-8.14 of the CP).  It 
also implements the recommendation that the rule in 
Patman v Harland should be reversed. 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) re-enacts the general rule in the 1874 
and 1881 Acts governing contracts to grant or assign a 
lease or sublease.  In essence the intended grantee or 
assignee cannot call for the title to the freehold or 
superior leasehold estate for the purposes of deducing 
title. 
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Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) qualifies subsection (1) and introduces 
a change to the statutory rules, as recommended by the 
Consultation Paper (see para 8.13 of the CP).  Where a 
substantial lease or sublease is being granted after the 
commencement of Part 8, the new statutory rule will 
entitle the intended grantee to see more of the lessor’s 
title. 
 
Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) re-enacts the provisions in section 4 of 
the Conveyancing Act 1882, whereby once a lease has 
been granted, any prior contract for that lease ceases to 
be part of the title documentation and a subsequent 
purchaser cannot call for it. 
 
Subsection (4) 
Subsection (4) implements the recommendation that 
the Rule in Patman v Harland be abolished (see para 
8.16 of the CP).  Under this a purchaser of leasehold 
property relying upon the statutory rules for deducing 
title could nevertheless be fixed with constructive 
notice of matters which the statutory rules would bar 
him or her from discovering (ie, they would be 
revealed only if there was an investigation of the 
superior title which the statute bars him or her from 
calling for).  This runs counter to the spirit of the 
statutory provisions. 
Subsection (5) 
Subsection (5) again confirms the long-standing rule 
that the statutory rules apply only to an “open” 
contract, so that it remains open to the parties to 
contract out of them. 
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Other 
conditions of 
title. 
 
8.14 
 
VPA 1874, 
s. 2 
 
CA 1881, 
s. 3 
 
62.  – (1) Subject to subsection (2), a purchaser of any 
land is not entitled to require –  
 
(a) the production of an instrument dated 
or made before the time prescribed by 
law, or stipulated, for the 
commencement of the title, even 
though the instrument creates a power 
subsequently exercised by an 
instrument produced to the purchaser, 
or 
 
(b) any information, or make any 
requisition, objection or inquiry with 
respect to any instrument referred to in 
paragraph (a) or the title prior to that 
time, notwithstanding that any 
instrument, or that prior title, is recited, 
agreed to be produced or noticed, 
 
and the purchaser shall assume, unless the contrary 
appears, that –  
 
(i) the recitals contained in the instruments 
produced of any instrument forming 
part of that prior title are correct, and 
give all the material contents of the 
instrument so recited, and  
 
(ii) every instrument so recited was duly 
executed by all necessary parties, and 
perfected, if and as required, by any act 
required or permitted by law.  
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(2) Subsection (1) does not deprive a purchaser of the 
right to require the production of any –  
 
(a) power of attorney under which any 
instrument which is produced is 
executed, or 
 
(b) instrument creating or disposing of an 
interest, power or obligation which is 
not shown to have ceased or expired, 
and subject to which any part of the 
property is disposed of by an 
instrument which is produced, or a 
copy of which is produced, 
 
(c) instrument creating any limitation or 
trust by reference to which any part of 
the property is disposed of by an 
instrument which is produced. 
 
(3) On a sale of land, the purchaser, where the 
purchaser requires the vendor to carry out such 
matters, shall bear the expenses (except where such 
expenses should be borne by the vendor in compliance 
with the obligation to deduce title) of –  
 
(a) production and inspection of all 
instruments, letters of administration, 
probates, proceedings at courts, 
records, statutory provisions and other 
documents not in the possession of the 
vendor, or the vendor’s mortgagee or 
trustee,  
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(b) making, procuring, producing, 
searching for and verifying all 
certificates, declarations, evidence and 
information, and all attested, office, 
stamped or other copies or abstracts of, 
or extracts from, any statutory 
provisions or other documents, not in 
the possession of the vendor or the 
vendor’s mortgagee or trustee, 
 
(c) making any copy, whether attested or 
unattested of any document retained by 
the vendor, or the vendor’s mortgagee 
or trustee, required to be delivered by 
the purchaser. 
 
(4) On a sale of land in lots, a purchaser of two or 
more lots held wholly or partly under the same title is 
entitled to no more than one abstract of the common 
title, nor to more than one copy of any document 
forming part of the common title, except at the 
purchaser’s own expense. 
 
(5) The inability of a vendor to furnish the purchaser 
with an acknowledgment of the right to production 
and delivery of copies of documents of title is not an 
objection to title where the purchaser will, on the 
completion of the contract, have an equitable right to 
the production of such documents. 
 
(6) Those acknowledgments and those undertakings 
for the safe custody of documents as the purchaser 
requires shall be furnished at the purchaser’s expense, 
and the vendor shall bear the expense of perusal and 
execution on behalf of or by the vendor, and on behalf 
of and by necessary parties other than the purchaser. 
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(7) A vendor may retain a document of title where the 
–  
 
(a) vendor retains any part of the land to 
which the document relates, or 
 
(b) document comprises an instrument –  
 
(i) creating a trust which still 
subsists, or 
 
(ii) relating to the appointment or 
discharge of a trustee of a 
subsisting trust. 
 
(8) This section takes effect subject to the terms of the 
contract for the sale or other disposition of the land. 
 
(9) Nothing in this section is to be read as binding a 
purchaser to complete the purchase in any case where, 
on a contract made independently of this section and 
containing stipulations similar to any of its provisions, 
specific performance would not be granted by the 
court against the purchaser. 
 
(10) In this section –  
 
(a) “instrument” includes a copy or 
abstract, 
 
(b) “production” includes furnishing a 
copy or abstract and cognate words 
shall be read accordingly. 
 
 
Section 62 re-enacts the substance of various other 
statutory provisions as to title contained in section 2 of 
the Vendor and Purchaser Act 1874 and section 3 of 
the Conveyancing Act 1881. 
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Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) re-enacts the substance of section 3(3) 
of the 1881 Act and, in effect, prohibits a purchaser 
from investigating the “pre-root” title. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) specifies a number of exceptions to the 
rule enshrined in subsection (1) which came to be 
recognised by the courts.  These are cases where the 
validity or effectiveness of an instrument contained in 
the deduced title depends on some pre-root instrument. 
 
Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) re-enacts the substance of section 3(6) 
of the 1881 Act, which requires the purchaser to bear 
the expenses of production of certain title 
documentation by the vendor. 
 
Subsection (4) 
 
Subsection (4) re-enacts the substance of section 3(7) 
of the 1881 Act, which deals with a sale of land in 
lots. 
 
Subsection (5) 
 
Subsection (5) re-enacts the substance of the Third 
Rule in section 2 of the 1874 Act as amended by 
section 9(8) of the 1881 Act.  Section 9 is replaced by 
section 87 of this Bill. 
 
Subsection (6) 
 
Subsection (6) re-enacts the substance of the Fourth 
Rule in section 2 of the 1874 Act. 
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Subsection (7) 
 
Subsection (7) re-enacts the substance of the Fifth 
Rule in section 2 of the 1874 Act. 
 
Subsection (8) 
 
Subsection (8) re-enacts the rule that the statutory 
conditions contained in section 62 take effect subject 
to the terms of the particular contract, thereby 
reflecting similar provisions in section 2 of the 1874 
Act and section 3(9) of the 1881 Act. 
 
Subsection (9) 
 
Subsection (9) re-enacts the substance of section 3(11) 
of the 1881 Act. 
 
Subsection (10)  
 
Subsection (10) contains definitions designed to 
simplify the wording of section 62, by avoiding 
repetition of wording which appears in the 1874 and 
1881 Acts. 
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Protection of 
purchasers. 
 
8.14 
 
VPA 1874, 
s.2 
63.  – (1) Recitals, statements and descriptions of 
facts, matters and parties contained in instruments, 
statutory provisions or statutory declarations 20 years 
old at the date of the contract are, unless and except so 
far as they are proved to be inaccurate, sufficient 
evidence of the truth of such facts, matters and parties. 
 
(2) Where land sold is held under a lease (other than a 
sublease), the purchaser shall assume, unless the 
contrary appears, that the lease was duly granted; and, 
on production of the receipt for the last payment due 
for rent under the lease before the date of the actual 
completion of the purchase, the purchaser shall 
assume, unless the contrary appears, that all the 
covenants and provisions of the lease have been duly 
performed and observed up to the date of actual 
completion of the purchase. 
 
(3) Where land sold is held by a sublease, the 
purchaser shall assume, unless the contrary appears, 
that the sublease and every superior lease were duly 
granted; and, on production of the receipt for the last 
payment due for rent under the sublease before the 
date of the actual completion of the purchase, the 
purchaser shall assume, unless the contrary appears, 
that all the covenants and provisions of the sublease 
have been duly performed and observed up to the date 
of actual completion of the purchase, and also that all 
rent due under, and all covenants and provisions of, 
every superior lease have been paid and duly 
performed and observed up to that date. 
 
 
Section 63 re-enacts various statutory provisions 
designed to protect purchasers in conveyancing 
transactions.
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Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) re-enacts the substance of the Second 
Rule in section 2 of the Vendor and Purchaser Act 
1874. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) re-enacts the substance of section 3(4) 
of the 1881 Act. 
 
Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) re-enacts the substance of section 3(5) 
of the 1881 Act. 
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Fraudulent 
concealment 
and 
falsification. 
 
8.37 
 
LPAA 1859, 
s.24 
LPAA 1860, 
s.8 
64.  – (1) Any person disposing of land to a purchaser, 
or the solicitor or other agent of such a person, who 
knowingly –  
 
(a) conceals from the purchaser any 
instrument or incumbrance material to 
the title, or 
 
(b) falsifies any information or matter on 
which the title may depend in order to 
induce the purchaser to accept the title 
offered or produced, 
 
with intent in any such case to defraud, is guilty of an 
offence under this Act. 
 
(2) Any such person or the person’s solicitor or agent 
is also liable to an action for damages by the 
purchaser, or persons deriving title under the 
purchaser, for any loss sustained by reason of –  
 
(a) the concealment of the instrument or 
incumbrance, or 
 
(b) any claim made by a person whose title 
to the land was concealed by such 
falsification. 
 
(3) In estimating damages, where the land is recovered 
from the purchaser or persons deriving title under the 
purchase, regard shall be had to any expenditure by 
them on improving the land. 
 
 
Section 64 re-enacts the substance of section 24 of 
Law of Property Amendment Act 1859, as 
recommended by the Consultation Paper (see paras 
8.36-8.37 of the CP). 
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Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) re-enacts the provisions making it a 
criminal offence to engage in fraud when deducing 
title to a purchaser. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) re-enacts the provisions giving a 
purchaser, or persons deriving title under the 
purchaser, a right to bring an action for damages for 
loss resulting from such fraud. 
 
Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) re-enacts the provisions for inclusion in 
an award of damages of compensation for 
improvements made to land before it is recovered by 
the rightful owner. 
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Notice of 
rights on 
common title. 
 
8.43 
 
CA 1911, s. 
11 
65.  – (1) Where land having a common title with 
other land is conveyed to a purchaser (other than a 
lessee or mortgagee) who does not hold or obtain 
possession of the documents forming the common 
title, the purchaser, notwithstanding a stipulation to 
the contrary, may require that a memorandum giving 
notice of any provisions in the conveyance restricting 
user of or conferring rights over any other land 
comprised in the common title is, where–  
 
(a) practicable, endorsed on, or 
 
(b) impracticable, permanently annexed to, 
 
some document selected by the purchaser but retained 
in the possession or control of the vendor and being or 
forming part of the common title. 
 
(2) The title of any person omitting to require an 
endorsement or annexation under this section is not 
affected or prejudiced merely by such omission. 
 
(3) This section does not apply to registered land. 
 
 
Section 65 re-enacts the substance of section 11 of the 
Conveyancing Act 1911.  It entitles a purchaser of part 
of land held under a common title to require an 
endorsement or annexation of a notice on one of the 
title documents retained by the vendor to show 
restrictive covenants or rights such as easements or 
profits being conferred on the purchaser over the land 
retained by the vendor. 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) confers the right to have an 
endorsement or annexation, which cannot be 
contracted out of. 
 191
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) makes it clear that the purchaser has a 
right to have an endorsement or annexation, not an 
obligation to require one, so that the omission to 
require one does not prejudice the purchaser’s title. 
 
Subsection (3)  
 
Subsection (3) excludes sales of part of registered 
land, because the matters covered by this section are 
dealt with by entries on the relevant folio. 
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Conveyances 
by deed only. 
 
8.21 
8.31 
 
RPA 1845, 
ss. 2 and 3 
 
Chapter 3 
 
Deeds and their operation 
 
66.  – (1) Subject to section 67, a legal estate or legal 
interest shall be created or conveyed by a deed only. 
 
(2) A deed is fully effective for such purposes without 
the need for any conveyance to uses and passes 
possession or the right to possession of the land, 
without actual entry, unless subject to some prior 
right to possession. 
 
(3) In the case of a voluntary conveyance, a resulting 
trust for the grantor is not implied merely because the 
land is not expressed to be conveyed for the use or 
benefit of the grantee. 
 
(4) It is no longer possible to create or to convey a 
legal estate or legal interest by a bargain and sale, 
covenant to stand seised, feoffment with livery of 
seisin or any combination of these. 
 
 
Section 66 implements the recommendations in the CP 
for repeal of the Statute of Uses (Ireland) 1634, 
consequential removal of the need for conveyances “to 
uses”, abolition of ancient methods of conveyance and 
substitution of the modern deed as the sole method of 
conveying legal title to land (see paras 8.20 - 8.21 and 
8.29 – 8.31 of the CP).  The CP makes it clear that this 
system will continue to operate until introduction of 
electronic methods under an eConveyancing system. 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) substitutes the modern deed as the sole 
method of conveying legal title to land.  This is 
subject to well-established exceptions set out in 
section 67. 
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Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) makes it clear that a simple deed is 
fully effective without having to include the traditional 
conveyance to uses.  This is partly consequential upon 
the repeal of the Statute of Uses (Ireland) 1634.  It 
also makes it clear that the deed passes automatically 
possession or the right to possession of the land 
without the need for the grantee to enter into 
possession.  This does not apply where there is some 
prior right to possession vested in some other person, 
for then the conveyance is subject to such prior right. 
 
Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) is also consequential on the repeal of 
the 1634 Statute.  Its repeal will remove the need for 
conveyances to uses and the provision in the 
subsection is designed to avoid a presumption arising 
in the case of a voluntary conveyance that the absence 
of the time-honoured formula “unto and to the use of” 
creates a resulting trust in favour of the grantor.  In 
future it will be necessary to prove the existence of 
such a trust without any such presumption. 
 
Subsection (4) 
 
Subsection (4) abolishes the ancient methods of 
conveying land, mostly based on the old feudal 
system, which section 2 of the Real Property Act 1845 
preserved, notwithstanding its introduction of the 
modern deed as an alternative. 
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Exceptions 
to deeds. 
 
8.31 
 
67.  – Section 66(1) does not apply to –  
 
(a) an assent by a personal representative, 
 
(b) a surrender or other conveyance taking 
effect by operation of law, 
 
(c) a disclaimer not required to be by deed, 
 
(d)  a lease or assignment of a leasehold 
estate not required to be by deed, 
 
(e)  a receipt not required to be by deed, 
 
(f) a vesting order of the court or other 
competent authority, or 
 
(g)  any other conveyance which may be 
prescribed.  
 
 
Section 67 contains a list of well-established 
exceptions to the rule enshrined in section 66 that the 
creation or conveyance of a legal estate or interest in 
land must be by deed. 
 
Paragraph (a) refers to an assent by personal 
representatives, which under section 52 of the 
Succession Act 1965 need be in writing only. 
 
Paragraph (b) refers to conveyances which the courts 
have long recognised may occur without execution of 
formal documentation, but instead are based upon the 
actions of the parties or circumstances concerning the 
land in question.  A typical example is a surrender of a 
tenancy, which the court may rule has taken place 
where the tenant vacates the premises and hands the 
keys back to the landlord, which the landlord accepts.  
Another example is an implied release of an easement 
on the basis that it has been abandoned by the owner 
(see section 40 of this Bill). 
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Paragraph (c) refers to disclaimers which also may be 
inferred from conduct, eg, where a beneficiary under a 
will refuses or renounces the gift or a trustee refuses to 
take up the office of trustee.  Under section 56 of the 
Bankruptcy Act 1988 a disclaimer of onerous property 
by the Official Assignee need be in writing only.  The 
same applies to a disclaimer by the liquidator of a 
company under section 290 of the Companies Act 
1963. 
 
Paragraph (d) refers to leases and assignments of 
leases which under sections 4 and 9 of Deasy’s Act 
(Landlord and Tenant Law Amendment Act, Ireland, 
1860) may need writing only, or, in some instances, no 
writing at all. 
 
Paragraph (e) refers to receipts which often may be in 
writing only.  Sometimes they are endorsed on deeds, 
without themselves being made by deed, eg, where a 
mortgage is discharged (see section 18 of the Housing 
Act 1988). 
 
Paragraph (f) refers to vesting orders, such as those 
made by the court under sections 26 to 33 of the 
Trustee Act 1893. 
 
Paragraph (g) enables additional exceptions to be 
added by statutory instrument. 
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Formalities 
for deeds. 
 
8.33 
 
68.  – (1) Any rule of law which requires –  
 
(a) a seal for the valid execution of deed by 
an individual, or 
 
(b) authority to deliver a deed to be given 
by deed, 
 
is abolished. 
 
(2) An instrument is a deed if it is –  
 
(a) described at its head by words such as 
“Assignment”, “Conveyance”, 
“Charge”, “Deed”, “Indenture”, 
“Lease”, “Mortgage”, “Surrender” or 
other heading appropriate to the deed in 
question, or it is otherwise made clear 
on its face that it is intended by the 
person making it, or the parties to it, to 
be a deed, by expressing it to be 
executed or signed as a deed, 
 
(b) executed in the following manner: 
 
(i) if made by an individual, it is –  
 
(A) signed by the individual 
in the presence of a 
witness who attests the 
signature, or  
 
(B) signed by a person at the 
individual’s direction 
given in the presence of 
a witness who attests the 
signature, or 
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(C) it is acknowledged by 
the individual in the 
presence of a witness 
who attests the 
signature, or 
 
(D) it is signed and sealed 
by the individual, 
 
(ii) if made by a company 
registered in the State, it is 
executed under the seal of the 
company in accordance with its 
Articles of Association, 
 
(iii) if made by a body corporate 
registered in the State other than 
a company, it is executed in 
accordance with the legal 
requirements governing 
execution of deeds by such a 
body corporate, 
 
(iv) if made by a foreign body 
corporate, it is executed in 
accordance with the legal 
requirements governing 
execution of the instrument in 
question by such a body 
corporate in the jurisdiction 
where it is incorporated. 
 
(c) delivered as a deed by the person 
executing it or by a person authorised 
to do so on that person’s behalf. 
 
(3) A deed has the effect of an indenture although not 
indented or expressed to be an indenture. 
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Section 68 overhauls the law governing the formalities 
for creation of deeds, in accordance with the 
recommendations made in the Commission’s Report 
LRC 56 – 1998.  It is based on the draft legislation 
included in that Report (see para 2.81). 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) abolishes the need for sealing by an 
individual (paragraph (a)), but not in respect of 
companies which would continue to execute deeds by 
affixing the corporate seal.  Paragraph (b) abolishes 
the rule that authority to deliver a deed has to be given 
by deed.  This has already been done for powers of 
attorney by section 15 of the Powers of Attorney Act 
1996. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) sets out the new requirements, 
following abolition of the need for sealing by an 
individual.  Paragraph (a) provides for identification 
of a document as a deed on the basis that no sealing is 
used, by using an appropriate description or wording.  
Paragraph (b) provides for execution by different 
persons or bodies.  Subparagraph (i) deals with 
individuals and makes it clear that it would still be 
open to an individual to use a seal, as at present.  
Subparagraphs (ii) and (iii) deal with companies and 
other corporate bodies and preserve the existing law.  
Subparagraph (iv) deals with foreign corporations 
executing instruments and is designed to get round the 
practical problems which arise at present because 
often they do not use seals as Irish corporations do.  It 
provides that an instrument executed according to the 
law in the jurisdiction in which the foreign corporation 
is incorporated will be a deed under section 66 and 
recognised as such in this jurisdiction.  Paragraph (c) 
preserves the requirement of delivery of a deed and 
this is amplified by section 69. 
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Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) re-enacts the substance of part of 
section 5 of the Real Property Act 1845. 
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Escrows by 
corporate 
bodies. 
 
69.  – (1) Any rule of law to the effect that the 
affixing of a corporate seal to an instrument effects 
delivery by the body corporate is abolished. 
 
(2) An instrument executed by a body corporate in 
accordance with section 68(2)(b) is capable of 
operating as an escrow in the same circumstances and 
with the same consequences as an instrument 
executed by an individual. 
 
 
Section 69 clarifies the law relating to delivery of 
deeds in escrow by corporations, as recommended by 
LRC 56 – 1998 (see paras 2.71). 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) abolishes the common law rule which 
suggests that the affixing of a corporate seal to an 
instrument automatically effects full delivery by the 
corporation.  This had led to the suggestion that a 
corporation cannot deliver a deed in escrow, which, if 
it were the rule, would be greatly inconvenient and not 
accord with practice. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) reiterates subsection (1) by making it 
clear that a corporation may deliver a deed in escrow 
in the same way that an individual can. 
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Conveyance 
to oneself. 
 
8.37 
8.43 
 
LPAA 1859, 
s. 21 
 
CA 1881,    
s. 50 
 
70.  – (1) Any property may be conveyed by a person 
to that person jointly with another person in the same 
way in which it might be conveyed by that person to 
another person. 
 
(2) Subject to subsection (3) –  
 
(a) a person may convey, but not lease, 
property to that same person in a 
different capacity, 
 
(b) two or more persons may convey, and 
have always been capable of 
conveying, any property vested in them 
to any one or more of themselves in the 
same way in which they could convey 
it to a third person. 
 
(3) Subsection (2) does not validate a conveyance 
made in breach of trust or other fiduciary obligation. 
 
(4) Without prejudice to section 86, this section does 
not affect any rule of law under which a covenant 
entered into with oneself is unenforceable. 
 
 
Section 70 consolidates provisions to be found in 
Section 21 of the Law of Property Amendment Act 
1859 and section 50 of the Conveyancing Act 1881, as 
recommended by the CP (see paras 8.36-8.37 and 8.43 
of the CP). 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) re-enacts the statutory rule that a person 
can convey any property (not just land) jointly to 
himself or herself and another person.  Under section 
86 of this Bill in such a case covenants in the 
conveyance are enforceable as if entered into with the 
other person alone. 
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Subsection (2) 
 
Paragraph (a) extends existing law, under which 
generally one cannot convey land to oneself.  The 
exception to this general rule which currently exists is 
contained in section 52 of the Succession Act 1965, 
under which a personal representative can execute an 
assent in his or her own favour.  Paragraph (a) 
enables other persons to make similar conveyances, 
such as a trustee conveying property to himself or 
herself as a beneficiary or the donee of a general 
power of appointment exercising it in his or her own 
favour.  This provision does not, however, apply to 
leasing because any purported lease with oneself 
would create unenforceable covenants, as subsection 
(4) reiterates, and, apart from that, the lease would 
merge in the lessor’s reversion.  Paragraph (b) 
confirms what has long been the position at common 
law, that two or more persons can convey property to 
a lesser number of themselves. 
 
Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) makes it clear that any conveyances 
made under subsection (2) are voidable if made in 
breach of trust or other fiduciary obligation. 
 
Subsection (4) 
 
Subsection (4) reiterates the fundamental rule that one 
cannot covenant with oneself.  This is subject to 
section 86 which deals with covenants entered into by 
a person with that person and another person. 
 
 203
Words of 
limitation. 
 
8.43 
 
CA 1881,     
s. 51 
 
71.  – (1) A conveyance of unregistered land without 
words of limitation, or any equivalent expression, 
passes the fee simple or the other entire estate or 
interest which the grantor had power to create or 
convey, unless a contrary intention is expressed in the 
conveyance. 
 
(2) A conveyance of unregistered land to a 
corporation sole by that person’s corporate 
designation without the word “successors” passes to 
the corporation the fee simple or the other entire 
estate or interest which the grantor had power to 
create or convey, unless a contrary intention appears 
in the conveyance. 
 
(3) Where an interest in land is expressed to be given 
to –  
 
(a) the heir or heirs, or 
 
(b) any particular heir, or 
 
(c) any class of heirs, or 
 
(d) issue, 
 
of any person in words which, under the rule known as 
the Rule in Shelley’s Case, would have operated to 
give that person a fee simple, those words operate as 
words of purchase and not of limitation and take effect 
in equity accordingly. 
 
(4) Subject subsections (5) to (7), subsections (1) and 
(2) apply to conveyances executed before the 
commencement of this Part, but without prejudice to 
any act or thing done or any interest disposed of or 
acquired before that commencement in consequence 
of the failure to use words of limitation in such a 
conveyance. 
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(5) Such an interest is extinguished unless the person 
who claims it applies to the court, within 12 years 
from the commencement of this Part, for an order 
declaring that that person is entitled to it or has 
acquired it and registers any order obtained under 
subsection (7). 
 
(6) On such an application the court may –  
 
(a) refuse to make an order if it is satisfied 
that no substantial injustice will be 
done to any party, or 
 
(b) in lieu of a declaration in favour of the 
applicant, order payment by another 
party of such compensation to the 
applicant as the court thinks 
appropriate. 
 
(7) An order under this section shall be registered in 
the Registry of Deeds or Land Registry as appropriate. 
 
 
Section 71 implements the recommendation in the CP 
that section 51 of the Conveyancing Act 1881 should 
be replaced by a provision abolishing the need for 
words of limitation in conveyances of unregistered 
land (see para 8.43 of the CP).  This was done for 
transfers of registered land by section 123 of the 
Registration of Title Act 1964. 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) contains the general abolition of the 
requirement for the use of words of limitation in 
conveyances of unregistered land. 
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Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) deals with conveyances to a 
corporation sole such as a bishop or government 
minister. 
 
Subsection (3)  
 
Subsection (3) gets rid of an arcane rule known as the 
Rule in Shelley’s Case.  According to this, if land is 
limited “to A for life, with remainder to A’s heirs”, the 
remainder clause was treated as containing words of 
“limitation” only, ie, delimiting A’s estate, rather than 
as words of “purchase”, ie, designating an estate to 
pass to A’s heirs.  The result was that A would be 
treated as obtaining a fee simple, rather than a life 
estate only, and the heirs as obtaining no interest at all.  
Under subsection (3) such a limitation will take effect 
as specified, with A obtaining a life interest and his 
heirs a fee simple in remainder.  Under Part 4 of the 
Bill this will operate as a trust of land.  Section 15(3) 
of the Succession Act 1965 provides the meaning of 
“heir” and “heirs” when used nowadays as words of 
purchase. 
 
Subsection (4) 
 
Subsection (4) applies the provisions in subsections 
(1) and (2) so as to cure defects in conveyances 
executed before the commencement of Part 8, but 
without prejudice to existing rights. 
 
Subsection (5)  
 
Subsection (5) requires persons claiming such rights to 
apply within 12 years for a court order confirming 
them, which must be registered. 
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Subsection (6) 
 
Subsection (6) gives the court a discretion to refuse an 
order if no substantial injury will be done, or instead 
to order compensation. 
 
Subsection (7) 
 
Subsection (7) provides for registration of an order so 
as to facilitate future conveyancing. 
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Reservations. 
 
8.43 
 
72.  – (1) A reservation of a legal estate or interest in 
a conveyance of land operates, without execution of 
the conveyance, or any regrant, by the grantee, to –  
 
(a) vest that estate or interest in the grantor 
or other person for whose benefit it is  
made,  
 
(b) annex it to the land, if any, for the 
benefit of which it is made. 
 
(2) A conveyance of land expressed to be subject to a 
legal estate or interest which is not in existence 
immediately before the date of the conveyance 
operates as a reservation within the meaning of 
subsection (1), unless a contrary intention is expressed 
in the conveyance. 
 
(3) For the purpose of construing the effect of a 
conveyance of land, a reservation shall not be treated 
as taking effect as a regrant. 
 
(4) This section applies only to reservations made after 
the commencement of this Part. 
 
 
Section 72 simplifies the law relating to reservations 
made in conveyances in favour of the grantor and 
removes complications involving the Statute of Uses 
(Ireland) 1634, which is being repealed.  It also 
replaces section 62 of the Conveyancing Act 1881, 
which had to be enacted to enable easements to be 
reserved under the 1634 Statute. 
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Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) provides that in future a reservation 
will operate fully whether or not the grantee has 
executed the conveyance.  A conveyance is effective 
to convey or transfer the land so long as the grantor 
executes it.  The necessity for the grantee to execute it 
also arises largely where the conveyance contains 
covenants being entered into by the grantee. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) states what has long been regarded as 
the rule, that making a conveyance subject to some 
new interest in favour of the grantor is a reservation.  
Where the conveyance is made subject to some 
interest already in existence, it involves, instead, an 
exception.  The distinction has been important because 
of the principle that a reservation was, in substance, a 
regrant of the new interest by the grantee to the 
grantor.  That rule is displaced by subsections (1) and 
(3). 
 
Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) reiterates the new law contained in 
subsection (1), that a reservation will, in future, 
operate without any regrant by the grantee.  A 
consequence of the principle that a reservation 
operates as a regrant was that, contrary to the general 
rule of construction of deeds, a reservation was 
construed against the grantee rather than the grantor.  
Subsection (3) applies the general rule to future 
reservations, ie, like the other provisions of the deed, it 
will be construed against the grantor in the event of 
any ambiguities or uncertainties. 
 
Subsection (4) 
 
Subsection (4) makes it clear that the new law applies 
only to future reservations. 
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Benefit of 
deeds. 
 
8.35 
 
RPA 1845, s. 
5 
 
73.  – (1) Where a deed is expressed to confer an 
estate or interest in land, or the benefit of an 
agreement, covenant or right relating to land, on a 
person, that person may enforce the deed whether or 
not named a party to it. 
 
(2) Nothing in this section otherwise affects the 
doctrine of privity of contract. 
 
 
Section 73 replaces section 5 of the Real Property Act 
1845 and recasts it in language designed to clarify its 
operation, which has long been controversial (see CP 
paras 8.34 – 8.35 of the CP).  In essence section 5 was 
probably designed to get round the so-called inter 
partes rule, ie, that the benefit of a deed inter partes 
(made by more than one party, to be distinguished 
from a deed poll) could be claimed only by the 
persons named as parties to it.  It is not uncommon for 
a deed made between A and B to contain, eg, a 
covenant by B for the benefit of A “and the owners for 
the time being of adjacent lands.”  Section 72 ensures 
that those owners can also enforce B’s covenants, ie, 
in addition to A. 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) recasts section 5 of the 1845 Act so as 
to make it clear that it applies only (1) where the deed 
expressly confers an estate or interest or the benefit of 
a covenant or right on a person not a party to the deed 
and (2) to deeds relating to land. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) makes it clear that the section does not 
otherwise affect the doctrine of privity of contract. 
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Features and 
rights 
conveyed 
with land. 
 
7.27 
 
CA 1881, s. 6 
 
74.  – (1) A conveyance of land includes, and conveys 
with the land, all –  
 
(a) buildings, commons, ditches, drains, 
erections, fences, fixtures, hedges, 
water, watercourses and other 
features forming part of the land, 
 
(b) advantages, easements, liberties, 
privileges, profits à prendre and 
rights appertaining or annexed to the 
land. 
 
(2) A conveyance of land which has houses or other 
buildings on it includes, and conveys with the land, 
houses or other buildings all –  
 
(a) areas, cellars, cisterns, courts, 
courtyards, drainpipes, drains, 
erections, fixtures, gardens, lights, 
outhouses, passages, sewers, 
watercourses, yards and other features 
forming part of the land, houses or 
other buildings, 
 
(b) advantages, easements, liberties, 
privileges, profits à prendre and rights 
appertaining or annexed to the land, 
houses or other buildings. 
 
(3) This section –  
 
(a) does not on a conveyance of land 
(whether or not it has houses or other 
buildings on it) –  
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(i) create any new interest or right 
or convert any quasi–interest or 
right existing prior to the 
conveyance into a full interest 
or right, or 
 
(ii) extend the scope of, or convert 
into a new interest or right, any 
licence, privilege or other 
interest or right existing before 
the conveyance, or  
 
(b) does not –  
 
(i) give to any person a better title 
to any land, interest or right 
referred to in the section than 
the title which the conveyance 
gives to the land expressed to be 
conveyed, or 
 
(ii) convey to any person any land, 
interest or right further or other 
than that which could have been 
conveyed to that person by the 
conveying parties. 
 
(c) takes effect subject to the terms of the 
conveyance. 
 
 
Section 74 replaces section 6 of the Conveyancing Act 
1881 and clarifies its operation as recommended by 
the CP (see paras 7.24 – 7.27 and 8.43). 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) re-enacts, with some recasting of the 
wording, section 6(1) of the 1881 Act. 
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Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) re-enacts, again with some recasting of 
the wording, section 6(2) of the 1881 Act.  Section 
6(3) of the 1881 Act is not re-enacted as it relates to 
conveyances of “manors”, a feudal concept no longer 
relevant to Ireland. 
 
Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) contains the recommended 
clarification. 
 
Subparagraph (a)(i) makes it clear that the section 
does not create any new interest or right or convert a 
quasi-interest or right into a full interest or right, such 
as occurs under the rule in Wheeldon v Burrows where 
land is subdivided.  This accords with the view taken 
by the Supreme Court in the recent case of William 
Bennett Construction Ltd v Greene (25 February 
2004) (see CP para 7.25).  Subparagraph (a)(ii) makes 
it clear that the section does not extend the scope of or 
convert an existing interest or right into a new interest 
or right, eg, convert a revocable licence into an 
easement.  This also accords with the views of the 
Supreme Court in the William Bennett case (see CP 
para 7.26).  Paragraph (b) re-enacts the substance of 
section 6(5) of the 1881 Act.  Paragraph (c) re-enacts 
the substance of section 6(4). 
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Supplemental 
instruments. 
 
8.43 
 
CA 1881, s. 
53 
 
75.  – (1) Any instrument expressed to be 
supplemental to a previous instrument, or directed to 
be read as an annex to such an instrument, is, so far as 
is appropriate, to be read and has effect as if the 
instrument so expressed or directed –  
 
(a) were made by way of endorsement on 
the previous instrument, or 
 
(b) contained a full recital of the previous 
instrument. 
 
(2) This section does not confer on a purchaser any 
right to an abstract, a copy or production, of any such 
previous instrument and a purchaser may accept the 
same evidence that the previous instrument does not 
affect the title as if it had merely been mentioned in 
the supplemental instrument. 
 
 
Section 75 re-enacts the substance of section 53 of the 
Conveyancing Act 1881, but, as recommended by the 
CP, extends it to cover all instruments and not just 
deeds (see para 8.43 of the CP). 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) re-enacts, with some recasting, section 
53 of the 1881 Act. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) states what has long been taken to be 
the position, that the statutory provision does not 
affect a purchaser’s position as regards title which can 
be required to be deduced by the vendor. 
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Partial 
releases. 
 
7.16 
 
LPAA 1859, 
ss. 10 and 11 
 
 
 
76.  – (1) A release of part of land from a –  
 
(a) rentcharge does not extinguish the 
rentcharge, but bars only the right to 
recover any part of the rentcharge out 
of the land released, 
 
(b) judgment charged on the land does not 
affect the validity of the judgment as 
regards any of the land not specifically 
released. 
 
(2) Subsection (1) does not –  
 
(a) prejudice the rights of any person 
interested in the land unreleased and 
not concurring in or confirming the 
release, or 
 
(b) prevent recovery of the whole of the 
rentcharge or enforcement of the whole 
judgment against the land unreleased, 
unless those interested agree otherwise. 
 
 
Section 76 re-enacts the substance of sections 10 and 
11 of the Law of Property Amendment Act 1859.  
These sections dealt with the effect of partial releases 
of rentcharges and judgments on land and reversed the 
common law rule that a partial release released the 
entire land. 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) re-enacts the provisions that a partial 
release does no more than release the part of the land 
in question. 
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Subsection (2) 
 
Paragraph (a) re-enacts the provisions in sections 10 
and 11 of the 1859 Act protecting the interests of 
parties not joining in the release.  Paragraph (b) 
clarifies, as recommended by the CP, the position that, 
unless the parties agree otherwise, the whole 
rentcharge or judgment can be enforced against the 
part of the land unreleased. 
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Fraudulent 
dispositions. 
 
8.23 
 
CA 1634,  
ss. 1 to 5, 10, 
11 and 14 
 
VCA 1893 
 
77.  – (1) Subject to subsection (2), any voluntary 
disposition of land made with the intention of 
defrauding a subsequent purchaser of the land is 
voidable by that purchaser. 
 
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a voluntary 
disposition is not to be read as intended to defraud 
merely because a subsequent disposition of the same 
land was made for valuable consideration. 
 
(3) Subject to subsection (4), any conveyance of 
property made with the intention of defrauding a 
creditor or other person is voidable by any person 
thereby prejudiced. 
 
(4) Subsection (3) does not –  
 
(a) apply to any estate or interest in 
property conveyed for valuable 
consideration to any person in good 
faith not having, at the time of the 
conveyance, notice of the fraudulent 
intention, or 
 
(b) affect the law of bankruptcy. 
 
 
Section 77 replaces the convoluted, and somewhat 
confusing, provisions contained in sections 1 to 5 of 
the Conveyancing Act (Ireland) 1634, as amended by 
the Voluntary Conveyances Act 1893, in accordance 
with the recommendation in the CP (see paras 8.22 – 
8.23 of the CP). 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) recasts in much simpler form the 
provisions in sections 1 to 5 of the 1634 Act. 
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Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) recasts in much simpler form the 
provisions of the 1893 Act. 
 
Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) recasts the provisions in section 10 of 
the 1634 Act. 
 
Subsection (4) 
 
Paragraph (a) recasts the provisions in section 14 of 
the 1634 Act.  Paragraph (b) makes a saving for 
provisions such as sections 57 to 59 of the Bankruptcy 
Act 1988. 
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Construction 
of 
instruments. 
 
8.43 
 
 
 
2005, No. - 
 
Chapter 4 
 
Contents of deeds 
 
78.  – Particular words and expressions used in any 
instrument relating to land executed or made after the 
commencement of this Part, unless the context 
otherwise requires, -  
 
(a) are subject to the same general rules of 
construction as are applicable to such 
words and expressions used in Acts of 
the Oireachtas under section 00 of the 
Interpretation Act 200-, 
 
(b) have the same particular meaning, 
construction or effect as assigned to 
such words and expressions used in 
Acts of the Oireachtas by the Schedule 
to that Act or by section 3 of this Act, 
whichever is more appropriate. 
 
 
Section 78 implements the recommendation in the CP, 
endorsing an earlier recommendation of the 
Commission, that the definitions of key words and 
expressions provided for Acts of the Oireachtas by the 
Interpretation Act 1937 (to be replaced by a new Act 
presently before the Oireachtas) should be applicable 
to private documents relating to land.  Section 77, 
therefore, refers to “instruments” rather than “deeds”.  
This would make available to private documents such 
useful provisions as the singular including the plural 
and vice versa, person including a corporation, and 
definitions of key words like “land” and “month”.  
Paragraph (b) also makes available the definitions in 
section 3 of this Bill.  Where the same word is defined 
differently in the 2005 Act and section 3 of this Bill, 
the definition which should be relied upon is the one 
that is more appropriate. 
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All estate 
clause. 
 
8.43 
 
CA 1881, s. 
63 
 
79.  – (1) Subject to subsection (2), a conveyance of 
land passes all the claim, demand, estate, interest, 
right and title which the conveying parties 
respectively have or have power to convey in, to or on 
the land conveyed or expressed or intended to be 
conveyed. 
 
(2) This section takes effect subject to the terms of the 
conveyance. 
 
 
Section 79 re-enacts the substance of section 63 of the 
Conveyancing Act 1881. 
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Receipts in 
deeds. 
 
8.43 
 
CA 1881, ss. 
54 to 56 
 
80.  – (1) A receipt for consideration in the body of a 
deed is sufficient discharge for the consideration to 
the person giving it, without any further receipt being 
endorsed on the deed. 
 
(2) A receipt for consideration in the body of a deed is, 
in favour of a subsequent purchaser (not having notice 
that the consideration so acknowledged to be received 
was not, in fact, given wholly or in part), conclusive 
evidence of the giving of the whole consideration. 
 
(3) Where a solicitor produces a deed which has –  
 
(a) in its body a receipt for consideration, 
 
(b) been executed by the person entitled 
to give a receipt for the consideration, 
 
the deed is conclusive authority to the person liable to 
give the consideration for giving it to the solicitor, 
without the solicitor producing any separate or other 
authority or direction in that behalf from the person 
who executed or signed the deed or receipt. 
 
(4) In subsection (3) “solicitor” includes any employee 
of a solicitor, and any member or employee of a firm 
in which the solicitor is a partner, and any such 
employee or member of another firm acting as agent 
of the solicitor or firm. 
 
 
Section 80 re-enacts, with some modifications as 
recommended by the CP (see para 8.43 of the CP), 
sections 54 to 56 of the Conveyancing Act 1881.  It 
drops the references to endorsed receipts – such 
endorsements have creased to be used in practice. 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) re-enacts section 54 of the 1881 Act. 
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Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) re-enacts section 55, but renders the 
receipt conclusive, rather than, merely sufficient 
evidence. 
 
Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) re-enacts section 56, but again renders 
the receipt conclusive authority. 
 
Subsection (4) 
 
Subsection (4) clarifies subsection (3) by making it 
clear that it extends to employees and agents, which 
accords with common practice. 
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Conditions 
and 
covenants not 
implied. 
 
8.35 
 
RPA 1845, 
 s. 4 
81.  – (1) An exchange or other conveyance of land 
does not imply any condition in law. 
 
(2) Subject to any statutory provision, the word “give” 
or “grant” in any conveyance does not imply any 
covenant. 
 
 
Section 81 implements the recommendation in the CP 
that section 4 of the Real Property Act 1845 should be 
re-enacted without substantial amendment (see paras 
8.34 – 8.35 of the CP).  It ensures that conveyances do 
not have unintended effect, so that conditions and 
covenants should not be implied where not intended or 
appropriate. 
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Covenants for 
title. 
 
8.43 
 
CA 1881, 
s. 7 
 
82.  – (1) In a conveyance of any class referred to in 
subsection (2) there are implied the covenants 
specified in relation to that class in Part II of Schedule 
2, and those covenants are deemed to be made –  
 
(a) by the person or by each person who 
conveys, as far as regards the estate or 
interest or share of the estate or interest 
expressed to be conveyed by such 
person (“the subject-matter of the 
conveyance”), 
 
(b) with the person to whom the 
conveyance is made, or with the 
persons jointly and severally, if more 
than one, to whom the conveyance is 
made as joint tenants, or with each of 
the persons, if more than one, to whom 
the conveyance is made as tenants in 
common, 
 
and have the effect specified in Parts I and II of 
Schedule 2. 
 
(2) The classes of conveyance referred to in subsection 
(1) are –  
 
Class 1: A conveyance for valuable 
consideration (other than a mortgage) 
of an estate or interest in land (other 
than a leasehold estate) made by a 
person who is expressed to convey 
“as beneficial owner”; 
 
Class 2: A conveyance for valuable 
consideration (other than a mortgage) 
of a leasehold estate made by a 
person who is expressed to convey 
“as beneficial owner”; 
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Class 3: A conveyance comprising a mortgage 
of land (other than land held for a 
leasehold estate) made by a person 
who is expressed to convey “as 
beneficial owner”; 
 
Class 4: A conveyance comprising a mortgage 
of leasehold land made by a person 
who is expressed to convey “as 
beneficial owner”; 
 
Class 5: A conveyance made by a person who 
is expressed to convey “as trustee”, 
“as mortgagee”, “as personal 
representative” or under an order of 
the court. 
 
(3) Where a conveyance is made by a person who is 
expressed to convey by direction of another person 
who is expressed to direct “as beneficial owner”, then, 
whether or not that other person is also expressed to 
convey “as beneficial owner”, the conveyance is for 
the purposes of this section a conveyance made by that 
other person expressed to convey “as beneficial 
owner” to the extent of the subject-matter of the 
conveyance made by that other person’s direction. 
 
(4) Without prejudice to section 52(6) of the Act of 
1965, where in a conveyance a person conveying is 
not expressed to convey “as beneficial owner”, “as 
trustee”, “as mortgagee”, “as personal representative”, 
under an order of the court or by a direction of a 
person “as beneficial owner”, no covenant on the part 
of the person conveying is implied in the conveyance. 
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(5) The benefit of a covenant implied under this 
section is – 
 
(a) annexed to and passes with the estate or 
interest of the implied covenantee, 
 
(b) enforceable by every person, including 
a lessee, mortgagee and any other 
person deriving title from or under the 
implied covenantee, in whom that 
estate or interest, or any  part of it, or 
an estate or interest derived out of it, is 
vested from time to time. 
 
(6) A covenant implied under this section may, by the 
terms of the conveyance, be –  
 
(a) excluded but not so that a sole covenant 
or all (as distinct from some only) of 
the covenants implied in relation to a 
person expressed to convey as specified 
in subsection (2) are excluded, 
 
(b) modified and, if so modified, operates 
as if the modification was included in 
this section and Schedule 2. 
 
(7) Any conveyance implied under this section by 
reason of a person being expressed to convey “as 
beneficial owner” may, by express reference to this 
section, be incorporated, with or without modification, 
in a conveyance, whether or not for valuable 
consideration, by a person who is expressed to convey 
as specified in Class 5 of subsection (2). 
 
 
Section 82 recasts, as recommended by the CP, the 
convoluted provisions of section 7 of the 
Conveyancing Act 1881 (see para 8.43).   
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It contains the operative provisions relating to the 
statutory covenants for title which are commonly 
relied upon in practice.  The actual covenants 
themselves are set out in Schedule 2 to the Bill.  As 
recommended by the CP, section 82 amends section 7 
to remove some of its flaws, eg, by implying the 
covenants whenever a person is only “expressed” to 
convey in a particular capacity, ie, whether or not he 
or she actually has it.  Otherwise, the covenants would 
be of little value. 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) implies the various covenants set out in 
Schedule 2 according to the different classes of 
conveyance specified in subsection (2). 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) follows section 7 of the 1881 Act in 
providing for different covenants to be implied 
depending upon the type of conveyance and capacity 
in which the person is expressed to convey. 
 
Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) deals with the situation where a person 
conveys under the direction of another person, eg, 
where a beneficiary solely entitled to land under a 
trust directs the trustee to convey the land to a third 
party.  The same covenants are implied as if the 
beneficiary had conveyed the land. 
 
Subsection (4) 
 
Subsection (4) makes it clear that if a person is not 
expressed to convey in one of the specified capacities 
(eg, as beneficial owner) no statutory covenants are 
implied.  The one exception to this rule is provided by 
section 52(6) of the Succession Act 1965, under which 
covenants appropriate to Class 5 in subsection (2) are  
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implied in an assent by a personal representative, 
whether or not the personal representative is expressed 
to convey as such. 
 
Subsection (5) 
 
Subsection (5) makes it clear that the benefit of 
implied covenants passes to whoever succeeds to the 
implied covenantee’s estate or interest in the land, 
including persons deriving title from that covenantee, 
such as a lessee or mortgagee. 
 
Subsection (6) 
 
Subsection (6) permits express modifications to be 
made to the implied covenants, but not their entire 
exclusion since this would be inconsistent with use of 
the specified capacities in a conveyance. 
 
Subsection (7) 
 
Subsection (7) permits the covenants implied in a 
conveyance for valuable consideration (Classes 1 to 4 
in subsection (2)) to be incorporated also in 
conveyances which may not involve such 
consideration (Class 5). 
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Additional 
covenants for 
leasehold 
conveyances. 
 
 
83.  – (1) In a conveyance of any class referred to in 
subsection (2) there are implied, in addition to the 
covenants referred to in section 82(1), the covenants 
specified in relation to that class in Part III of 
Schedule 2, and those covenants are deemed to be 
made –  
 
(a) by the person, or by the persons jointly 
and severally, if more than one, so 
specified in relation to any class of 
conveyance, 
 
(b) with the person, or with the persons 
jointly and severally, if more than one, 
who is the other party, or are the other 
parties, to the conveyance, 
 
and have the effect specified in Parts I and III of 
Schedule 2. 
 
(2) The classes of conveyance referred to in subsection 
(1) are –  
 
Class 6: A conveyance for valuable 
consideration (other than a mortgage) 
of –  
 
(a) the entirety of the land 
comprised in a lease, or 
 
(b) part of the land 
comprised in a lease, 
subject to part of the 
rent reserved by the 
lease which has been, or 
is by the conveyance, 
apportioned with the 
consent of the lessor, 
 
 for the residue of the term or interest 
created by the lease. 
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Class 7: A conveyance for valuable, 
consideration, other than a mortgage, 
of part of the land comprised in the 
lease, for the residue of the term or 
interest created by the lease, subject 
to part of the rent reserved by the 
lease which has been, or is by the 
conveyance, apportioned without the 
consent of the lessor. 
 
(3) Where in a conveyance, other than a mortgage, 
part of land comprised in a lease is, without the 
consent of the lessor, expressed to be conveyed –  
 
(a) subject to the entire rent, then covenant 
(1) in paragraph 2 of Part III of 
Schedule 2 has effect as if the entire 
rent were the apportioned rent, 
 
(b) exonerated from the entire rent, then 
covenant (2) in paragraph 2 of Part III 
of Schedule 2 has effect as if the entire 
rent were the balance of the rent, and 
“(other than the covenant to pay the 
entire rent)” were omitted from the 
covenant. 
 
(4) The benefit of a covenant implied under this 
section is  –  
 
(a) annexed to and passes with the estate or 
interest of the implied covenantee, 
 
(b) enforceable by every person, including 
a lessee, mortgagee and other person 
deriving title from or under the implied 
covenantee in whom that estate or 
interest, or part of it or an estate or 
interest derived out of it, is vested from 
time to time. 
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(5) Any covenant implied under this section may, by 
the terms of the conveyance, be –  
 
(a) modified by the express provisions of 
the conveyance and, if so modified, 
operates as if the modification were 
included in this section and Schedule 2, 
 
(b) in particular, extended by providing 
expressly in the conveyance that –  
 
(i) the land conveyed, or 
 
(ii) the part of the land demised 
which remains vested in the 
covenantor, 
 
stands charged with the payment  of all 
money which would otherwise become 
payable under the implied covenant. 
 
 
Section 83 provides for additional covenants to be 
implied on an assignment of a lease.  Section 82 deals 
with covenants implied in relation to the assignor.  
Section 83 deals with covenants implied in relation to 
the assignee, whether the assignment is of the whole 
or of part only of the demised land. 
 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) provides for the statutory implication of 
the covenants specified in subsection (2) and set out in 
Schedule 2. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) specifies the classes of covenant, the 
numbering following on from those in section 82(2). 
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Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) adapts the implied covenants where an 
apportionment of rent without the lessor’s consent 
results in it being loaded entirely on the part of the 
land conveyed or the part retained. 
 
Subsection (4) 
 
Subsection (4) provides that the benefit of the implied 
covenants passes to the covenantee’s successors in 
title, including persons deriving title from or under the 
covenantee or successors. 
 
Subsection (5) 
 
Subsection (5) makes provision for modification and 
extension of the implied covenants. 
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Scope of 
sections 82 
and 83. 
 
84.  – In sections 82 and 83 –  
 
(a) “conveyance” –  
 
(i) does not include the granting of a 
lease, 
 
(ii) means a conveyance made after 
the commencement of this Part, 
 
(b) any reference to a person being 
expressed to “convey”, or to an estate 
or interest or land being expressed to be 
“conveyed” does not mean that the 
words “convey” or “conveyed” must be 
used in the conveyance for the 
covenant to be implied. 
 
 
Section 84 clarifies the scope of sections 82 and 83.  
Under paragraph (a) they do not apply to the initial 
grant of a lease, as opposed to a subsequent 
assignment of an already existing lease.  Implied 
covenants on the initial grant of a lease are covered by 
section 41 of Deasy’s Act (Landlord and Tenant Law 
Amendment Act, Ireland, 1860).  They also apply only 
to conveyances made after the commencement of Part 
8.  Paragraph (b) makes it clear that the implied 
covenants still operate even though a conveyance does 
not use the words “convey” or “conveyed”, eg, an 
assignment of a lease might use instead “assign” or 
“assigned”. 
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Covenants by 
or with two 
or more 
persons. 
 
8.43 
 
CA 1881,  
s. 60 
 
85.  – (1) Where under a covenant persons are –  
 
(a) covenantors, the covenant binds them 
and any two or more of them jointly 
and each of them severally, 
 
(b) covenantees, the covenant shall be 
construed as being also made with each 
of them. 
 
(2) A covenant made with persons jointly to convey, 
pay money or do any other act to them or for their 
benefit, implies an obligation to do the act to, or for 
the benefit of –  
 
(a) the survivor or survivors of them, 
 
(b) any other person on whom the right to 
sue on the covenant devolves. 
 
(3) This section takes effect subject to the terms of the 
covenant or conveyance in which it is contained or 
implied or of any statutory provision implying the 
covenant. 
 
(4) In this section “covenant” includes an express or 
implied covenant and a bond or obligation contained 
in a deed. 
 
 
Section 85 contains provisions designed to shorten 
conveyances and re-enacts the substance of section 60 
of the Conveyancing Act 1881.  It implies useful 
provisions in conveyances unless they have express 
provisions to the contrary. 
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Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) makes a covenant involving more than 
one covenantor or covenantee enforceable by or 
against each separately as well as by or against all of 
them together. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) re-enacts the substance of section 60 of 
the 1881 Act, which entitled the survivor or survivors 
of joint covenantees to the benefit of covenants or 
other obligations contained in a deed. 
 
Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) makes it clear that the provisions in 
section 85 may be excluded by express provision or 
contrary statutory provisions. 
 
Subsection (4) 
 
Subsection (4) makes it clear, as section 60 of the 
1881 Act does, that the provisions apply to bonds or 
other obligations contained in a deed. 
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Covenants by 
person jointly 
with others. 
 
86.  – A covenant, whether express or implied, 
entered into by a person with that person jointly with 
another person or other persons shall be construed 
and enforceable as if it had been entered into with that 
other person or persons alone. 
 
 
Section 86 gets round the common law rule that a 
person may not contract with or sue himself or herself.  
It provides that where a person covenants with himself 
or herself and another person or other persons, the 
covenant will be enforceable by the other person or 
persons.  This is the equivalent for covenants of the 
provision for conveyances contained in section 70 of 
the Bill. 
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Production 
and safe 
custody of 
documents. 
 
8.43 
 
 
87.  – (1) Where a person retains possession of 
documents and gives to another person in writing an -  
 
(a) acknowledgment of the right of that 
other to production of these documents 
and to delivery of copies of them (“the 
acknowledgment”), 
 
(b) undertaking for the safe custody of 
those documents (“the undertaking”) 
 
the acknowledgment and the undertaking have the 
effect specified in this section. 
 
(2) The obligations imposed by an acknowledgment 
are to –  
 
(a) produce the documents or any of them 
at all reasonable times for the purpose 
of inspection and of comparison with 
abstracts or copies of the documents, 
by the person entitled to request 
production or by any person authorised 
in writing by that person, 
 
(b) produce the documents or any of them 
in court or any other place where, or on 
any occasion when, production may 
properly be required for proving or 
supporting the title or claim of the 
person entitled to request production, or 
for any other purpose relating to that 
title or claim, 
 
(c) deliver to the person entitled to request 
them such copies or abstracts, attested 
or unattested, of or from the documents 
or any of them. 
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(3) The obligation imposed by an undertaking is to 
keep the documents complete, safe, uncancelled and 
undefaced. 
 
(4) The obligations shall be performed from time to 
time in the case of the –  
 
(a) acknowledgment, at the request in 
writing of, 
 
(b) undertaking, in favour of, 
 
the person to whom it is given, or any person, not 
being a lessee at a rent, who has or who claims any 
estate, interest or right through or under that person 
interested in or affected by the terms of the document 
to which the acknowledgment or undertaking relates. 
 
(5) The acknowledgment and undertaking bind the 
documents to which they relate in the possession or 
control of the person who retains them, and of every 
other person having possession or control of them 
from time to time, but bind each individual possessor 
or person as long only as that person has possession or 
control. 
 
(6) Each person having possession or control of such 
documents is bound specifically to perform the 
obligations imposed by this section, unless prevented 
from doing so by fire or other inevitable accident, but 
all costs and expenses of or incidental to specific 
performance of the acknowledgment shall be paid by 
the person requesting performance. 
 
(7) The acknowledgment does not confer any right to 
damages for loss or destruction of, or injury to, the 
documents to which it relates, from whatever cause 
arising. 
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(8) Any person claiming to be entitled to the benefit of 
an undertaking may apply to the court for damages for 
any loss or destruction of, or injury to, the documents 
or any of them to which it relates. 
 
(9) Upon such application the court may direct such 
inquiries and make such order as to costs or other 
matters as it thinks fit. 
 
(10) An acknowledgment or undertaking under this 
section satisfies any liability to give a covenant for 
production and delivery of copies of or extracts from 
documents or for safe custody of documents. 
 
(11) The rights conferred by an acknowledgment or 
undertaking under this section are in addition to all 
such other rights relating to production, inspection or 
obtaining copies of documents as are not satisfied by 
the giving of the acknowledgment or undertaking. 
 
(12) This section –  
 
(a) has effect where an acknowledgment or 
undertaking is given by a person to that 
same person in different capacities in 
the same way as where it is given by 
one person to another, 
 
(b) takes effect subject to the terms of the 
acknowledgment  or undertaking. 
 
 
Section 87 recasts the provisions in section 9 of the 
Conveyancing Act 1881 which apply where a 
landowner conveys only part of land and retains the 
title documents which relate to the whole land.  The 
purchaser of the part conveyed may need those 
documents, or copies of them, in future transactions 
and this is what the acknowledgment and undertaking 
provided for are designed to secure. 
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Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) provides for the acknowledgment of the 
right to production of documents, or copies of them, 
and undertaking for their safe custody. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) sets out the scope of the 
acknowledgment. 
 
Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) sets out the scope of the undertaking. 
 
Subsection (4) 
 
Subsection (4) states who, from time to time, is 
obliged to comply with the acknowledgment or the 
undertaking. 
 
Subsection (5) 
 
Subsection (5) further defines the scope of the 
acknowledgment and undertaking – they apply to each 
person who comes into possession or control of the 
documents. 
 
Subsection (6) 
 
Subsection (6) enables the court to grant specific 
performance to enforce the obligations, but not where 
the documents have been accidentally destroyed. 
 
Subsection (7) 
 
Subsection (7) makes it clear that there is no right to 
damages for loss or destruction if an acknowledgment 
only is given. 
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Subsections (8) and (9) 
 
Subsections (8) and (9) provide that such a right to 
damages will arise where an undertaking for safe 
custody has been given. 
 
Subsection (10) 
 
Subsection (10) makes it clear that an 
acknowledgment or undertaking given under the 
section 87 satisfies any covenant to give one. 
 
Subsection (11) 
 
Subsection (11) makes it clear that the rights given by 
section 87 are in addition to other rights to production 
of documents, such as those conferred by section 
62(2) of this Bill. 
 
Subsection (12) 
 
Subsection (12) makes it clear that the section applies 
where an acknowledgment or undertaking is given by 
a person to himself or herself in a different capacity, 
eg, as a personal representative or trustee in favour of 
himself or herself as a beneficiary.  It also makes it 
clear that the statutory provisions may be varied by the 
express terms of the acknowledgment or undertaking. 
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Notices. 
 
8.43 
 
88.  – (1) Subject to subsection (2), where an 
instrument makes provision for giving or serving a 
notice it may be given or served as if it were 
authorised or required to be given or served under this 
Act. 
 
(2) Subsection (1) takes effect subject to the terms of 
the instrument. 
 
 
Section 88 implements the recommendation in the CP 
that the provisions in section 67 of the Conveyancing 
Act 1881 governing service of notices under that Act 
should be made applicable to notices to be served 
under private instruments. 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) makes the appropriate provision by 
attracting the provisions in section 4 of the Bill. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) makes it clear the provision in 
subsection (1) may be modified by the express terms 
of the instrument. 
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Restrictions 
on 
constructive 
notice. 
 
8.43 
 
CA 1882, s. 3 
 
Chapter 5 
 
General provisions 
 
89.  – (1) A purchaser is not affected prejudicially by 
notice of any fact, instrument, matter or thing unless –  
 
(a) it is within the purchaser’s own 
knowledge or would have come to the 
purchaser’s knowledge if such inquiries 
and inspections had been made as 
ought reasonably to have been made by 
the purchaser, or 
 
(b) in the same transaction with respect to 
which a question of notice to the 
purchaser arises, it has come to the 
knowledge of the purchaser’s counsel, 
as such, or solicitor or other agent, as 
such, or would have come to the 
knowledge of the solicitor or other 
agent if such inquiries and inspections 
had been made as ought reasonably to 
have been made by the solicitor or 
agent. 
 
(2) Without prejudice to section 61(4), subsection (1) 
does not exempt a purchaser from any liability under, 
or any obligation to perform or observe, any covenant, 
provision or restriction contained in any instrument 
under which the purchaser’s title is derived, 
immediately or mediately; and such liability or 
obligation may be enforced in the same manner and to 
the same extent as if this section had not been enacted. 
 
(3) A purchaser is not, by reason of anything in this 
section, affected by notice in any case where the 
purchaser would not have been so affected if this 
section had not been enacted. 
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(4) This section applies to all purchases whenever 
made. 
 
 
Section 89 re-enacts section 3 of the Conveyancing Act 
1882, which is the very important provision governing 
the doctrine of constructive notice. 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) restricts constructive notice to matters 
which would come to light if good conveyancing 
practice were followed by the purchaser and his or her 
legal advisers. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) confirms that a purchaser is bound by 
the provisions of instruments which form part of the 
title required to be deduced by the vendor. 
 
Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) prevents the section from being used in 
a particular case to expand the scope of constructive 
notice. 
 
Subsection (4) 
 
Subsection (4) makes it clear that this provision 
preserves existing law. 
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Court orders. 
 
8.43 
 
CA 1881, s. 
70 
 
90.  – (1) Without prejudice to any ground of appeal 
against any order, an order of the court under any 
statutory or other jurisdiction is not invalid as against 
a purchaser on the ground of want of –  
 
(a)  jurisdiction, or 
 
(b) any concurrence, consent, notice or 
service. 
 
(2) This section applies to –  
 
(a) any lease, sale or other act, under the 
authority of the court and purporting to 
be in pursuance of any statutory 
provision, notwithstanding any 
exception in that provision, 
 
(b) all court orders whenever made. 
 
 
Section 90 re-enacts section 70 of the Conveyancing 
Act 1881.  It has not been qualified as recommended 
by the CP (see para 8.43 of the CP) on the ground that 
this might cast doubt on titles which have been settled 
or accepted on the assumption that a court order is 
conclusive. 
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Regulations 
for Part 8. 
 
8.04 
8.06 
8.07 
 
91.  – (1) The Minister may make regulations 
prescribing –  
 
(a) advertisements made in respect of sales 
of residential land, 
 
(b) booking or other deposits, including the 
form of receipt for such deposits, 
payable in respect of sales of residential 
land, 
 
(c) the formalities for creation of, and the 
conditions of sale applicable to, a 
contract for the sale or other disposition 
of an interest in land, 
 
(d) the terms of building contracts, 
including stage payments to be made 
under such contracts, 
 
(e) the terms of sales by auction or by 
tender, 
 
(f) the cost of or other matters relating to 
surveys of land for sale, 
 
(g) any other matter designed to protect the 
interests of purchasers or to facilitate 
the conveyancing of residential land. 
 
(2) In this section “residential land” includes 
apartments, flats, houses and any other unit or part of a 
building used for residential purposes. 
 
 
Section 91 implements the recommendations in the CP 
that power should be conferred to make regulations 
governing various aspects of conveyancing practice 
(see paras 8.04, 8.06 and 8.07 of the CP). 
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Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) lists various matters upon which 
regulations may be made, such as conditions of sales, 
booking deposits and stage payments in building 
contracts.  Paragraph (g) includes a general power 
exercisable for protection of purchasers or facilitation 
of purchases.  This may become useful in facilitating 
the introduction in due course of an e-conveyancing 
system. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) makes it clear that the power to make 
regulations applies to any kind of residential property 
for sale or purchase. 
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 PART 9 
 
MORTGAGES 
 
Part 9 implements the various recommendations 
contained in Chapter 9 of the CP for simplification 
and modernisation of the law of mortgages.  In 
particular it seeks to assimilate the law relating to 
mortgages of unregistered land with that relating to 
registered land, where the sole method of mortgaging 
the land, so as to create a legal mortgage, is by way of 
a charge.  A major portion of Part 9 is concerned with 
ensuring that the new charge system provides 
mortgagees (lenders) with the same degree of security 
as enjoyed under the traditional system of mortgaging 
by transferring ownership of the land, subject to the 
mortgagor’s (borrower’s) right of redemption. 
 
Part 9 does not, in general, interfere with the various 
methods of creating equitable mortgages (eg by 
deposit of title documents), on the basis that it will be 
some time before a comprehensive eConveyancing 
system will become operative.  Such a system may 
render such informal mortgages redundant, but 
meanwhile the continuance of substantial unregistered 
land transactions leaves a place for such, albeit now 
comparatively rare, transactions.  Nor does Part 9 
interfere with the general equitable jurisdiction of the 
courts to control unfairness in the way mortgages 
operate.  The courts should remain free to develop 
long-recognised doctrines such as those relating to 
“clogs on the equity of redemption” and undue 
influence (see CP paras 9.09 – 9.10 of the CP).  Part 9 
does, however, contain various provisions designed to 
ensure that a mortgagee’s rights and remedies are 
exercised only when this is necessary for the 
protection or enforcement of its security. 
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A consequence of Part 9 is that various pre-1922 
statutes can be repealed.  In addition, various 
provisions relating to mortgages in the Conveyancing 
Acts 1881-1911 are being replaced, often with 
substantial amendment. 
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Legal 
mortgages. 
 
9.08 
 
PART 9 
 
MORTGAGES 
 
Chapter 1 
 
Creation of mortgages 
 
92.  – (1) A mortgage of a legal estate or interest in 
land shall be created in law by a charge by deed only 
and such a mortgage is referred to in this Part as a 
“charge by way of legal mortgage”; and “mortgage”, 
“mortgagor”, and “mortgagee” shall be read 
accordingly. 
 
(2) From the commencement of this Part, any –  
 
(a) purported conveyance of a legal estate 
or interest in land by way of mortgage, 
or 
 
(b) purported legal mortgage of land by 
deed, or 
 
(c) other transaction which under any 
instrument or statutory provision would 
operate otherwise as a legal mortgage 
of land, 
 
operates as if it were a charge by way of legal 
mortgage. 
 
(3) From the commencement of this Part, any power, 
whenever created, to mortgage or lend money on 
mortgage of a legal estate or interest in land operates 
as a power to mortgage the legal estate or interest by a 
charge by way of legal mortgage or to lend money on 
the security of such a charge. 
 
(4) Subject to subsection (5), this section, and the 
other provisions of this Part, apply to both 
unregistered and registered land. 
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(5) Section 62(6) of the Registration of Title Act 1964 
is amended by substitution of “charge by way of legal 
mortgage within the meaning of Part 9 of the Land 
and Conveyancing (Reform) Act 2005” for “mortgage 
by deed within the meaning of the Conveyancing 
Acts”. 
 
(6) Nothing in this section affects the creation of 
equitable mortgages. 
 
(7) From the commencement of this Part, it shall not 
be possible to create a Welsh mortgage and any 
purported creation of such a mortgage is void. 
 
(8) For the purposes of subsection (7), a “Welsh 
mortgage” includes any transaction under which a 
grantee or chargee of land is entitled to hold 
possession, and take rents and profits in lieu of interest 
on a loan, of land without the grantor or chargor being 
under a personal obligation to repay the loan, but 
being entitled to redeem. 
 
 
Section 92 introduces the charge method as the only 
method of creating a legal mortgage of land.  In 
substance this change operates only in respect of 
unregistered land, because a charge is already the only 
method of creating a legal mortgage of registered land 
(see section 62 of the Registration of Title Act 1964). 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) introduces the charge method and 
provides that it is to be referred to as a “charge by way 
of legal mortgage”.  This description is necessary to 
distinguish such a charge from other types of charge 
on land which do not create a mortgage, such as 
rentcharges and annuities.  Such charges do not 
usually confer the extensive rights which a mortgage 
confers, such as the right to sell the land without a 
court order. 
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Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) provides that any attempt in future to 
create a legal mortgage in any other way will instead 
create a charge by way of legal mortgage. 
 
Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) provides that in future any power, 
whenever created, to mortgage land or to lend money 
on such security will operate as a power to charge the 
land by way of legal mortgage or to lend money on the 
security of the charge. 
 
Subsection (4) 
 
Subsection (4) confirms that the charge system will, in 
future, apply to both registered and unregistered land, 
so that the one deed of charge may be used for land 
which comprises both categories. 
 
Subsection (5) 
 
Subsection (5) makes a consequential amendment to 
section 62(6) of the Registration of Title Act 1964, 
which refers to provisions in the Conveyancing Acts 
which are being replaced by the provisions of Part 9 of 
this Bill. 
 
Subsection (6) 
 
Subsection (6) confirms, as mentioned earlier, that this 
Bill does not interfere with the creation of equitable 
mortgages. 
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Subsection (7) 
 
Subsection (7) implements the recommendations in the 
CP that Welsh mortgages (once common but very 
rarely created in modern times) should be abolished as 
inconsistent with the true purpose of a mortgage.  For 
example, the right of the mortgagee under such a 
mortgage to take possession and to retain the rents and 
profits of the land, without being liable to account to 
the mortgagor, is totally inconsistent with an ordinary 
mortgage where strict liability to account exists.  The 
inconsistency would be increased by the provisions of 
this Bill, under which a mortgagee’s remedies 
(including the right to take possession of the land) 
could be exercised only where necessary to protect or 
enforce its security.  A mortgagee will no longer be 
able to take possession of the land “before the ink is 
dry on the mortgage” (see CP paras 9.13 – 9.15 and 
section 100). 
 
Subsection (8) 
 
Subsection (8) provides a definition of a “Welsh 
mortgage” for the purposes of subsection (7). 
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Position of 
mortgagor 
and 
mortgagee. 
 
9.05 
9.24 
93.  – (1) Subject to this Part, where a charge by way 
of legal mortgage is created after the commencement 
of this Part the –  
 
(a) mortgagor has the same powers and 
rights and the same protection at law 
and in equity as the mortgagor would 
have been entitled to, 
 
(b) mortgagee has the same duties, powers 
and rights as the mortgagee would have 
had, 
 
if the mortgagee’s security had been created by a 
conveyance before that commencement of the legal 
estate or interest in the land of the mortgagor. 
 
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection 
(1)(b) and subject to subsection (3), a first mortgagee 
under a charge by way of legal mortgage has the same 
right to possession of title documents as such 
mortgagee would have had if the security had been 
created by a conveyance referred to in subsection (1). 
 
(3) A mortgagee who retains possession or control of 
title documents relating to the mortgaged land is, in 
addition to being subject to the mortgagor’s rights 
under section 94, responsible for their safe custody as 
if an undertaking for this were given under section 87. 
 
 
Section 93 states the general proposition, as mentioned 
earlier and reiterated in the CP, that a charge by way 
of legal mortgage will confer on the mortgagee the 
same security rights as the traditional method of 
creating a legal mortgage by conveyance of ownership 
(which is being abolished).  It also confirms that the 
mortgagor’s position is not prejudiced.  This is, 
however, subject to the other provisions of Part 9. 
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Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1), while preserving the general position 
of the mortgagor and mortgagee, makes it clear that 
this is subject to the other provisions of Part 9.  These 
introduce numerous changes, largely designed to give 
further protection to mortgagors by ensuring that a 
mortgagee’s remedies are exercised only where 
necessary to protect or enforce its security. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) deals with one particular matter upon 
which there might be doubt, ie, the position of a first 
mortgagee who obtains only a charge on the land and 
not a conveyance of the mortgagor’s estate or interest 
in it.  Such a mortgagee will still be entitled to 
possession of the title documents until the mortgage is 
discharged. 
 
Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) implements the recommendation in the 
CP that where a mortgagee retains possession or 
control of the title documents it should be responsible 
for their safe custody (see para 9.24 of the CP). 
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Title 
documents. 
 
9.24 
 
CA 1881, 
s. 16 
 
Chapter 2 
 
Powers and rights of mortgagor 
 
94.  – (1) Subject to subsection (2), a mortgagor, as 
long as the right to redeem subsists, may from time to 
time, at reasonable times, inspect and make copies or 
abstracts of or extracts from the title documents 
relating to the mortgaged property in the possession 
or power of the mortgagee. 
 
(2) Rights under subsection (1) are exercisable on–  
 
(a) the request and at the cost of the 
mortgagor, 
 
(b) payment by the mortgagor of the 
mortgagee’s reasonable costs in 
relation to the exercise. 
 
(3) Subsection (1) has effect notwithstanding any 
stipulation to the contrary. 
 
 
Section 94 re-enacts the substance of section 16 of the 
Conveyancing Act 1881. 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) entitles the mortgagor to inspect and 
take copies of title documents retained by the 
mortgagee (eg a first mortgagee under section 93(2)). 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) makes it clear that the mortgagor has to 
meet all costs associated with the right to inspect and 
take copies. 
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Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) makes it clear that the mortgagor’s 
rights cannot be excluded expressly. 
 
 257
Abolition of 
right to 
consolidate. 
 
9.24 
 
CA 1881, 
s. 17 
 
95.  – (1) A mortgagor is entitled to redeem any 
mortgage without having to pay any money due under 
any other mortgage with the same mortgagee, 
whether that other mortgage is of the same or other 
property. 
 
(2) Notwithstanding any stipulation to the contrary, a 
mortgagee may not consolidate two or more 
mortgages of the same or other property. 
 
 
Section 95 implements the recommendation in the CP 
that the mortgagee’s right of consolidation should be 
abolished (see para 9.24 of the CP). 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) confirms the consequence of subsection 
(2) but, in so doing, makes it clear that a mortgagor is 
entitled to redeem in all cases of two or more 
mortgages with the same mortgagee.  It has been a 
matter of some doubt whether the right of 
consolidation is confined to mortgages of the same 
property. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) abolishes the right to consolidate. 
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Transfer in 
lieu of 
discharge. 
 
96.  – (1) A mortgagor who is entitled to redeem may, 
subject to compliance with the terms on which the 
mortgagor would be entitled to require a discharge, 
require the mortgagee, instead of discharging the 
mortgage, to assign the mortgage debt and transfer the 
mortgage to any third person, as the mortgagor 
directs. 
 
(2) On the mortgagor so directing, the mortgagee is 
bound to assign and transfer accordingly. 
 
(3) The rights conferred by subsection (1) belong to 
and may be enforced by each incumbrancer or the 
mortgagor notwithstanding any intermediate 
incumbrance, but a requisition of an incumbrancer 
prevails over a requisition of the mortgagor and, as 
between incumbrancers, a requisition of a prior 
incumbrancer prevails over a requisition of a 
subsequent incumbrancer. 
 
(4) This section –  
 
(a) does not apply in the case of a 
mortgagee being or having been in 
possession, 
 
(b) applies notwithstanding any stipulation 
to the contrary. 
 
 
Section 96 re-enacts the substance of section 15 of the 
Conveyancing Act 1881, as amended by section 12 of 
the Conveyancing Act 1882. 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) entitles a mortgagor to require a 
transfer of the mortgage instead of redeeming it. 
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Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) binds the mortgagee to abide by such a 
requisition. 
 
Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) deals with priorities where there are 
several mortgages or incumbrances. 
 
Subsection (4) 
 
Subsection (4) excludes the case where the mortgagee 
is in possession, because such a mortgagee is liable to 
account strictly to the mortgagor.  Subject to that, it is 
not possible to contract out of the mortgagor’s right to 
require a transfer. 
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Court order 
for sale. 
 
97.  – (1) This section applies to any action brought 
by a mortgagor, or any other person entitled to 
redeem the mortgaged property or interested in either 
the mortgage money or the right of redemption, for –  
 
(a) redemption, or 
 
(b) sale, or 
 
(c) the raising and payment in any manner 
of mortgage money, or 
 
(d) any combination of these in the 
alternative. 
 
(2) In any such action the court may, if it thinks fit, 
direct a sale of the mortgaged property on such terms 
as it thinks fit, notwithstanding that any person so 
entitled or interested dissents or does not enter an 
appearance. 
 
(3) Without prejudice to the generality of the court’s 
discretion under subsection (2), it may –  
 
(a) allow any time for redemption or 
payment of the mortgage money, 
 
(b) require lodgment in court of a sum to 
meet the expenses of a sale and to 
secure a performance of its terms, 
 
(c) give directions as to costs and require 
the giving of security for costs, 
 
(d) direct a sale without previously 
determining priorities of incumbrances, 
 
(e) give the conduct of the sale to a 
particular party, 
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(f) make a vesting order conveying the 
mortgaged property to a purchaser or 
appoint a person to make such a 
conveyance, 
 
(g) in the case of an equitable mortgage of 
a legal estate or interest in land, confer 
on a person power to convey that estate 
or interest in the name of the legal 
owner. 
 
 
Section 97 puts in statutory form a jurisdiction which 
probably has long existed under the court’s inherent 
equitable jurisdiction.  A similar statutory jurisdiction 
was contained in section 25 of the Conveyancing Act 
1881, but that section was confined to foreclosure 
actions and did not apply to Ireland because by the late 
19th century foreclosure had ceased to be granted by 
the Irish courts.  However, the jurisdiction may be a 
useful one on occasion, such as where a mortgagor in 
financial difficulties wishes to force a sale on the 
mortgagee in order to reduce mounting debt.  It would 
remain up to the court to decide in its discretion 
whether such a sale was appropriate. 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) makes it clear that the mortgagor or any 
other person entitled to redeem or interested may seek 
an order in a variety of actions. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) gives the court a complete discretion 
whether to make an order for sale and, if so, on what 
terms. 
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Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) amplifies the various directions which 
the court can make in relation to an order for sale. 
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Advances on 
joint account. 
 
9.24 
 
CA 1881, 
s. 61 
 
98.  – (1) Where –  
 
(a) money advanced or owing under a 
mortgage, obligation for payment or 
transfer of a mortgage is expressed to 
be advanced by or owing to two or 
more persons out of money, or as 
money, belonging to them on a joint 
account, or 
 
(b) such a mortgage, obligation or transfer 
is made to two or more persons jointly, 
 
the mortgage money, or other money or money’s 
worth for the time being due to those persons shall, as 
between them and the mortgagor or obligor, be 
deemed to belong to them on a joint account. 
 
(2) The receipt in writing of the –  
 
(a) survivors or last survivor of those 
persons, or  
 
(b) personal representative of the last 
survivor, 
 
is a complete discharge for all money or money’s 
worth for the time being due, notwithstanding any 
notice to the payer of a severance of such joint 
account. 
 
(3) This section takes effect subject to the terms of the 
mortgage, obligation or transfer. 
 
 
Section 98 re-enacts the substance of section 61 of the 
Conveyancing Act 1881. 
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Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) facilitates a mortgagor dealing with two 
or more mortgagees where they advance the money 
jointly or on the basis of a joint account clause. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) enables the mortgagor to obtain a good 
discharge from the survivor, or personal 
representatives of the last survivor. 
 
Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) confirms that the terms of the mortgage 
may vary the statutory provisions. 
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Powers and 
rights 
generally. 
 
9.15 
9.16 
 
Chapter 3 
 
Duties, powers and rights of mortgagee 
 
99.  – (1) Subject to this Part, the powers and rights of 
a mortgagee under sections 100 to 113 –  
 
(a) apply to any mortgage created by deed 
after the commencement of this Part, 
 
(b) vest as soon as the mortgage is created, 
 
(c) do not become exercisable unless–  
 
(i) 28 days’ notice in the 
prescribed form is given to the 
mortgagor, 
 
(ii) it is for the purpose of 
protecting the mortgaged 
property or realising the 
mortgagee’s security. 
 
(2) A mortgagee’s right of foreclosure is abolished. 
 
(3) Except for subsection (1) and as provided 
elsewhere in this Part, the powers and rights conferred 
by sections 100 to 113 take effect subject to the 
express terms of the mortgage. 
 
 
Section 99 lays down some general principles 
governing the mortgagee’s powers and rights, 
particularly the remedies for enforcement of its 
security, as recommended by the CP (see paras 9.13 – 
15 of the CP). 
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Subsection (1) 
 
Paragraph (a) preserves the rule under the 
Conveyancing Act 1881 that the statutory provisions 
apply to all mortgages created by deed, ie, including 
equitable mortgages so created.  Paragraph (b), 
however, alters the law by providing that all the 
mortgagee’s remedies, such as the powers to sell and 
to appoint a receiver, vest as soon as the mortgage is 
created.  Paragraph (c) also alters the law in some 
respects by providing that no remedy, not even the 
right to take possession, can be exercised unless notice 
is given to the mortgagor and it is for the purpose of 
protecting the mortgaged property or realising the 
mortgagee’s security.  It is important to note that these 
provisions are subject to the other provisions of Part 9.  
Thus sections 100 to 113, in dealing with specific 
remedies, lay down various other provisions as to their 
exercise, including provisions as to notice to be given 
to the mortgagor. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) abolishes the remedy of foreclosure as 
recommended by the CP (see para 9.16 of the CP).  
That remedy has not been granted by an Irish court for 
over a century, because of the inherent risk of 
unfairness to the mortgagor. 
 
Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) enables the parties to vary the statutory 
provisions, except where this is specifically 
prohibited.  Such a prohibition relates to the 
provisions in subsection (1). 
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Taking 
possession. 
 
9.16 
 
100.  – (1) Subject to section 101 and notwithstanding 
any stipulation to the contrary in the mortgage, a 
mortgagee shall not take possession of the mortgaged 
property without a court order granted under this 
section, unless the mortgagor consented in writing to 
such taking. 
 
(2) A mortgagee may apply to the court for an order 
for possession of the mortgaged property and on such 
application the court may, if it thinks fit, order that 
possession be granted to the applicant on such terms 
and conditions, if any, as it thinks fit. 
 
(3) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection 
(2), if it appears to the court that the mortgagor is 
likely to be able within a reasonable period to pay any 
sums due under the mortgage or to remedy any other 
breach of obligation arising under it, the court may –  
 
(a) adjourn the proceedings, or 
 
(b) on making an order for possession, or 
at any time before the enforcement of 
such an order, 
 
(i) stay the enforcement, or 
 
(ii) postpone the date for delivery 
of possession, or 
 
(iii) suspend the order, 
 
for such period or periods as it thinks 
reasonable and, if an order is 
suspended, the court may subsequently 
revive it. 
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(4) Any adjournment, stay, postponement or 
suspension under subsection (3) may be made subject 
to such terms and conditions with regard to payment 
by the mortgagor of any sum secured by the mortgage 
or the remedying of any breach of obligation as the 
court thinks fit. 
 
(5) The court may revoke or vary any term or 
condition imposed under subsection (4). 
 
(6) Nothing in this section affects the jurisdiction of 
the court under –  
 
(a) section 62(7) of the Act of 1964, or  
 
(b) sections 7 and 8 of the Act of 1976. 
 
 
Section 100 governs the obtaining by a mortgagee of a 
court order for possession of the mortgaged property.  
Under section 98(1)(c) this cannot generally be sought 
unless prior notice has been given to the mortgagor 
and it is for the purpose of protecting the property or 
realising the mortgagee’s security, eg, as a preliminary 
to exercising the power of sale.  Where emergency 
action is necessary, section 101 may be invoked. 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) prescribes the general requirement to 
obtain a court order. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) confers a wide discretion on the court 
as to whether to make an order and, if it does so, as to 
its terms and conditions. 
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Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) amplifies the court’s discretion to take 
into account the position of the mortgagor as regards 
correcting any default by granting an adjournment, 
stay of enforcement or other order. 
 
Subsection (4) 
 
Subsection (4) amplifies the court’s discretion as to the 
terms and conditions of such supplementary orders. 
 
Subsection (5) 
 
Subsection (5) empowers the court to vary or revoke 
such terms and conditions. 
 
Subsection (6) 
 
Subsection (6) contains savings for the jurisdiction of 
the court under section 62(7) of the Registration of 
Title Act 1964 and sections 7 and 8 of the Family 
Home Protection Act 1976. 
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Abandoned 
property. 
 
9.16 
 
101.  – (1) Where a mortgagee has reasonable grounds 
for believing that –  
 
(a) the mortgagor has abandoned the 
mortgaged property, 
 
(b) urgent steps are necessary to prevent 
deterioration of, or damage to, the 
property or entry on it by trespassers or 
other unauthorised persons, 
 
the mortgagee may apply to the District Court, or any 
court already seised of any application or proceedings 
relating to the mortgaged property, for an order 
authorising the mortgagee to take possession of the 
property on such terms and conditions as the court 
thinks fit. 
 
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection 
(1), an order under this section may specify –  
 
(a) the period during which the mortgagee 
may retain possession of the mortgaged 
property, 
 
(b) works which may be carried out by the 
mortgagee for the purpose of –  
 
(i) protecting the mortgaged 
property, or 
 
(ii) preparing it for sale in exercise 
of the mortgagee’s power under 
section 103, or 
 
(c) costs and expenses incurred by the 
mortgagee which may be added to the 
mortgage debt. 
 
(3) The mortgagee is not liable to account strictly to 
the mortgagor during a period of possession under an 
order under this section. 
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(4) Nothing in this section prejudices the right of a 
mortgagee to apply to the court for an order for sale of 
the mortgaged property. 
 
 
Section 101 implements the recommendation in the 
CP that a mortgagee should be able to take possession 
of the mortgaged property in an emergency, without 
having to give notice to the mortgagor as is generally 
necessary under section 99 (see para 9.16 of the CP).  
The section nevertheless requires the mortgagee to 
obtain a District Court order in such cases, or an order 
from any other court already hearing an application or 
dealing with proceedings relating to the property. 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) entitles the mortgagee to obtain a 
District Court order only if it has reasonable grounds 
for believing that the mortgagor has abandoned the 
property and that, as a consequence, urgent action is 
necessary to protect it from, eg, deterioration or entry 
by trespassers.  The District Court is given a wide 
discretion as to the terms and conditions upon which it 
may grant the order. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) amplifies the discretion as to the terms 
and conditions.  These are in addition to the provisions 
in section 103 which clarify the position of a 
mortgagee which takes possession of the mortgaged 
property. 
 
Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) reverses the general rule where a 
mortgagee takes possession – the liability to account 
strictly to the mortgagor is inappropriate in the 
circumstances which justify an application under 
subsection (1). 
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Subsection (4) 
 
Subsection (4) contains a saving for the much-used 
jurisdiction of the court to grant an order for sale on 
the basis of a declaration that a sum is “well-charged” 
on the property. 
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Mortgagee in 
possession. 
 
9.16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
102.  – (1) Subject to the terms of any order under 
section 100 or section 101 and notwithstanding any 
stipulation to the contrary in the mortgage, a 
mortgagee in possession shall take steps within a 
reasonable time to exercise the power to –  
 
(a) sell the mortgaged property under 
section 103, or 
 
(b) if it is not appropriate to sell, lease the 
property under section 114 and use the 
rent and any other income received 
from the lessee to reduce the mortgage 
debt, including interest accrued or 
accruing. 
 
(2) Section 34 of the Act of 1957 does not apply to a 
mortgagee who takes possession of land under a court 
order under section 100 or section 101. 
  
 
Section 102 implements the recommendation in the 
CP that a mortgagee should only take possession in 
order to realise its security or to protect the property 
(see para 9.16 of the CP).  For this reason the Bill does 
not include an equivalent of the power in section 
19(1)(iv) of the Conveyancing Act 1881 of a 
mortgagee in possession to cut and sell timber on the 
mortgaged property, without apparently having to use 
the proceeds to reduce the mortgage debt. 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) requires the mortgagee in possession 
either to proceed within a reasonable time to sell the 
property or, if a sale is not appropriate, to let it and use 
the income to reduce the debt, including interest. 
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Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) removes what may be regarded as an 
anomaly in the law, that a mortgagee in possession, 
who is usually liable to account strictly to the 
mortgagor, is also regarded as being in “adverse” 
possession and so may become the owner of the 
property by barring the mortgagor’s right to redeem 
under the Statute of Limitations 1957. 
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Power of 
sale. 
 
9.16 
9.24 
 
CA 1881,  
ss. 19(1)(i), 
20, 21(4), 
21(6) and 
21(7) 
 
CA 1911, s. 
5(2) 
 
103.  – (1) Subject to sections 104 to 109, and 
notwithstanding any stipulation to the contrary in the 
mortgage or any agreement for the mortgage, a 
mortgagee or any other person for the time being 
entitled to receive, and give a discharge for, the 
mortgage money, may sell, or concur with any other 
person in selling, the mortgaged property provided -  
 
(a) following service of notice on the 
mortgagor, or on one of two or more 
mortgagors, requiring payment of the 
mortgage money, default has been 
made in payment of that money, or part 
of it, for three months after such 
service, or 
 
(b) some interest under the mortgage or, in 
the case of mortgage money payable by 
instalments, some instalment 
representing interest or part interest and 
part capital is in arrears and unpaid for 
two months after becoming due, or 
 
(c) there has been a breach by the 
mortgagor, or some person concurring 
in the mortgage, of some other 
provision contained in the mortgage or 
any statutory provision, including this 
Act, other than a covenant for payment 
of the mortgage money or interest. 
 
(2) A mortgagee is not answerable for any involuntary 
loss resulting from the exercise or execution of the 
power of sale under this Part, of any trust connected 
with it or of any power or provision contained in the 
mortgage. 
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(3) Once the power of sale becomes exercisable, the 
person entitled to exercise it may demand and recover 
from any person, other than a person having in the 
mortgaged property an estate or interest in priority to 
the mortgage, all deeds and documents relating to the 
property, or its title, which a purchaser under the 
power of sale would be entitled to demand and 
recover. 
 
 
Section 103 specifies when the power of sale can be 
exercised. It re-enacts the substance of various 
provisions in the Conveyancing Acts 1881 and 1911. 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) re-enacts the substance of sections 
19(1)(i), 20 and 21(4) of the 1881 Act. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) re-enacts the substance of section 21(6) 
of the 1881 Act, as amended by section 5(2) of the 
1911 Act. 
 
Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) re-enacts the substance of section 21(7) 
of the 1881 Act. 
 
 277
Incidental 
powers. 
 
9.24 
 
CA 1881, 
s. 19(1)(i) 
 
CA 1911, s. 4 
 
104.  – (1) Incidental to the power of sale are the 
power to –  
 
(a) sell the mortgaged property –  
 
(i) subject to prior charges or not,  
 
(ii) either together or in lots,  
 
(iii) by public auction, tender or 
private contract,  
 
(iv) with a reserve price or subject 
to a right to bid up to that price 
at an auction, 
 
(v) subject to such conditions 
respecting title, evidence of 
title, restrictions on user of land 
or other matter as the mortgagee 
or  other person selling thinks 
fit, 
 
(b) rescind any contract for sale and to 
resell, 
 
(c) impose or reserve or make binding by 
covenant or otherwise, on the sold part 
of the mortgaged property, or on the 
unsold part, any restriction or 
reservation with respect to building on 
or other user of land, or with respect to 
mines and minerals, for the purpose of 
their more beneficial working, or with 
respect to any other matter, 
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(d) sell the mortgaged property, or all or 
any mines and minerals apart from the 
surface, with or without –  
 
(i) imposing any easement, right or 
privilege connected with 
building or other purposes on 
the sold part of the mortgaged 
property or the unsold part, 
 
(ii) an exception or reservation of 
all or any of the mines and 
minerals in or under the 
mortgaged property and with or 
without a grant, reservation or 
imposition of powers of 
working or other powers for or 
connected with mining 
purposes, in relation to or on the 
sold part of the mortgaged 
property or the unsold part. 
 
(2) In this section “mortgaged property” includes any 
part of such property. 
 
 
Section 104 re-enacts the substance of section 19(1)(i) 
of the Conveyancing Act 1881 and section 4 of the 
Conveyancing Act 1911. 
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Duties in 
selling. 
 
9.16 
 
 
105.  – (1)In the exercise of the power of sale 
conferred by this Part, or any express power of sale, 
the mortgagee, or any receiver or other person acting 
on behalf of the mortgagee, shall, notwithstanding any 
stipulation to the contrary in the mortgage or any 
agreement for the mortgage, ensure as far as is 
reasonably practicable that the mortgaged property is 
sold at the best price reasonably obtainable. 
 
(2) Within 28 days after completion of the sale, the 
mortgagee shall serve a notice in the prescribed form 
on the mortgagor containing particulars of the sale.  
 
(3) A mortgagee who, without reasonable excuse, is in 
breach of the obligation imposed by subsection (2) is 
guilty of an offence. 
 
(4) Nothing in this section affects the operation of any 
rule of law relating to the duty of a mortgagee to 
account to a mortgagor. 
 
(5) This section does not apply to a building society 
within the meaning of the Act of 1989. 
 
(6) In subsection (2) “mortgagor” includes a person 
last known to the mortgagee to be the mortgagor, but 
does not include a person to whom, without the 
knowledge of the mortgagee, any of the rights or 
liabilities of the mortgagor under the mortgage have 
been assigned. 
 
 
Section 105 extends to all mortgages, as recommended 
by the CP, the statutory duty to obtain the best price 
reasonable obtainable for the mortgaged property on 
sale imposed on building societies by section 26 of the 
Building Societies Act 1989 (See para 9.16 of the CP) 
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Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) imposes the statutory duty not only on 
the mortgagee, but also on any receiver or other 
person selling on the mortgagee’s behalf. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) imposes an additional duty on the 
mortgagee to notify the mortgagor of the outcome of 
the sale – if the mortgagor considers that there has 
been a breach of duty resulting in a loss (eg, a sale 
below market value) he or she may sue for damages 
(see section 107(2)). 
 
Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) renders it an offence by the mortgagee 
not to serve the notice of the completed sale under 
subsection (2), unless there is a reasonable excuse. 
 
Subsection (4) 
 
Subsection (4) has a saving for the general duty of a 
mortgagee to account for the proceeds of sale – see 
section 109 of the Bill. 
 
Subsection (5) 
 
Subsection (5) excludes application of the section to 
building societies which are governed by section 26 of 
the Building Societies Act 1989. 
 
Subsection (6) 
 
Subsection (6) defines “mortgagor” for the purposes of 
serving the notice of the particulars of completion of 
the sale. 
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Conveyance 
on sale. 
 
9.16 
9.24 
 
CA 1881, 
s. 21(1)  
 
106.  – (1)A mortgagee exercising the power of sale 
conferred by this Part, or an express power of sale, has 
power to convey the property specified in subsection 
(2) –  
 
(a) freed from all estates, interests and 
rights in respect of  which the mortgage 
has priority, 
 
(b) subject to all estates, interests and 
rights which have priority to the 
mortgage. 
 
(2) Subject to subsections (4)(b) and (5), the 
conveyance –  
 
(a) vests the estate or interest which has 
been mortgaged in the purchaser, 
 
(b) extinguishes the mortgage, but without 
prejudice to any personal liability of the 
mortgagor not discharged out of the 
proceeds of sale, 
 
(c) vests any fixtures or personal property 
included in the mortgage and the sale in 
the purchaser. 
 
(3) The conveyance may be made in the name of the 
mortgagor or other person in whom the estate or 
interest being conveyed is vested immediately before 
the date of the sale. 
 
(4) This section –  
 
(a) applies to a sale by a sub-mortgagee so 
as to enable the sub-mortgagee to 
convey the head-mortgagor’s property 
in the same manner as the mortgagee, 
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(b) does not apply to a mortgage of part 
only of a leasehold estate unless –  
 
(i) there is no rent reserved by the 
lease or any rent which is 
reserved, 
 
(ii) any lessee’s covenants, 
 
have been apportioned as regards the 
property mortgaged. 
 
(5) Where the mortgaged property comprises 
registered land, the conveyance is subject to section 51 
of the Act of 1964. 
 
 
Section 106 makes provision for giving effect to a sale 
by the mortgagee, taking account of the fact that under 
section 92 the mortgagee will no longer have the 
mortgagor’s estate or interest conveyed to it, but will 
have a charge only.  It provides a power, nevertheless, 
as recommended by the CP, to vest that estate or 
interest in the purchaser, without the need for a power 
of attorney (see para 9.16 of the CP). 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) provides the power to convey, 
applicable to both the statutory and an express power 
of sale. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) provides that the mortgagee’s 
conveyance will vest the mortgagor’s estate or interest 
in the purchaser and extinguish the mortgage.  It will 
also vest any fixtures and chattels included in the 
mortgage and the sale. 
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Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) enables the conveyance to be made in 
the name of the mortgagor or other person in whom 
the estate or interest is vested immediately before the 
sale. 
 
Subsection (4) 
 
Subsection (4) applies the section to sub-mortgages, 
but provides that it does not apply to a mortgage of 
part only of a leasehold estate unless an apportionment 
of rent and other lessee covenants has been made.  
This is to ensure that the purchaser takes on 
obligations confined to the land being purchased. 
 
Subsection (5) 
 
Subsection (5) applies the usual provision relating to 
registered land, that a conveyance is not effective until 
registered in the Land Registry. 
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Protection of 
purchasers. 
 
9.16 
9.24 
 
CA 1881,  
s. 21(2)  
 
CA 1911, 
s. 5(1) 
 
107.  – (1) Where a conveyance is made in professed 
exercise of the power of sale conferred by this Part, 
the title of the purchaser is not impeachable on the 
ground that –  
 
(a) no case had arisen to authorise the sale, 
or 
 
(b) due notice had not been given, or 
 
(c) the power was otherwise improperly 
exercised, 
 
and a purchaser is not, either before or on conveyance, 
required to see or inquire whether the power is 
properly exercised. 
 
(2) Any person who suffers loss as a consequence of 
an unauthorised or improper exercise of the power of 
sale has a remedy in damages against the person 
exercising the power. 
 
 
Section 107 re-enacts the substance of provisions in 
section 21(2) of the Conveyancing Act 1881, as 
amended by section 5(1) of the Conveyancing Act 
1911. 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) ensures that a purchaser from a 
mortgagee exercising the statutory power of sale 
obtains a good title to the property conveyed.  It also 
confirms that a purchaser does not have to make 
inquiries about its exercise in order to obtain such a 
title. 
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Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) provides that the remedy of a person 
who suffers any loss as a consequence of an improper 
or irregular exercise of the power (eg a mortgagor who 
is aggrieved that the property has been sold for well 
below its market value) is to sue the mortgagee for 
damages. 
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Mortgagee’s 
receipts. 
 
9.24 
 
CA 1881, 
s. 22 
 
108.  – (1) Subject to subsection (2), the receipt in 
writing of a mortgagee is a conclusive discharge for 
any money arising under the power of sale conferred 
by this Part, or for any money or securities comprised 
in the mortgage, or arising under it, and a person 
paying or transferring the same to the mortgagee is not 
required to inquire whether any money remains due 
under the mortgage. 
 
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply where the purchaser 
has actual knowledge of an impropriety or irregularity 
in the exercise of the power of sale or knowingly 
participates in such an exercise. 
 
(3) Subject to subsection (4), money received by a 
mortgagee under the mortgage or from the proceeds of 
securities comprised in it shall be applied as section 
109 requires as regards money arising from a sale 
under the power of sale conferred by this Part. 
 
 
Section 108 re-enacts the substance of section 22 of 
the Conveyancing Act 1881, but with one change 
recommended by the CP (see para 9.24 of the CP). 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) renders the mortgagee’s receipt now a 
“conclusive” (rather than simply “sufficient”) 
discharge for the purchaser, unless the purchaser has 
actual knowledge of the improper or irregular exercise 
of the power of sale, or knowingly participates in it. 
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Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) reiterates that there is no discharge for 
a purchaser who knowingly participates in an 
improper sale by a mortgagee. 
 
Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) provides that money received under the 
mortgage is to be applied in the same way as the 
proceeds of a sale by the mortgagee, as prescribed by 
section 109. 
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Application 
of proceeds 
of sale. 
 
9.24 
 
CA 1881, 
s. 21(3) 
 
109.  – (1) Money received by the mortgagee which 
arises from the sale of mortgaged property shall be 
applied in the following order –  
 
(a) in discharge of prior incumbrances to 
which the sale was not made subject, if 
any, or payment into court of a sum to 
meet any such prior incumbrances, 
 
(b) in payment of all costs properly 
incurred by the mortgagee as incident 
to the sale or any attempted sale or 
otherwise, 
 
(c) in discharge of the mortgage money, 
interest and costs, and other money, if 
any, due under the mortgage. 
 
(2) Any residue of the money so received shall be held 
on trust by the mortgagee to be paid to the person, if 
any, who –  
 
(a) would, but for the sale, be the 
mortgagee secured on the property sold 
next in priority after the mortgagee 
selling, or 
 
(b) is otherwise authorised to give receipts 
for the money so received, or, if there is 
no such person, 
 
(c) is the mortgagor. 
 
(3) Where, in accordance with subsection (2), the 
mortgagee gives effect to the trust of the residue by 
paying it to a subsequent mortgagee, the latter shall 
apply it in accordance with subsections (1)(c) and (2) 
and similar duties attach to each subsequent 
mortgagee who receives any of the residue. 
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(4) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b), costs 
payable include the costs properly incurred of 
recovering and receiving the money or securities, and 
of conversion of securities into money, instead of 
those incident to the sale. 
 
 
Section 109 re-enacts the substance of section 21(3) of 
the Conveyancing Act 1881, but amplifies it. 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) specifies what the mortgagee must do 
initially with the proceeds of a sale, eg, discharging 
his or her mortgage and prior mortgages. 
 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) specifies what should be done with any 
residue of the proceeds after compliance with 
subsection (1) – ultimately the mortgagor is entitled to 
this after all other incumbrancers have been paid. 
 
Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) makes it clear that if the residue is 
passed on to other mortgagees, each of them must 
comply with the section. 
 
Subsection (4) 
 
Subsection (4) clarifies what costs may be met out of 
the proceeds of sale. 
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Appointment 
of receiver. 
 
9.16 
9.24 
 
CA 1881,  
ss. 19(i), (iii), 
24(1) – (7) 
 
110.  – (1) Subject to the same proviso relating to 
exercise of the power of sale set out in section 
103(1)(a) to (c), the mortgagee or other person may 
appoint, by writing, such person as the mortgagee or 
that other person thinks fit to be a receiver of –  
 
(a) the income of the mortgaged property, 
or 
 
(b) if the mortgaged property comprises an 
interest in income, or a rentcharge or 
other annual or other periodical sum, 
that property. 
 
(2) A receiver appointed under subsection (1) is the 
agent of the mortgagor, who is solely responsible for 
the receiver’s acts or defaults, unless the mortgage 
provides otherwise. 
 
(3) The receiver may –  
 
(a) demand and recover all the income to 
which the appointment relates, by 
action or otherwise, in the name either 
of the mortgagor or mortgagee, to the 
full extent of the estate or interest 
which the mortgagor could dispose of, 
 
(b)  give effectual receipts accordingly for 
such income, 
 
(c) exercise any powers delegated by the 
mortgagee or other person to the 
receiver. 
 
(4) Any power delegated to the receiver shall be 
exercised in accordance with this Part. 
 
(5) A person paying money to the receiver is not 
concerned to inquire whether any case has happened 
to authorise the receiver to act. 
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(6) The receiver may be removed, and a new receiver 
may be appointed, by the mortgagee or the other 
person in writing. 
 
(7) The receiver may retain out of any money 
received, for remuneration and in satisfaction of all 
costs incurred as receiver, a commission at –  
 
(a) such rate, not exceeding five per cent 
on the gross amount of all money 
received, as is specified in the 
appointment, or, if no such rate is so 
specified, 
 
(b) the rate of five per cent on that gross 
amount, or 
 
(c) such other rate as the court thinks fit to 
allow, on application made by the 
receiver for that purpose. 
 
(8) The receiver shall, if so directed in writing by the 
mortgagee, insure to the extent, if any, to which the 
mortgagee might have insured and keep insured 
against loss or damage by fire, flood, storm, tempest 
or other perils commonly covered by a policy of 
comprehensive insurance, out of the money received, 
any property comprised in the mortgage, whether 
affixed to land or not, which is of an insurable nature. 
 
 
Section 110 re-enacts the substance of sections 
19(1)(iii) and 24 of the Conveyancing Act 1881, which 
deal with the power to appoint a receiver. 
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Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) confers a statutory power exercisable 
on the same basis as the power of sale under section 
103, ie, where notice has been served on the 
mortgagor and he or she has nevertheless continued in 
default on mortgage payments or other breach of the 
mortgage terms. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) confirms the long-established rule that, 
although the receiver is appointed by the mortgagee, 
he or she is nevertheless regarded as the agent of the 
mortgagor. 
 
Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) specifies the receiver’s powers, 
including those delegated by the mortgagee. 
 
Subsection (4) 
 
Subsection (4) makes it clear, as recommended by the 
CP, that any such delegated powers must be exercised 
in accordance with the statutory provisions.  Thus if 
the receiver sells the mortgaged property on behalf of 
the mortgagee, the duty to get the best price 
reasonably obtainable under section 105 must be 
complied with (see para 9.16 of the CP). 
 
Subsection (5) 
 
Subsection (5) protects a purchaser dealing with the 
receiver. 
 
Subsection (6) 
 
Subsection (6) provides for removal of a receiver and 
appointment of a new one. 
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Subsection (7) 
 
Subsection (7) deals with the receiver’s remuneration. 
 
Subsection (8) 
 
Subsection (8) provides for directions as to insuring 
the property to be given by the mortgagee. 
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Application 
of income 
received. 
 
9.16 
9.24 
 
CA 1881, 
s. 24(8) 
 
111.  – (1) Subject to subsection (2) and section 
112(5), the receiver shall apply all income received in 
the following order –  
 
(a)  in discharge of all rents, taxes, rates 
and outgoings affecting the mortgaged 
property, 
 
(b) in discharge of all annual sums or other 
payments, and the interest on all 
principal sums, which have priority to 
the mortgage under which the receiver 
is appointed, 
 
(c) in payment of the receiver’s 
commission, 
 
(d) in payment of premiums on insurance, 
if any, payable under this Part or the 
mortgage, 
 
(e)  in defraying the cost of repairs as 
directed in writing by the mortgagee, 
 
(f) in payment of interest accruing due in 
respect of any principal money due 
under the mortgage, 
 
(g) in or towards discharge of the principal 
sum, if so directed in writing by the 
mortgagee. 
 
(2) The mortgagee may, by direction in writing –  
 
(a) waive particular categories of 
payments, or particular payments to be 
made under such categories, or 
 
(b) vary the order of categories of 
payments, 
 
to be made under subsection (1). 
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(3) The residue (if any), of any money so received 
after making the payments specified in subsection (1) 
shall be paid by the receiver to the person who, but for 
the possession of the receiver, would have been 
entitled to receive that money or who is otherwise 
entitled to the mortgaged property. 
 
 
Section 111 re-enacts the substance of section 24(8) of 
the Conveyancing Act 1881, but with some 
adjustments recommended by the CP (see para 9.24 of 
the CP). 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) sets out the order of payments to be 
made by the receiver and makes it clear that, unless 
the mortgagee directs otherwise, this order must be 
followed. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) makes it clear, as recommended by the 
CP (see paras 9.16 and 9.24 of the CP), that it is open 
to the mortgagee to waive payments or vary their 
order by giving written directions to this effect. 
 
Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) makes provision for disposal of any 
surplus left over after making the subsection (1) 
payments. 
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Insurance. 
 
9.24 
 
CA 1881, 
ss. 19(1)(ii), 
23 
 
112.  – (1) A mortgagee may insure and keep insured 
any building, effects or other property of an insurable 
nature, whether affixed to the land or not, which forms 
part of the mortgaged property. 
 
(2) The insurance shall be for the full reinstatement 
cost of repairing any loss or damage arising from fire, 
flood, storm, tempest and other perils commonly 
covered by a policy of comprehensive insurance. 
 
(3) The mortgagee may give a good discharge for any 
money payable under any such insurance, but, subject 
to subsection (4), so much of such money as exceeds 
the sums due under the mortgage shall be dealt with 
by the mortgagee as if it were the proceeds of a sale of 
the mortgaged property. 
 
(4) The mortgagee may require any money received 
under such or other insurance of the mortgaged 
property to be applied –  
 
(a) by the mortgagor in making good loss 
or damage covered by the insurance, or 
 
(b) in or towards the discharge of the 
mortgage money. 
 
 
Section 112 re-enacts the substance of sections 
19(1)(i) and 23 of the Conveyancing Act 1881, which 
deal with insurance of the mortgaged property. 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) confers on the mortgagee the power to 
insure, but altered to reflect the modern practice of 
having cover for full reinstatement cost, as 
recommended by the CP (see para 9.24 of the CP).  
This is all subject to the terms of the mortgage or 
separate agreement with the mortgagor – see section 
99(3). 
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Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) confirms that, unless agreed otherwise, 
the insurance should be for full reinstatement cost. 
 
Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) provides that the mortgagee can give a 
good discharge for insurance money and any surplus 
must be held on trust in the same way as surplus 
proceeds of a sale under section 108. 
 
Subsection (4) 
 
Subsection (4) empowers the mortgagee to require 
insurance money to be devoted to repairs or put 
towards the mortgage debt. 
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Further 
advances. 
 
9.18 
 
113.  – (1) Where a mortgage is expressed to be 
created on any property for the purpose of securing 
(whether with or without present advances) future 
advances, the mortgagee is entitled, in priority to any 
subsequent mortgagee, to payment of any sum due in 
respect of any such future advance, provided –  
 
(a) the mortgagee had no express notice in 
writing of the subsequent mortgage 
when the advance was made, or 
 
(b) whether or not the mortgagee had such 
notice, the mortgage imposes an 
obligation to make such future 
advances, or 
 
(c) an arrangement has been made to this 
effect with the subsequent mortgagee. 
 
 
(2) In subsection (1) “future advances” includes sums 
from time to time due on a current account and all 
sums which, by agreement or in the course of business 
between the parties, are considered to be advances on 
the security of the mortgage. 
 
(3) From the commencement of this Part and 
notwithstanding any stipulation to the contrary, 
tacking in the form commonly known as tabula in 
naufragio is abolished. 
 
(4) This section –  
 
(a) applies to mortgages made before or 
after the commencement of this Part, 
 
(b) does not affect any priority acquired by 
tacking before that commencement or 
in respect of advances made in 
accordance with of subsection (1)(a) 
and (c). 
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Section 113 amends the law of tacking as 
recommended by the CP (see para 9.18 of the CP). 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) states existing law in paragraphs (a) 
and (c) but reverses the common law position in 
paragraph (b), ie, where there is an obligation to make 
further advances, these may still be tacked even 
though the mortgagee has notice of the subsequent 
mortgage rather than, as appears to be the situation 
under existing law, such notice relieving the 
mortgagee of the obligation. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) defines “further advances” in 
accordance with current banking practice. 
 
Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) abolishes the controversial method 
known as tabula in naufragio, which was abolished by 
section 7 of the Vendor and Purchaser Act 1874, but 
restored by section 73 of the Conveyancing Act 1881.  
It very rarely operates in practice because the Registry 
of Deeds and Land Registry systems militate against 
it. 
 
Subsection (4) 
 
Subsection (4) applies the new provisions to all 
mortgages whenever created, but saves existing 
priorities where mortgagees have relied upon the areas 
of law being changed by section 113, ie, abolition of 
the form tabula in naufragio and subsection (1)(b). 
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Leasing 
powers. 
 
9.24 
 
CA 1881, 
s. 18 
 
CA 1911,  
s. 3 
 
Chapter 4 
 
Leases and surrenders of leases 
 
114.  – (1) A mortgagor of land, while in possession, 
may, as against every other incumbrancer, lease the 
land with the consent in writing of the mortgagee 
which shall not be unreasonably withheld. 
 
(2) A lease made without such consent is voidable by 
a mortgagee who establishes that –  
 
(a) the lessee had actual knowledge of the 
mortgage at the time of the granting of 
the lease, 
 
(b) the granting had prejudiced the 
mortgagee. 
 
(3) A mortgagee of land while in possession or, after 
the mortgagee has appointed a receiver and so long as 
the receiver acts, the receiver, may, as against all prior 
incumbrancers, if any, and the mortgagor, lease the 
land provided –  
 
(a) it is for the purpose of –  
 
(i) preserving the value of the land, 
or 
 
(ii) protection of the mortgagee’s 
security, or 
 
(iii) raising income to pay interest 
due under the mortgage or 
otherwise reduce the debt,  
or 
 
(b) it is otherwise an appropriate use of the 
land pending its sale, or 
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(c) the mortgagor consents in writing, or 
 
(d) the court in any action relating to the 
mortgaged property makes an order 
permitting such lease. 
 
(4) In this section “mortgagor” does not include an 
incumbrancer deriving title from or under the original 
mortgagor. 
 
(5) This section –  
 
(a) applies only where the mortgage is 
created after the commencement of this 
Part, 
 
(b) takes effect subject to the terms of the 
mortgage. 
 
 
Section 114 recasts the provisions of section 18 of the 
Conveyancing Act 1881, as amended by section 3 of 
the Conveyancing Act 1911, as recommended by the 
CP (see para 9.24 of the CP). 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) now confers a general power of leasing 
on the mortgagor, but subject to the consent of the 
mortgagee, which cannot be unreasonably withheld. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) clarifies the position where the 
mortgagor leases without consent.  The mortgagee can 
set it aside only if prejudiced and the lessee was aware 
of the existence of the mortgage. 
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Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) now confines the power of a mortgagee 
in possession (or where the mortgagee’s receiver is in 
possession, the receiver) to lease in the situations 
listed, such as for the purpose of preserving the value 
of the land or protecting the security or raising income 
pending a sale.  Otherwise it may be done where the 
mortgagor consents or the court sanctions it. 
 
Subsection (4) 
 
Subsection (4) re-enacts the provision in section 3(10) 
of the Conveyancing Act 1911. 
 
Subsection (5) 
 
Subsection (5) makes it clear that the new provisions 
apply only to mortgages created after the 
commencement of the new Act and, even then, subject 
to variation by the terms of the mortgage. 
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Exercise of 
leasing 
powers. 
 
115.  – (1) A lease to be granted under section 114 
shall –  
 
(a) be in writing,  
 
(b) reserve the best rent which can 
reasonably be obtained, taking into 
account any premium or other capital 
sum paid by the lessee and other 
relevant circumstances, 
 
(c) be otherwise granted on the best terms 
that can reasonably be obtained and 
accords with good commercial practice, 
 
and execution of the lease by the lessor shall be 
sufficient evidence of execution and delivery of the 
lease. 
 
(2) A purported lease which fails to comply with 
subsection (1) is void. 
 
(3) A duplicate of such lease shall be executed by the 
lessee and delivered to the lessor.  
 
(4) In the case of a lease by the mortgagor, the 
mortgagor shall, within one month after making the 
lease, deliver to the mortgagee or, where there are 
more than one, the mortgagee first in priority, a copy 
of the lease duly executed by the lessee. 
 
(5) Failure by the mortgagor to comply with 
subsection (4) does not affect the validity of the lease. 
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(6) Where a premium or other capital sum is paid by 
the lessee and the lease is granted by the –  
 
(a) mortgagor, it, or, where it exceeds the 
mortgage debt, so much of it as is 
required for the purpose, shall be 
applied in or towards discharge of that 
debt, whether or not the date for 
redemption has arrived, 
 
(b) mortgagee, it shall be applied as if it 
comprised the proceeds of a sale in 
accordance with section 109. 
 
 
Section 115 amplifies section 114 and again recasts 
the provisions in the 1881 and 1911 Acts. 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) requires the lease to be in writing and 
granted on proper commercial terms.  A failure to 
comply will render the lease void under subsection 
(2). 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) confirms that non-compliance with 
subsection (1) renders the purported lease void 
 
Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) requires a duplicate to be executed by 
the lessee and delivered to the lessor, but the lessor’s 
execution of the lease is sufficient evidence of 
compliance under subsection (1). 
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Subsection (4) 
 
Subsection (4) requires the mortgagor to deliver within 
one month to the mortgagee a copy of any lease the 
mortgagor grants, but under subsection (5) non-
compliance by the mortgagor does not invalidate the 
lease. 
 
Subsection (5) 
 
Subsection (5) confirms that non-compliance with 
subsection (4) does not invalidate the lease. 
 
Subsection (6) 
 
Subsection (6) provides for what is to happen where 
the lease is granted at a premium or other capital sum 
is paid by the lessee. 
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Surrenders. 
 
CA 1911, 
s. 3 
 
116.  – (1) Subject to subsection (6), the power of 
accepting surrenders of leases conferred by this 
section shall be exercised only for the purpose of 
granting a new lease under section 114 or as 
authorised by the terms of the mortgage. 
 
(2) A mortgagor or mortgagee in possession (or a 
mortgagee who has appointed a receiver who is still 
acting) may accept a surrender of a lease granted by 
them, whether the surrender relates to the whole or 
part only of the land leased. 
 
(3) On such a surrender –  
 
(a) the term of the new lease shall not be 
less than the unexpired term which 
would have subsisted under the 
surrendered lease if it had not been 
surrendered, 
 
(b) the rent reserved by the new lease shall 
not be less than the rent which would 
have been payable under the 
surrendered lease if it has not been 
surrendered, 
 
(c) where part only of the land has been 
surrendered –  
 
(i) the rent reserved by the new 
lease shall not be less than is 
required to make the aggregate 
rents payable under the 
remaining lease and new lease 
not less than the rent payable 
under the surrendered lease if 
no partial surrender had been 
accepted, 
 
(ii) any other modifications of the 
original lease shall comply with 
section 115. 
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(4) A purported acceptance of a surrender where 
subsection (3) is not complied with is void. 
 
(5) Where a surrender involves payment of a premium 
or consideration other than the agreement to accept 
surrender, the surrender is void unless, in the case of a 
surrender to–  
 
(a) the mortgagor, the consent of 
incumbrancers, or 
 
(b) a second or subsequent mortgagee, the 
consent of any prior incumbrancer, 
 
is obtained. 
 
(6) This section takes effect subject to the terms of the 
mortgage or any separate agreement in writing 
between the mortgagor and mortgagee. 
 
 
Section 116 re-casts the provisions in section 3 of the 
Conveyancing Act 1911 dealing with surrender of 
leases in order to grant new leases. 
 
Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) confines the provisions to surrenders 
for such purposes, but under subsection (6) the parties 
may vary this in the mortgage or by separate 
agreement. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) confers the power to accept surrenders, 
including partial ones. 
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Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) lays down terms for such surrenders 
designed to ensure that the terms of the new leases are 
just as good as those in the surrendered lease. 
 
Subsection (4) 
 
Subsection (4) renders a purported acceptance void if 
subsection (3) is not complied with. 
 
Subsection (5) 
 
Subsection (5) requires consents by interested parties 
where a premium or other consideration is being paid 
for acceptance of the surrender. 
 
Subsection (6) 
 
Subsection (6) confirms that the parties may modify 
the statutory provisions. 
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PART 10 
 
JUDGMENT MORTGAGES 
 
Part 10 implements the recommendation in the CP that 
the Commission’s earlier Consultation Paper on 
Judgment Mortgages (LRC CP 30 – 2004) should be 
implemented (see Chapter 10).  The result is that the 
pre-1922 statutes dealing with such mortgages will be 
replaced with substantial amendment.  Because of that 
replacement, Part 10 also re-enacts the substance of 
the provisions in those statutes for registration and re-
registration of a judgment and registration of a lis 
pendens if it is to bind a purchaser of land.  In view of 
the numerous requirements relating to these matters, 
the substantive provisions in Part 10 have been drafted 
on the basis that the detailed requirements as to 
registration, including forms which should be used in 
future, will be prescribed by statutory instrument.  
LRC CP 30 – 2004 drew attention to the many 
difficulties created by the complicated requirements 
set out in the substantive provisions of the pre-1922 
statutes.  It is also much easier to amend regulations to 
respond to new developments, such as the introduction 
of eConveyancing. 
 
The one matter referred to in the earlier Consultation 
Paper which is not dealt with in Part 10 relates to 
severance of a joint tenancy.  This is dealt with by 
section 29(3) of this Bill. 
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Interpretation 
of Part 10. 
 
 
10.02 
 
JMA 1858, 
ss. 3 and 4 
PART 10 
 
JUDGMENT MORTGAGES 
 
117. – In this Part, unless the context otherwise 
requires –  
 
“creditor” includes –  
 
(a) an authorised agent and any 
person authorised by the court 
to register a judgment mortgage 
on behalf of a judgment 
creditor, 
 
(b) one or some only of several 
creditors who have obtained the 
same judgment; 
 
“judgment” includes any decree or order of 
any court of record. 
 
 
Section 117 re-enacts parts of sections 3 and 4 of the 
Judgment Mortgage (Ireland) Act 1858. It provides a 
definition of “creditor” and “judgment” which saves 
having to repeat, as the Judgment Mortgage (Ireland) 
Acts 1850 and 1858 do, references to the different 
kinds of court order. 
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Registration 
of judgments. 
 
10.02 
 
JMA 1850,  
s. 4 
 
118. – A judgment does not bind a purchaser of land 
for valuable consideration or a creditor unless and 
until it is registered in the prescribed manner in the 
Judgments Office within five years before the –  
 
(a) conveyance to the purchaser, or 
 
(b) debt of the creditor accrued, 
 
and re-registered in the prescribed manner at the 
expiration of every successive five years. 
 
 
Section 118 re-enacts the substance of section 4 of the 
Judgment Mortgage (Ireland) Act 1850.  As explained 
in the introductory note to Part 10, the detailed 
requirements as to the method of registration will be 
set out in regulations made under section 5 of this Bill. 
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Registration 
of lis 
pendens. 
 
JMA 1850, 
s. 5 
119. – A lis pendens does not bind a purchaser of land 
for valuable consideration, without actual knowledge 
of it, unless it is registered in the prescribed manner in 
the Judgments Office within five years before the 
making of the conveyance to the purchaser. 
 
 
Section 119 re-enacts the substance of section 5 of the 
1850 Act.  Again provision is made for regulations to 
govern the detailed requirements of registration in the 
Judgments Office. 
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Registration 
of judgment 
mortgages. 
 
10.02 
 
JMA 1850, 
s. 6 
 
 
 
 
1964, No. 16 
 
120. – (1) A creditor who has obtained a judgment 
against a person may register a judgment mortgage 
against that person’s land in accordance with this 
section. 
 
(2)  A judgment mortgage shall be registered in the 
Registry of Deeds or Land Registry, as appropriate. 
 
(3) For the avoidance of doubt it is, and always has 
been, the case that –  
 
(a)  there is no requirement to re-register a 
judgment mortgage in order to maintain 
its validity or enforceability against the 
land or a purchaser of the land, 
 
(b) a judgment mortgage may be registered 
–  
 
(i) notwithstanding that the 
judgment debtor has obtained 
an order of the court granting a 
stay of execution, unless the 
court orders otherwise, 
 
(ii) against the interest of a 
beneficiary under a trust for sale 
of land. 
 
 
Section 120 provides for registration of judgment 
mortgages against the judgment debtor’s land.  It 
replaces the confusing and convoluted provisions in 
section 6 of the Judgment Mortgage (Ireland) Act 
1850, which have caused much difficulty in practice, 
as discussed in LRC CP 30 – 2104 (see chapter 2).  
“Land” is defined by section 3 of the Bill and includes 
any estate or interest in land. 
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Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) confers the general right to register a 
judgment mortgage, without restriction, other than 
compliance with the section’s formalities.  This is as 
recommended by the Commission (see para 4.08). 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) simplifies the requirements by making 
provision for registration in the Registry of Deeds or 
Land Registry, depending on whether it relates to 
unregistered or registered land.  The precise method of 
registration will be prescribed by regulation in 
accordance with section 5(5).  It is envisaged that the 
information and other matters to be included in this 
form will be simplified in accordance with the various 
recommendations made by the Commission, 
especially as regards unregistered land (see paras 2.27, 
2.34, 2.40, 4.11, 4.14, 4.16, 4.18 and 4.19 of the CP).  
Such simplification has already been achieved for 
registered land by section 71 of the Registration of 
Title Act 1964.  Making provision for regulations also 
facilitates future adjustments which may be necessary 
or appropriate for introduction of eConveyancing, 
again as recommended by the Commission (see para 
4.37). 
 
Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) clarifies a number of matters as 
recommended by the Commission (see paras 2.50, 
2.75, 4.21, 4.36 and 4.38 of the CP).  Paragraph (a) 
confirms that the provisions in section 4 of the 1850 
Act requiring re-registration of the judgments every 
five years (see section 118 of this Bill) do not apply, 
and never have applied, to judgment mortgages.  
Paragraph (b)(i) confirms that a creditor may still 
register a judgment mortgage even though the 
judgment debtor has been granted a stay of execution, 
unless the court orders otherwise.  
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Paragraph (b)(ii) confirms that a judgment mortgage 
may still be registered against the equitable interest of 
a beneficiary under a trust for sale of land, even 
though under the doctrine of conversion that interest is 
deemed to be personalty (ie, an interest in the proceeds 
of sale rather than an interest in land).  Until the actual 
conversion takes place, the trustees are still holding 
land for the beneficiary and creditors should be able to 
move against it. 
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Company 
debtor. 
 
 
121. – The Act of 1963 is amended as follows: 
 
(a) the insertion after section 99(2)(i) of –  
 
“(j) a charge created by registration 
of a judgment mortgage 
affecting any property of the 
company.”, 
 
(b) the substitution in section 102(1) of 
“prescribed form” for “affidavit”. 
 
 
Section 121 amends the Companies Act 1963, as 
recommended by the Commission (see para 2.73).  
The consequence of these changes is that a judgment 
mortgage is treated like other charges which must be 
notified to the registrar of companies under section 99 
of that Act, ie, a failure so to notify renders the charge 
void against the liquidator and any creditor of the 
company. 
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Effect of 
registration. 
 
10.02 
 
JMA 1850, 
ss. 7 and 8 
 
 
 
 
10.04 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JMA 1850, 
s. 8 
 
122.  – (1) Registration of a judgment mortgage under 
section 120 creates in respect of the judgment debtor’s 
land a mortgage by deed for the purposes of section 99 
and, subject to this Part, confers powers, rights and 
duties on the judgment creditor as mortgagee 
accordingly. 
 
(2) The judgment mortgage is subject to any equity or 
incumbrance affecting the judgment debtor’s land, 
whether registered or not, at the time of its 
registration. 
 
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2), an equity or 
incumbrance does not include any claim lodged in 
court against a judgment debtor’s land which is not a 
family home within the Family Home Protection Act 
1976, unless the claim seeks an order specifically 
against that land. 
 
(4) Subject to section 284(2) of the Act of 1963 and 
section 51 of the Act of 1988, a judgment creditor who 
has registered a judgment mortgage has the same 
priority and security as any other mortgagee of land. 
 
(5) Section 77 applies to a voluntary conveyance of 
land made by the judgment debtor before the creditor 
registers a judgment mortgage against that land under 
section 120 as if the creditor were a purchaser for the 
purposes of section 77. 
 
 
Section 122 replaces sections 7 and 8 of the 1850 Act 
and states the effect of registration of a judgment 
mortgage. 
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Subsection (1) 
 
Subsection (1) confirms that the registered judgment 
mortgage creates the equivalent of a mortgage by deed 
which attracts all the powers, rights and duties of an 
ordinary mortgage created by deed over the debtor’s 
estate or interest in the land.  This automatically 
attracts the various powers, rights and duties conferred 
by Chapter 3 of Part 9 of the Bill, as recommended by 
the Commission in LRC CP 30 – 2004 (see paras 4.27 
– 4.30, 4.39, 5.06, 5.17 and 5.21).  It also means that 
the provisions in sections 7 and 8 of the Family Home 
Protection Act 1976 apply (see section 100(6) of this 
Bill).  The qualification stated in subsection (1) 
concerns provisions like subsection (2), which reflect 
that there is one important difference from an ordinary 
mortgage, ie, a judgment mortgage is created by the 
unilateral action of the judgment creditor (mortgagee) 
and so is, in that respect, more like a voluntary 
transaction than one created for consideration. 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) confirms that a judgment mortgage is 
subject to prior equities or incumbrances, a rule 
already stated for registered land by section 71(4) of 
the Registration of Title Act 1964.  Since it has the 
effect of a mortgage by deed under Part 9 of the Bill, 
there is no need to state that it has, like such a charge, 
priority over later mortgages or incumbrances (see 
LRC CP 30 – 2004, paras 4.22 – 4.25). 
 
 319
Subsection (3) 
 
Subsection (3) implements the recommendation in the 
CP based on the suggestion in the case of AS v GS and 
AIB as to what should constitute a prior equity to 
which a judgment mortgage is subject (see paras 10.03 
– 10.04).  This was that, unless the land is a family 
home, a claim lodged in court should not constitute 
such an equity unless it specifically seeks an order 
against the land. 
 
Subsection (4) 
 
Subsection (4) implements the recommendation in 
LRC CP 30 – 2004 that a judgment mortgagee should 
have the same priority as an ordinary mortgagee where 
the debtor becomes insolvent.  This is subject to the 
general rule that any such security created shortly 
before the insolvency is void against the Official 
Assignee or liquidator of a company.  Consequential 
amendments to the legislation governing insolvency 
are set out in Schedule 1, Part II of this Bill.  Such 
amendments are also necessary as a result of the 
abolition of the sheriff’s right to seize leasehold land 
contained in section 124 of this Bill. 
 
Subsection (5) 
 
Subsection (5) re-enacts the substance of section 8 of 
the Judgment Mortgage (Ireland) Act 1850.  That 
section refers to the provisions in the Conveyancing 
Act (Ireland) 1634 which will be replaced by section 
77 of this Bill. 
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Discharge of 
judgment 
mortgages. 
 
JMA 1850, 
s. 9 
 
JMA 1858, 
s. 5 
 
123. – Registration in the Registry of Deeds in the 
prescribed manner of a certificate of satisfaction of a 
judgment in respect of which a judgment mortgage has 
been registered extinguishes the judgment mortgage. 
 
 
Section 123 re-enacts the substance of section 9 of the 
Judgment Mortgage (Ireland) Act 1850 and section 5 
of the Judgment Mortgage (Ireland) Act 1858.  It 
relates to unregistered land.  Discharge of judgment 
mortgages on registered land is dealt with by section 
65 of the Registration of Title Act 1964. 
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Abolition of 
power to 
seize 
leasehold 
estate. 
 
10.06 
 
124. – The power of the sheriff, or of other persons 
entitled to exercise the sheriff’s powers, to seize a 
leasehold estate under a writ of fieri facias or other 
process of execution is abolished. 
 
 
Section 124 implements the recommendations in the 
CP that the power of the sheriff to seize leasehold land 
should be abolished.  An earlier report of the Law 
Reform Commission pointed out that this remedy was 
rarely invoked, surrounded by uncertainties and of 
very doubtful efficacy as a method of enforcing debts 
against land.  It was suggested that judgment creditors 
should be left to use the more appropriate remedy of a 
judgment mortgage: see Report on Debt Collection: 
(1) the Law Relating to Sheriffs (LRC 27 – 1988) 
(paras 54 – 57).  The CP also pointed out that its 
abolition would simplify conveyancing by removing 
the need to make searches in the Sheriff’s Office. 
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PART 11 
 
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 
 
Part 11 implements Chapter 12 of the CP, which 
recommended implementation of the Commission’s 
Report on Title to Adverse Possession of Land (LRC 
67 – 2002) and various other reports touching on the 
subject of that doctrine and the application of the 
Statute of Limitations 1957 to land transactions. 
 
Part 11 also makes important adjustments to take 
account of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, which was incorporated in Irish Law by the 
Human Rights Commission Act 2000.  These are 
designed to preserve the doctrine of adverse 
possession in its longstanding role of providing a 
mechanism for resolving disputed claims to ownership 
of land and uncertainties relating to title.  At the same 
time they attempt to achieve compatibility with 
Convention principles by preventing loss of ownership 
through mere oversight or inadvertence, without any 
compensation or opportunity to retrieve the situation.  
The provisions in question draw on the analogy of the 
acquisition of easements and profits à prendre by 
prescription.  The provisions governing prescriptive 
claims set out in Part 7 of this Bill require the claim to 
be sanctioned by a court order which must be 
registered in the Registry of Deeds or Land Registry 
(see especially section 36). 
 
It should also be noted that the doctrine of adverse 
possession is amended by section 102 of this Bill. 
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Amendment 
of s. 17 of the 
Act of 1957. 
 
125. – Section 17(2) of the Act of 1957 is amended by 
deletion of “, without a lease in writing,” wherever it 
appears. 
 
 
Section 125 implements the recommendation in the 
Commission’s Report Land Law and Conveyancing 
Law: (1) General Proposals (LRC 30 – 1989) (para. 
55) that the distinction between oral and written 
periodic tenancies drawn by section 17(2) of the 1957 
Act should be abolished. 
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Amendment 
of s. 18 of the 
Act of 1957. 
 
126. – Section 18 of the Act of 1957 is amended by 
addition of the following subsection: 
 
“(5) For the purposes of this section a person is 
in adverse possession when exercising physical 
control of land for that person’s own benefit 
and in a way which is inconsistent with the 
right to possession of the owner of the land.” 
 
 
Section 126 implements the recommendation in LRC 
30 – 1989 (para 53) that it should be made clear, as it 
was in the case of Murphy v Murphy [1980] IR 183 
(see also Durack Manufacturing Ltd. v Considine 
[1987] IR 677), but then doubted in other cases, that 
adverse possession should be based upon the physical 
control and intention to possess of the claimant in a 
way inconsistent with the “paper” owner’s title, and 
not on the intention of the paper owner.  A similar 
view has been taken more recently in England by the 
House of Lords in J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham 
[2003] All ER 865. 
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Amendment 
of s. 24 of the 
Act of 1957. 
 
127. – Section 24 of the Act of 1957 is amended by 
substitution of –  
 
(a) “after” for “at”; 
 
(b) “vested in any person in whose favour 
a court order is registered under section 
130 of the Land and Conveyancing Act 
2005, but not otherwise.” for 
“extinguished”. 
 
 
Section 127 amends section 24 of the 1957 Act to 
make it accord with the new provisions governing 
acquisition of title to land by adverse possession 
contained in section 130 of this Bill. 
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Amendment 
of s. 32 of the 
Act of 1957. 
 
128. – Section 32 of the Act of 1957 is amended by 
the addition of the following subsection: 
 
“(3) In the case of a judgment mortgage, the 
right of action accrues from the date the 
judgment is marked and not when a judgment 
mortgage is registered on foot of it.” 
 
Section 128 clarifies the operation of section 32 of the 
1957 Act in the case of a judgment mortgage, as 
recommended in the Commission’s Consultation 
Paper on Judgment Mortgages (LRC CP 30 – 2004) 
(see paras 2.51 – 2.52). 
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Application 
by adverse 
possessor for 
vesting order. 
 
129. – (1) Subject to section 130, any person (“the 
applicant”) who claims the benefit of the period of 
limitation relating to an action by the owner (“the 
owner”) to recover land under the Act of 1957 may 
apply to the court for an order (a “vesting order”) to 
vest title to the land in the applicant. 
 
(2) Unless it is proved to the contrary, the court shall 
assume that the title to be vested in the applicant is the 
fee simple estate in possession, but without prejudice 
to any claims to the land which are not barred under 
the Act of 1957. 
 
(3) Legal title does not vest in the applicant until the 
vesting order is registered in the Land Registry. 
 
(4) The following section is substituted for section 49 
of the Act of 1964: 
 
“49. – Where a court order is made under 
section 131 of the Land and Conveyancing Act 
2005 the Registrar shall give effect to it.” 
 
(5) Section 24 applies to a vesting under subsection (2) 
as if it had been effected by a conveyance. 
 
Section 129 introduces new law to govern a claim by a 
person to have acquired title to land by adverse 
possession.  In future, as with a claim to an easement 
or profit à prendre by prescription, such a claim will 
have to be made in court.  Section 130 deals with court 
applications and the making of a vesting order in 
favour of the applicant in appropriate cases, which 
must then be registered in the Land Registry so as to 
make the state of the title clear as to the future.  The 
view has been taken that since there is a court order 
for the vesting, this should be registered in the Land 
Registry even in the case of unregistered land.  This 
will be one way of extending registration of titles. 
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Subsection (1) 
Subsection (1) entitles any person who claims that the 
limitation period under the 1957 Act has run in his or 
her favour to apply for a vesting order.  This provision 
for a positive vesting of the title in the adverse 
possessor, instead of the current purely negative 
“extinguishment” of the “paper” owner’s title, 
implements the main recommendation in the 
Commission’s Report on Title by Adverse Possession 
of Land (LRC 67 – 2002) (Chapter 3). 
 
Subsection (2) 
 
Subsection (2) covers cases where it is not known 
what title was held by the dispossessed owner.  The 
court is to assume that it is the fee simple, but without 
prejudice to any claims to the land which are unbarred.  
Thus if, in fact, the dispossessed owner held a 
leasehold interest only, it would remain open to the 
landlord to establish his or her claim to the land. 
 
Subsection (3) 
Subsection (3) makes it clear that legal title will not 
vest in an applicant who obtains a court order until it 
is registered in the Land Registry.  Until that is done, 
the order will vest as equitable interest only in the 
applicant. 
Subsection (4) 
Subsection (4) adjusts the Registration of Title Act 
1964 to the new law. 
Subsection (5) 
 
Subsection (5) implements the recommendation in 
LRC 67 – 2002 to apply section 6 of the 
Conveyancing Act 1881 (replaced by section 74 of this 
Bill). 
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Making of 
vesting order. 
 
130. – (1) On an application under section 129 the 
court may cause such –  
 
(a) notices to be displayed or served, or 
 
(b) inquiries and searches to be made, or 
 
(c) advertisements to be placed, or 
 
(d) statutory declarations or other evidence 
to be furnished, 
 
as to the ownership or possession of the land as it 
thinks fit. 
 
(2) A vesting order shall be made under section 129 
only if the court is satisfied that –  
 
(a) the applicant (including a predecessor) 
has been in adverse possession 
throughout the period of limitation, and  
 
(b) either –  
 
(i) whether from the lack of 
response to notices, inquiries, 
searches or advertisements 
displayed, served, made or 
placed, from statutory 
declarations or other evidence 
furnished, under subsection (1) 
or otherwise, it is reasonable to 
assume that the owner has 
abandoned the land or is 
unlikely to be found, or 
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(ii) owing to a mistaken assumption 
as to the position of the 
boundary between the 
applicant’s land and the owner’s 
land, the applicant has, 
throughout the period of 
limitation, encroached upon part 
of the owner’s land reasonably 
believing it to be part of the 
applicant’s land, or  
 
(iii) where the application relates to 
land comprised in a deceased 
person’s estate, it is reasonable 
to assume that an order in 
favour of the applicant would 
accord with the deceased’s 
wishes, or 
 
(iv) in any other case, in the interest 
of settling the title to land in the 
fairest manner, it is appropriate 
to make the order, 
 
subject, in any such case, if the court 
thinks fit, to payment by the applicant 
of a sum of money to the owner by way 
of compensation for loss, defrayment of 
costs and expenses or otherwise. 
 
Section 130 deals with the making of vesting orders in 
favour of an adverse possessor. 
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Subsection (1) 
Subsection (1) requires the service of notices, the 
making of inquiries and searches or the placement of 
advertisements to ensure, so far as is practicable, that 
the paper owner is warned of the application for a 
vesting order.  He or she may then make 
representations to the court and, in particular, argue 
that the requirements of subsection (2) have not been 
met.  This procedure is one way of ensuring 
compliance with the European Convention.  It also 
requires the furnishing of evidence of the adverse 
possession, by way of statutory declarations or 
otherwise. 
Subsection (2) 
Subsection (2) makes further changes in the current 
law, again to ensure compliance with the European 
Convention.  Paragraph (a) retains the current 
requirement that a claimant, in order to succeed, must 
establish adverse possession for the requisite 
limitation period.  Clarification of the concept of 
adverse possession is provided by the amendment 
introduced by section 126 of this Bill. 
Paragraph (b) limits the situations in which an 
adverse possessor will, in future, succeed in acquiring 
title.  Subparagraph (i) covers cases where the paper 
owner has abandoned the land or is unlikely to be 
found.  Subparagraph (ii) deals with cases where a 
genuine mistake has been made over the boundary 
between properties and encroachment by one 
neighbour on another’s land has occurred.  These are 
both typical and traditional examples of the doctrine of 
adverse possession being used to “quiet titles”.  
Subparagraph (iii) deals another, with the very 
common case where the doctrine is used to settle 
ownership of a deceased farmer’s land.  
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Often one member of the family has been left to run 
the farm, while the others have long since left to 
pursue their lives elsewhere, sometimes overseas. 
Frequently no grant of probate or letters of 
administration are taken out and the one member of 
the family who has stayed on the farm (often looking 
after the deceased and the deceased’s spouse in their 
final years) will continue farming it regardless of such 
formalities.  The issue of ownership will only arise 
when some transaction is sought to be carried out, eg, 
borrowing on the security of the farm or selling off 
part of the land. 
 Subparagraph (iv) is a residual category where the 
court may consider that it is appropriate to apply the 
doctrine.  
However, mindful of Convention principles and, 
indeed, constitutional ones, the court may, in any case 
where it intends to make an order vesting title to the 
land in the adverse possessor, make it subject to 
payment of compensation, if the court considers this 
appropriate to the case in question.  It would be 
unlikely to be appropriate in cases coming within 
subparagraph (b)(i), but might be in other cases. 
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Leasehold 
land. 
 
131. – (1) Where it is established that land vesting 
under section 129 was held, immediately before such 
vesting, for a leasehold estate, the person in whom it 
vests may serve a notice on the immediate landlord or 
any superior landlord, requiring such landlord to 
furnish –  
 
(a) where the land is held under –  
 
(i) a lease, a copy of the lease, or 
 
(ii) an oral tenancy, a written 
statement of its terms, 
 
(b) particulars of any incumbrance 
affecting the land, 
 
(c) the name and address of the person for 
the time being entitled to the next 
superior interest in the land and of the 
owner of any such incumbrance. 
 
(2) Where the existence, identity or whereabouts of 
any person on whom a notice may be served under 
subsection (1) cannot be established by taking 
reasonable measures, a notice may be served instead 
on any person in receipt of any rents in respect of the 
land. 
 
(3) A notice served under subsection (2) may require a 
recipient of the notice to furnish the name and address 
of the person to whom any such rent received is paid 
and any other information within the recipient’s 
possession or procurement which is capable of 
assisting in the identification of the terms of lease or 
tenancy. 
 
(4) If any person fails or refuses to comply with a 
notice served under this section, the person who 
served it may apply to the court for an order 
compelling compliance. 
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(5) If the existence, identity or whereabouts of any 
person on whom a notice may be served under 
subsections (1) or (2) cannot be established by taking 
reasonable measures, the person entitled to serve the 
notice may cause an advertisement in the prescribed 
form to be published in a daily newspaper circulating 
in the area in which the land is situated or such other 
areas, including an area outside the State, as appears to 
that person to be appropriate in all the circumstances. 
 
(6) Where a person has served a notice or caused an 
advertisement to be placed under this section, that 
person’s interest in the land is not subject to forfeiture 
(whether by action or otherwise), ejectment or any 
other proceedings arising out of the lease or tenancy 
before the expiration of three months after the date of 
service on that person of a copy of the lease or other 
information requested in the notice or advertisement. 
 
Section 131 implements the recommendations in LRC 
67 – 2002 for dealing with the application of the new 
law of adverse possession in cases involving leasehold 
land.  The point is that the effect of vesting the lease 
or tenancy in the adverse possessor is that the latter 
becomes subject to the terms of the lease or tenancy.  
It is important, therefore, that he or she knows what 
those terms are. 
Subsection (1) 
Subsection (1) makes provision for service of a notice 
on the landlord in order to discover the terms of the 
lease or tenancy. 
Subsection (2) 
Subsection (2) enables a notice to be served on 
whoever receives the rent, if the landlord is not doing 
so. 
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Subsection (3) 
Subsection (3) requires the person who receives the 
rent to furnish what information he or she has. 
Subsection (4) 
Subsection (4) makes provision for the court to compel 
compliance with notices served under subsections (1) 
and (2). 
Subsection (5) 
Subsection (5) makes provision for newspaper 
advertisements if it is not known on whom a notice 
could be served. 
Subsection (6) 
Subsection (6) protects the adverse possessor from 
action by the landlord until it is known what the terms 
are which must be complied with. 
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Liability of 
tenant. 
 
132. – Where land vesting under section 129 was held, 
immediately before such vesting, for a leasehold 
estate, then in respect of the period beginning on the 
date of such vesting -  
 
(a) the person in whom the title so vested 
(“the tenant”) is solely liable to the 
person holding the immediate or 
superior interest (“the landlord”) in 
respect of any terms of the lease or 
tenancy agreement which is capable of 
running with the title so vested, 
notwithstanding that no notice was 
given to, or consent obtained from, the 
landlord, 
 
(b) the landlord is solely liable to the 
tenant in respect of any term of the 
lease or tenancy agreement in so far as 
it is capable of benefiting the tenant. 
 
(2) Where the title so vesting relates to part only of the 
land held under the lease or tenancy agreement, this 
subsection applies only to such part and any rights and 
liabilities shall be apportioned among the tenant, 
landlord and the person holding title to the other part 
as the parties agree or, in default of agreement, as the 
court determines. 
 
Section 132 deals with cases where the adverse 
possessor acquires title to leasehold land only. 
Subsection (1) 
Subsection (1) treats the vesting in the adverse 
possessor as the equivalent of an assignment of the 
lease or tenancy, notwithstanding the lack of notices to 
or consent by the landlord. 
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Subsection (2) 
Subsection (2) provides for apportionment of rights 
and liabilities where part only of the land is vested. 
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Mortgaged 
land. 
 
133. – (1) Where land vesting under section 129 is 
subject to a mortgage, the person in whom it vests 
may tender any amount of the money remaining due 
under the mortgage to the person entitled to receive it 
and that person is obliged to receive it in satisfaction 
of the amount due. 
 
(2) Subsection (1) does not affect the –  
 
(a) mortgagee’s security under the 
mortgage for all monies owing under 
the mortgage, 
 
(b) personal liability of the dispossessed 
mortgagor for the mortgage debt. 
 
(3) The person in whom the land vests subject to any 
mortgage may serve notice on any person entitled to 
receive the mortgage money, requesting that person, 
within four weeks of the date of service, to furnish –  
 
(a) particulars of the terms of the 
mortgage, 
 
(b) particulars of any amount of mortgage 
money already paid, 
 
(c) the date of the last payment made under 
the mortgage, 
 
(d) particulars of any amount outstanding 
under the mortgage. 
 
(4) If any person fails or refuses to comply with a 
notice served under subsection (2), the person who 
served it may apply to the court for an order 
compelling compliance. 
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(5) In hearing such an application the court shall have 
regard to all the circumstances of the case, including 
any right of confidentiality or privacy of the 
mortgagor. 
 
 
Section 133 deals with the situation where the land 
acquired by the adverse possessor is mortgaged.  He 
may wish to pay off some or all of the debt to avoid 
repossession by the mortgagee. 
Subsection (1) 
Subsection (1) entitles the adverse possessor to pay the 
debt and requires the mortgagee to receive the money 
in satisfaction of it. 
Subsection (2) 
Subsection (2) makes it clear that otherwise the 
mortgage is unaffected and the dispossessed 
mortgagor remains liable for the debt. 
Subsection (3) 
Subsection (3) is designed to enable the adverse 
possessor to obtain information about the mortgage. 
Subsection (4) 
Subsection (4) enables the court to order compliance 
with a notice requesting information. 
Subsection (5) 
Subsection (5), however, requires the court to have 
regard to any right of confidentiality or privacy of the 
mortgagor.
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Sections 82 
and 83. 
 
SCHEDULE 2 
 
COVENANTS IMPLIED IN CONVEYANCES 
 
PART I 
EXTENT OF THE BURDEN OF COVENANTS 
 
1. In this Schedule, unless either the context 
otherwise requires or the contrary is expressed, the 
covenantor’s liability in respect of any covenant 
extends to the acts or omissions only of persons 
within any of the following classes: 
 
(i) the covenantor and any person 
conveying by the covenantor’s 
direction; 
 
(ii) any person through whom the 
covenantor derives title; 
 
(iii) any person (including a mortgagee) 
who either holds or has held a 
derivative title from the covenantor for 
less than the estate or interest vested in 
the covenantor or who holds or has 
held such a derivative title from any 
predecessor in title of the covenantor; 
 
(iv) any person who holds or has held in 
trust for the covenantor. 
 
2. It is not a breach of a covenant contained in this 
Schedule where the conveyance by the covenantor 
was made expressly subject to the act, matter or thing 
which, but for this paragraph, would or might have 
caused such a breach. 
 
3. The covenantor has no liability for any defect in 
the title of which it is proved that the covenantee had 
actual knowledge before the making of the contract to 
convey or the making of the conveyance (whichever 
is the earlier). 
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PART II 
IMPLIED COVENANTS 
 
Paragraph 1 
 
Class 1 Conveyances 
 
Covenants implied in a conveyance (other than a 
mortgage) for valuable consideration of an estate or 
interest in land (other than a leasehold estate) made 
by a person who is expressed to convey “as beneficial 
owner”. 
 
(1)  That the covenantor has the right to convey the 
subject-matter of the conveyance, save that the 
covenantor’s liability is only in respect of any acts or 
omissions of the covenantor or persons within class 
(ii) of paragraph 1 of Part I. 
 
(2) That the person to whom the conveyance is 
made will quietly enjoy the subject-matter of the 
conveyance without disturbance from any person 
within any class in paragraph 1 of Part I. 
 
(3) That the subject-matter of the conveyance is 
free from all claims, demands, estates, incumbrances 
and interests. 
 
(4) That the covenantor will, at the covenantor’s 
own cost, take such action as may be necessary for 
the better assuring of the subject-matter of the 
conveyance as may from time to time be reasonably 
required by the person to whom the conveyance is 
made and the persons deriving title under that person. 
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Paragraph 2 
 
Class 2 Conveyances 
 
Covenants implied in a conveyance (other than a 
mortgage) for valuable consideration of a leasehold 
estate made by a person who is expressed to convey 
“as beneficial owner”. 
 
(1) to (4) Covenants (1) to (4) in paragraph 1. 
 
(5) That the lease which created the subject-matter 
of the conveyance is at the time of the conveyance 
valid and effectual. 
 
(6) That the rent reserved by the lease has up to 
the time of the conveyance been paid and the 
covenants expressly or impliedly contained in the 
lease have been performed and observed by the 
lessee. 
 
The covenantor’s liability in respect of covenants (5) 
and (6) is restricted to –  
 
(a) any acts or omissions of the covenantor 
or persons within class (ii) of paragraph 
1 in Part I, and 
 
(b) as regards the covenants mentioned in 
covenant (6), breaches caused by such 
acts and omissions the consequences of 
which could not be discovered on 
reasonable inspection of the property 
conveyed. 
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Paragraph 3 
 
Class 3 Conveyances 
 
Covenants implied in a conveyance comprising a 
mortgage of land (other than land held for a leasehold 
estate) made by a person who is expressed to convey 
“as beneficial owner”. 
 
(1) to (4) Covenants (1) to (4) in paragraph 1. 
 
Those covenants are subject to the following 
variations, that is to say, -  
 
(a) liability in respect of any breach of the 
covenants extends to the acts or 
omissions of any person whether or not 
that person is within the classes of 
person set out in paragraph 1 of Part I; 
 
(b) covenant (2) (for quiet enjoyment) is 
not implied against any mortgagor until 
the mortgagee has lawfully entered into 
possession of the property conveyed. 
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Paragraph 4 
 
Class 4 Conveyances 
 
Covenants implied in a conveyance comprising a 
mortgage of leasehold land made by a person who is 
expressed to convey “as beneficial owner”. 
 
(1) to (4)  Covenants (1) to (4) in paragraph 1, 
subject to the variations mentioned in paragraph 3. 
 
(5)  That the grant or lease which created the 
estate out of which the subject-matter of the 
conveyance is created is at the time of the conveyance 
valid and effectual and that the rent reserved by the 
grant or lease has up to that time been paid and that 
the covenants expressed or implied in the grant or 
lease have been performed and observed. 
 
(6)  That the covenantor will from time to time, so 
long as any money remains owing on the security of 
the property conveyed, pay the rent reserved by the 
grant or lease and perform and observe the covenants 
in it and will indemnify the person to whom the 
conveyance is made in respect of any consequences 
of the breach of this covenant. 
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Paragraph 5 
 
Class 5 Conveyances 
 
Covenant implied in a conveyance made by a person 
who is expressed to convey “as trustee”, “as 
mortgagee”, “as personal representative” or under 
an order of the court. 
 
That the covenantor has not, by virtue of any act or 
omission of the covenantor, caused the title to the 
estate or interest conveyed to be liable to be 
impeached through the existence of any incumbrance 
or rendered the covenantor unable to convey that 
estate or interest in the manner in which it is 
expressed to be conveyed. 
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PART III 
ADDITIONAL IMPLIED COVENANTS FOR 
LEASEHOLDS 
 
Paragraph 1 
 
Class 6 Conveyances 
 
Additional covenants implied in a conveyance (other 
than a mortgage) for valuable consideration of (a) the 
entirety of land comprised in a lease, or (b) part of 
the land comprised in a lease, subject to a part of the 
rent reserved by the lease which has been, or is by the 
conveyance, apportioned with the consent of the 
lessor. 
 
(1) That the assignee, or the person deriving title 
under the assignee, will at all times, from the date of 
the conveyance or other date stated in it, duly pay all 
rent becoming due under the lease creating the estate 
for which the land is conveyed, or, as the case may 
be, such part of such rent as has been apportioned to 
the land conveyed, and observe and perform all the 
covenants, contained in it and on the part of the lessee 
to be observed and performed, so far as they relate to 
the land conveyed. 
 
(2)  That the assignee will at all times, from that 
date, indemnify the conveying parties and their 
estates from and against all claims, costs and 
proceedings on account of any omission to pay the 
rent, or the part of the rent so apportioned, or any 
breach of any of the covenants, so far as they relate to 
the land conveyed. 
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Paragraph 2 
 
Class 7 Conveyances 
 
Additional covenants implied in a conveyance (other 
than a mortgage) for valuable consideration of part 
of the land comprised in a lease, subject to a part of 
the rent reserved by the lease which has been, or is by 
the conveyance, apportioned without the consent of 
the lessor. 
 
(1) In every case That the assignee will at all 
times, from the date of the conveyance, or other date 
stated in it, pay the apportioned rent and observe and 
perform all the covenants (other than the covenant to 
pay the entire rent) contained in the lease creating the 
estate for which the land is conveyed, and on the part 
of the lessee to be observed and performed, so far as 
the same relate to the land conveyed; and also will at 
all times from that date indemnify the conveying 
parties and their respective estates, from and against 
all claims, costs and proceedings on account of any 
omission to pay the apportioned rent or any breach of 
any of such covenants. 
 
(2)  Where the conveying party is expressed to 
convey “as beneficial owner” That the assignor, or 
the persons deriving title under the assignor, will at 
all times, from the date of the conveyance, or other 
date stated in it, pay the balance of the rent (after 
deducting the said apportioned rent and any other 
rents similarly apportioned in respect of land not 
retained) and observe and perform all the covenants 
(other than the covenant to pay the entire rent) 
contained in the lease and on the part of the lessee to 
be observed and performed so far as they relate to the 
land demised (other than the land comprised in the 
conveyance) and remaining vested in the assignor; 
and also will at all times, from that date, indemnify 
the assignee, and the assignee’s estate, from and
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  against all claims, costs and proceedings on account 
of any omission to pay the balance of the rent or any 
breach of any of such covenants. 
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